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INTRODUCTION
The ideals of the Revolution had still not settled into
the mainstream of American life by 1830.
Americans were slaves.

Over two million black

Burgeoning industry was sucking low-

income farm-people into the cities and exploiting them.

The

best of the virgin lands were held by the banks and railroads.
For a great number of the new Republic's first-born, meaningful
freedom and equality had yet to be attained.

Many among them

were eager to transform America's institutions to fit the
ideals of the democracy.

Some of these young people, centering

about Concord and Boston, accepted the title "Transcendentalist."
In its hoped-for reformation for society this group felt
a special intellectual challenge from the elder scholars who
scoffed at the possibility of ordinary persons establishing
moral and religious truths for themselves.

According to the

older, and even ancient, tradition the directives

or

God's will

indeed God's very existence could be reliably ascertained only
by a specially educated elite, trained to interpret Scriptures
and to think correctly.
Those of the Transcendentalist temper disagreed.

Since

nature was the expression of God's will, the more freely one
could attend to one's nature the more sure his moral judgments;
moreover since nature was accessible to all, God's will must
l
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be open to all.

The Transcendentalists set about to articulate

a new approach to judging reality, one in which the discovery
of God's will--and indeed God's existence--would be accessible
to everyone.

Orestes Brownson, Theodore Parker and others tried

to formulate this approach.

And however their formulations

varied they all agreed implicitly that it was crucial this new
approach should be able to confirm God's existence.

For just

as their elders, the Transcendentalists (and many of their
associates) had willingly inherited the Puritan belief that
moral precepts derived their authority as expressions of God's
will.

To deny God's existence would destroy the binding force

of moral law and hence completely deflate their hopes for mass
institutional reform.
Ralph Waldo Emerson also attempted to articulate the new
metaphysical viewpoint, and from it to develop a broadly
accessible approach to God's existence that might serve to
ground a morals befitting the New Democracy.

This study con-

cerns his treatment of the question of God's existence.
propositions serve as major focal-points.

Three

First, Emerson's

thought is genuinely and creatively philosaphieal.

Second, his

philosophical procedure arises within the ordinary experience
of living and may be called an incipient pragmatism.

Third,

following this procedure Emerson concluded that the evidences
for belief arising in ordinary experience show that God exists.
Disappointment with the teachings of traditional Christianity led him into the path of philosophy.

His earliest concern
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had been to find suitable norms for moral perfection within
traditional Christianity but he concluded that since Christianity supposed nature was corrupt its claims regarding moral
behavior and reality in general, including God's existence,
were worthless.

From revelation he turned to reason.

Tradi-

tional empiricism and idealism seemed serious efforts at developing a viable approach to nature but he decided both tell
short because they too began with myopic assumptions about
nature.

To find answers at all he would have to work out his

own approach to philosophy.

Only then coul1 he argue to God's

existence and ground his moral ·theory.

Chapter I and II trace

his critique of traditional Christianity and philosophy to this
conclusion.
His new approach was total reliance on the ordinary experience of natural living.
spontaneity.

It had two phasest simplicity and

The first attempts to relieve man from cultural

preconceptions which hinder total reliance on natural living.
The second immerses man totally in the spontaneous directionalities of nature.

Spontaneous living provides him with true

beliefs about the world, and--important for his argument tor
God's existence--his norms for ascertaining whether his beliefs
are true.

The next two Chapters study simplicity and sponta-

neity, the phases of his philosophical procedure.
We should explain in passing that he is not a philosopher
in the usual academic sense, for his is not a technical philosophy.

His language is controlled but not literal.

His thought
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is logically disciplined but he makes little study of logic as a
discipline--nor does he concern himself at any length with whether his reasoning fits into the accepted canons of logic.

His

philosophy is more a.kin to that of Dante, Goethe, Kierkegaard,
Nietzche, Camus, and perhaps Sartre.

He is nearer as he himself

claims to the ancient Greek "lovers of wisdom", Socrates and
Plato.

For Emerson, the important issues pertain to human exis-

tence; they arise as genuine problems in actual human living or
not at all.

His concepts, his procedures, his modes of expres-

sion are entirely decided by that concern.
The last two Chapters deal specifically with his thinking
on God's existence.

He believed that his philosophical proce-

dure (loosely designated as "the moral sentiment") established
that God, the primal boundless source of creativity, existed.
In brief, since belief in God arose within and was confirmed by
ordinary experience according to the moral sentiment, then God
must be real.

Chapter V discusses the meaning he gives to the

term God; Chapter VI turns to the argument itself.

CHAPTER I
EMERSON'S CRITIQUE OF TRADITIONAL CHRISTIANITY
Emerson decided that natural intelligence alone, not a
specially historically given Christian revelation, could properl;
ground moral and religious beliefs.

He came to this conclusion

during his efforts to discover an adequate standard for moral
perfection within Christian revelation.

This chapter deals with

the stages of his thinking which led him to this decision.
In the earliest stage he sought the moral standard within
the

New

England sects, Calvinism and Unitaria.nism.

Unsatisfied,

he then tried to locate it within some as yet undiscovered nonsectarian core of Christian revelation.
phases.

This state had two

For a while he tried arguing that this core was a

unique deposit given in history. but soon concluding it was far
more pertinent to establish the existence of this unique revelation in the present, he abandoned the historical quest.

During

this second stage he attempted to turn the Unitarian arguments
for the authenticity of Christian revelation to his own purposes.
These arguments, from miracles and the moral sense, receive
special attention in this chapter.

It was through his efforts

to use them to argue to the authentic core of Christian revelation that he came to the final stage of his critique: that if
5
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moral and religious truths were to be discovered at all, only
natural intelligence would find them.
F..arly Influence of Calvinism and Unitarianism
Ralph Waldo Emerson entered Harvard College in 1817 perplexed.

The scripture injunction "Be ye perfect even as your

heavenly Father is perfect," haunted him.

Taken at its written

worth it suggested a paradox--that imperfect man become like
God.

Yet how was it possible for imperfect mortals to reach

divine perfection?

The young man earnestly sought an answer.

He believed God specially instituted Christianity to unravel
the puzzle precisely by providing the standard which would
bring the commanded perfection about.

Hence his search began

within the gates of Christianity or, more particularly, within
the two religious traditions closest within the gates for him
at the time: Calvinism and Unitarianism.
His life was subject to the early influences of both Calvinism and Unitarianism.

He grew up an avowed Unitarian--born

into the religion of his father, a minister, who, following the
leadership of another Unitarian minister, Buckminster, placed
New England Unitarianism on the path toward its eventual sophistication.

Moreover, by the time Ralph Yaldo went to Harvard

the school was already firmly in the direction of Unitarian
hands.

In fact he never fully set aside his Unitarian associa-

tions.
Yet he was also steeped with lasting effect in Calvinism.
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With bis father's death, his formation from age eight shifted
almost entirely into the care of his mother and his Aunt Mary,
both devout Calvinists.

special comment.

His aunt, Mary Moody Emerson, deserves

Quick, intelligent, slightly renegade in her

religious beliefs, she tried earnestly to combine a strong
sense of dedication to her own religious beliefs with a fair
amount of open-mindedness toward the beliefs of other denominations.

The true scope of her influence on the youth--though

quite significant--has yet to be researched.
life at many times.

She entered his

She became almost a second mother in the

widow Emerson's struggling household and gained the rare distinction of being Ralph Waldo's intellectual confident during his
early manhood years.
Even his Unitarianism had its Calvinist traces.

Originally

New England Unitarianism grew out of the Calvinist congregations.
Its nascent form seemed so consistent with the Calvinist teachings that its eventual burgeoning as a distinct point of view
took many Calvinist theologians entirely by surprise.

They

accused its leaders of having planted sedition in the Calvinist
ranks. 1

As a result of the split many Oalvinist domains became

Unitarian.

Thus, for instance, Cotton Mather once pastored

Emerson's father's pulpit--a fact which the younger Emerson
regarded with reverence.

Harvard College too was Calvinist

before it turned Unitarian.

Its library remained a storehouse

lcr. Clarence Faust "The Background of the Unitarian Opposition to Transcendental!sm," Modern Philology, XXXV (1938), pp.
297, et sgq.

..
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of the older Puritan writings.

Ralph Waldo would read them

intently.
Initially the youth hoped to find an adequate moral standard within Calvinism and Unitarianism.
him.

But neither satisfied

Both drew distorted pictures of nature, especially bum.an

nature.

The Calvinist conception was too pessimistic; the Uni-

tarian, too optimistic.
Calvinist Conception ot Nature
According to classical Calvinist theology man's nature,
because of the primitive tall, is entirely depraved.

Man can

do nothing ot himself either to achieve or thwart his salvation;
salvation is entirely a gift of God.

Christ justifies and sanc-

tities a particular fallen man's nature, 1! God's will has so
predestined it.

Justification means to be redeemed or saved;

sanctification means to be purified from sin in one's day to day
activities. 2
The sign of justification is personal sanctification.

Man

must, therefore, attempt by his own efforts to make his every
action holy--1.e., pleasing to God's will.

Yet since all nature

has become depraved with the fall of man's nature he cannot
expect to discover God's will by looking to the things of nature
2

cr. John Winthrop, "Journal," p. 53; John Cotton, "Christian ciiling," pp. 1?2, et .!.9.9.•• in The American Puritans: Their
Prose and Poet~, ed. by~erry Miller;-Anchor Boois {Garden atty,
lew Yori: Doub eday and Company, 1956). (Hereinafter referred
to as American Puritans.)
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(God's hidden will).

To discover what course of action conforms

to God's will he must turn with trust to God's revealed will,
the Bible. 3
Living by the Bible was not all that simple, since usually
it was not immediately evident how a Scriptural passage should
relate to a present course of action.

Somehow, depraved though

his nature was, the elect had to rely on his natural capacities
to make the right interpretation of Scriptures.

Puritans in the

homeland came to recognize this amid the climate of rapid social
change which marked Elizabethan and Restoration England. 4 The
success of the colonists in forging a new community in the wilderness, where there was high demand to rely on one's own abilities, sparked a like realization among New England Puritans.

In

their efforts to cope with this complication Puritans polarized
into two tendencies.
Following one move some Puritans, on the theory that upon
justification reason becomes somewhat regenerated, inclined to
direct their sanctification by a sober, conservative, rather
rationally critical commitment to Revelation; following another
move some leaned toward the belief that the Spirit dwelling
within steers the elect to sanctification by their personal
feelings of religious enthusiasm.

John Cotton and Anne

3.Q!. Increase Mather, "Han knows not his time," pp. 183,
et .!9.9,i Urian Oakes, "The Sovereign E.f'fic~cy of Divine ProviTence," pp. 192, .!! !.9.9.•, ~·
4 Alan Simpson, Puritanism in Old and New England (Chicago:
University ot ChicaJ1:0 Press. l9~l. u.-n.-
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Hutchinson represent the polarity in the 1600's; Charles Chauncy
and Johnathan F.dwards reflect it in the 1700's.
Special Impact or Edwards on the Development
of New England Calvinism
It is important to our purpose to remark upon the place of
Johnathan Edwards in the development of New England Calvinist
theology.

Perry Miller maintains that American Transcendenta-

lists were attempting to recapture the position of Edwardianism.
Indeed some key .Emersonian notions can be traced to Calvinist
origins through Edwards.5
During the 18th century certain sectors of New England
became rather well to do.

With increased prosperity Puritan
religiousness turned quite sedate and formalistic. 6 In the age

before, the experience of conversion had been widely considered
the chief sign of election, or salvation, and among Congregationalists, of church membership.

This experience, usually

attended by a feeling of high enthusiasm, indicated a new birth
which brought with it the conviction of being saved and a dedication to doing battle with sin.?

Now the earlier insistence on

inward feelings of ecstacy and on moral seriousness had dwindled,
so much so that frequently not even clerics considered it
5l'1iller "Johnathan Edwards to :Emerson,"!'!!.! England .2!!!£terly, XIII (December, 1940), p. 608.
6

Ibid.• p. 600.
?Simpson, Puritanism !!!, fil ~ .!!?! England,

pp. 2, ~ !.9.9.•

11

necessary to experience oonversion. 8
It was Edwards who refurbished the foundations of Puritan
philosophy and revived the waning seriousness of Puritan ferYor
and dedication.
heart~

•

To rekindle religious experience, to call men's

to God, Edwards not without trepidation strongly rear-

firmed the importance of sentiment--thus the vigorous tone of
his sermons.
Yet be was not as distrustful as Calvin of rational thinki
as a

means to foster religious insight.
FA.wards was a gifted speculative thinker whose mind
was nourished by the great thinkers or the past,
and freshened by the new currents flowing trom the
Cambridge Platonists, from Locke and from Berkeley. 9

In effect Edwards attempted to synthesize both poles in the
Puritan tradition by bringing both reason and emotion to bear
together upon sound religious conviction.

Emerson's notion

or

experience bears FA.ward's mark.
Edwards also mollified the Puritan concept ot nature.

Like

Calvin he placed the sovereignty of God above all other considerations, yet within this framework several subordinate doctrines assumed a different tone.
fallen all nature was a product

First, though depraved and

or

God's will.

was all-good all nature had to be good.lo
means

or

Since His will

Secondly regarding

sanctification, though men were saved only by putting

8Ral:ph Barton Perry, Puritauism and Democracy; (New York:
Harper and Row, 1944), p. ?~.
--9Perr,., Puritanism !!!9. Democrac1, p. 102.
lOMiller "Johnat

...
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on Christ rather than by their own natural intelligence obedience was neither blind nor ignorant but rather, as Ralph Barton
Perry put it,
••• within its limits the human mind shares and confirms
the knowledge of God, and the moral experience and insight of man give meaning to the goodness of God ••••
God's omnipotence was construed as a beneficent force
which guaranteed the triumph of the moral will; and
his omniscience as a revelation of the good, which
eon.firmed and extended the worshipper's moral judgement. God was obeyed for the sake of that goodness
which his power executes, and which bis wisdom illuminates.11
By :Emerson's day the emotional tide of the Great Awakening
in which Edwards shared had ebbed, and sober intellectual currents augmented now by the presence of Lockean philosophy within
them reasserted themselves upon New England Calvinist beliefs.
Once again pastors returned to their libraries and people to
religious formalism.

Hence the Calvinism young :ED.arson dis-

covered was that nourished by the intellectual side of F.d.wards,
shorn of much of the fervid drive that made it live.

But his

own growing concern for reform soon quickened his interest in
the fuller picture of Edwards.

He was particularly drawn to

Edwards' less auspicious view of nature and to his attempt to
bring reason and emotions into synthesis.
Unitarian Conception of Nature
Even the first generation of New England Puritans though
heavily suspicious of human nature took the material and
11

Perry, Puritanism

~

Democracy, p. 3?0.
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spiritual success of their project as a sign of the rightness of
their decision to leave the Old for the New World.

The New--

brutal and wild--World had demanded more than geographical separation from the homeland.

The forms for every-day living in

.England, founded on circumstances far different than those of
New England, did not lend themselves well to the problems of
surviving in the wilderness.

The colonists were forced to rely

on their own strengths, skills and ingenuity to develop viable
torms of their own.

The success o! their experiment coaxed New

Englanders into a gradual trust of human nature. The early
Unitarians, fed by their colonial experience, 12 and to some
extent encouraged by Enlightenment ideals, seized upon and
developed those aspects of Edwardian theology which stressed the
goodness of nature and the capabilities

or

human intelligence.

The major point of opposition between the Unitarians and
Calvinists concerned their views on the goodness and reliability
of nature.
Yet man

According to Unitarians man's nature was not fallen.

~

activities.

sanctify himself--perfect himself in his daily
That was the comm.and of God.

Sanctification no

longer meant, as it did for the Calvinists, the external expression of the fact that the fallen man had been internally
restored to the order of grace (justification).
to become more God-like.

It merely meant

Man was born in the image of God.

12 cr. Joseph Buckminster, "Sermon," pp. 17-18, in The
Transcendentalists: An Antholo~, ed. by Perry Miller (aambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1960~ (Hereinafter referred to as
The Transcendentalists.)
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!hough never fallen. man at birth only very slightly reflected
the divine image.
the image.

Sanctification was the gradual improvement on

Man placed himself on the road of progressive sanc-

tification by his own efforts--by knowing and doing G·od's will.
How to discover God's will remained a difficult issue though.
While in contrast to Calvinists, Unitarians professed more confidence in the ability of human intelligence, they still believed
that unaided it could unveil only little of God's expressed will
in nature.

A special guide, provided by the Scriptural life of

Christ, was needed.

Even here, however, Unitarians interpreted

the Scriptures according to their own--rather Lockean--notions
of experience and understanding.
With Locke's thought influential in their theology, Unitarians were prey to the difficulties inherent in his philosophy.
One such problem was whether Locke's theory of knowledge actually made it even possible to apply reason validly to morals and
religion.

Though at first unaware of this problem, by the time

Emerson had reached college the Unitarians were quite sensitive
to it, but they felt they had found rectification for Locke's
shortcomings in the theory of the moral sense elaborated by the
Scottish School of Common Sense. 1 3 Thus assured• the Unitarians'
l3Reasonableness was the norm used by New England Unitarians to decide which Scriptural statements God actually revealed.
Their conception of reasonableness depended heavily on Locke's
theory of knowledge. Hume had argued that given Locke's basic
assumptions no one could rationally establish the truth of moral
and religious statements. Were Hume correct the Unitarians,
with their theory of Biblical interpretation, would not be able
to authenticate almost any important Scriptural passage.

p
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confidence in nature led them to maintain that both nature
itself and especially Scriptures express for man those courses
of action which conform to God's will. Human understanding, or
more particularly the moral sentiment 14--applicable both to
nature and to Scriptures--made God's will intelligible. 1 5
Rejection of Calvinism and Unitarianism
Neither Calvinism nor Unitarianism gave Emerson a satisfactory account of man's relationship to God, hence neither
could provide the proper base for deciding norms for reaching
perfection.

The young man wondered

~

his heavenly father

expected imperfect man to be as perfect as He.

The Calvinists

maintained that the justified must indeed be perfect, though
perfect sanctification in this world could never be achieved.
The merit of the Calvinist position was its attempted explanation of how one could remain imperfect (sanctification) and
still be called perfect (justification).

He respected the

realism of the Calvinists for having recognized man's imperfection.

But he believed that they went too far in asserting the

total corruption and unreliability of human nature.

He along

14Unitarians who accepted the theory of the moral sentiment
borrowed it from the Scottish School of Common Sense. For the
New England Unitarians the moral sentiment was a unified act or
intelligence and emotions, issuing from a special sense, wherein
they differed strongly from both David Hume and Adam Smith.
l5stephen E. Whicher, Freedom and Fate (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1953), pp. 6-?.

jilP
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with many of his generation had become convinced that the eminent success of the new nation in carving out a worthwhile-indeed superior--society in the wilderness had come about
chiefly through man's reliance on his own intelligence and
force.

This conYiction was a major !actor in leading him and

many of his fellow New Englanders to a more sanguine view of
nature.

To use and enjoy nature's goods, to keep all man's

natural capacities in place of useful prominence, were cardinal
Emersonian principles.

On this point he was closer to the Unitarians.

In his es-

timate the strength of their view resided in their positive
stress on the need to live virtuously and especially in their
attempt to provide a scheme for sanctification in which both
nature and man's reason had been rescued from limbo.

Yet he

felt their depiction of nature was as much over-drawn as that of
the Calvinists'.

For the Unitarian doctrine supposed man to

have far more ability to achieve good than Emerson thought the
facts allowed.

That was its fatal weakness.

Neither Calvinism nor Unitarianism sufficiently satisfied
him.

As he says the rigid party (Calvinism) takes as its prin-

ciple man's deep liability to sin; the liberal, man's boundless
capacity for virtue.

Both run off to extremes. The truth he
thought must somehow be in between. 16 Each sect had preserved

16Arthur c. MoGiffert, Jr., ed., Youn Emerson Speaks
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1938), ~. (Hereinafter
referred to as YES.)

-
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part of the integral Christian message but had also distorted
the rest; therefore neither had a clear claim to a reliable
moral standard.

Surmising that the cause of the distortion was

sectarianism, he next set about to discover the full Christian
revelati0n, unsullied by the dogmatizing influence of any
sect. 17
The Search for the Primitive Core
of Christian Revelation
For the next phase of his investigation, Emerson hoped to
turn to his own purposes the standard Unitarian arguments for
the authenticity of Christianity.

These arguments--from mira-

cles and the moral sense--require special discussion.

The

difficulties he had in implementing them forced him first to
abandon hope

or

finding the unsullied historical core of Chris-

tianity and then even to reject the possibility of its uniqueness.

The following section deals with the features or these

arguments, the problems they raised, and the conclusion :Emerson
reached because of them: that if moral and religious truths were
discoverable, only natural intelligence--and not a special revelation--would be able to find them.
The Appeal to Miracles
The Unitarian appeal to miracles was rather simple in

17~·•PP• 84-85.
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outline.

God is all-good.

important matters.

He would not deceive mankind in

Miracles accompanied the founding of Chris-

tianity in numbers unrivaled by any other religion.

Since only

God can perform miracles these must have been a sign by which
God had indicated that Christianity is a unique revelation of
His will for man.

To conclude otherwise would mean that God

has deceived man which because of His infinite goodness He would
not do.
Emerson's first difficulties with the argument came from
Hume's objections against the reality of miracles. 18

Hume held

that miracles were violations of the laws of nature--laws which
"firm and unalterable experience has established."

Since uni-

form experience amounts to a proof only a superior opposite
proof can establish the reality of miracles. 1 9

The case for

miracles depends on reliability of the testimony of witnesses.
since none of us has seen a miracle.
mony

We only trust the testi-

of a witness because of past observation.

Since past

observation also grounds the laws of nature, we must compare the

18 .Em.erson•s first introduction to Hume came at Harvard College. The faculty seems to have had as much animosity as misconception about Hume's thought. They generally believed Hume
to have been effectively silenced by the developments in the
Scottish School, and were bewildered to discover that he and not
Locke had won the day among European scholars. The Hume Emerson
first learned of was that of his professors. But in the years
immediately to follow, he took Hume under increasingly serious
re-appraisal.
l9David Hume, An Enquirz ConeerninH Human Understanding, in
The Philosophical Works, ed.
Thomasi11 areen and Thomas
Hodge ~rose, reprint of the new edition (London: 1886; Aalen:

oy

pr
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past experience in both cases in order to judge which is more
probable.

Since testimony concerning religious miracles more

commonly violates the truth than that concerning any other
matter of fa.ct, we should form a general resolve never to trust
the authority of the former.

Hume concludes that people accept

miracles because of "the passion of surprise and wonder, arising
from miracles, being an agreeable emotion, given a sensible
tendency toward belief of those events from which it is
derive d •

n20

Hume's conclusion is particularly biting.
Christian Religion not only was at first attended
by miracies, but even at this day cannot be believed
by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is
insufficient to convince us of its veracity, and who
even is moved by faith to assent to it is conscious
of a continue~ miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and a
determination to believe what is most contrary to
custom and experienee.21
Incredible as it may seem Emerson would transform this view into
a summary of true belief.

We shall return tothis.

He initially tried to counter Hume with a rather traditional argument.

He grants from his reading of the Common Sense

philosopher, Thomas Brown,,that Hume correctly stated that faith
in testimony was based on the lesser improbability of the facts
than of the falsehood of the witness.

He further asserts--with

implications about the moral sense Hume would reject--that man
is endowed with a principle of inevitable belief in the

20Ibid., Pt. II.
21 Ibid.

-
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uniformity of the laws of nature.
laws of nature.

But miracles do not violate

Since God's will is one of the powers of nature 1

what he wills in a miracle may be a new effect in nature but
cannot be an internal contradiction of the laws of nature. 22
Still this response did not fully satisfy him; he strongly suspected that

Hume

had yet to be effectively answered.

Not long afterwards he hit upon a solution in a paradox
typically Emersonian.

Hume was absolutely aorreet.

of miracles as special events repulsed the mind.
wrong to conclude that there are no miracles.

The notion

But he was

There is a

strictly divine character to ordinary phenomena.

What revolts

the mind is the idea of two kinds of miracles, the ordinary and
the special (those to which Christianity turns). 2 3
The miraculous is a divine manifestation.

A divine mani-

festation is what happens by powers beyond the capacities open
to given agents of our experience.

Moral goodness among men,

and novelty in all of nature--elevation, as we shall see later-are occurences beyond the power of the object to explain.

"All

our life is a miracle ••• ! believe in a manifestation of power
22
william Gilman, Alfred Ferguson, et al., eds., The Journals and Miscellaneous Notebooks Qf. Ralpn-Wi!do Emerson;-";-vo!s.
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1960), Vol. II, pp. 402-403.
(Hereinafter referred to as~.)
2 3F.d.ward Waldo Emerson, ed., The Complete Works of Ralph
~ldo Emerson, centenary edition, ~vols. (Boston: Houghton
ffiin and Co., 1903-1904), Vol. I, p. 129. (Hereinafter referred to as Works.) JMN, Vol. III, p. 241; Ralph Rusk, The
Letters of Ralpn Yaldo~erson, 6 vols. (New York: Colum.bra-University 'Press, 1939), Vo!. I, pp. 174-175. (Hereinafter referred to as Letters.)
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beyond my own, because I am such a manifestation. 11 --e.g., rais24 In the "Divinity
ing an arm, remembering, communicating.
School Address" he remarks that Christ, the finest example of
how we should live, felt all man's life was a miracle; Christ
knew that "this daily miracle shines as the character ascends." 2 5
Emerson equates 'ascension' with •creation' and 'being'.
The moral sentiment identifies the presence of newness, or a
creative act.

Creative acts reveal divine presenae. 26

To his

Aunt Mary he writes it is more fit to take every moment of the
existence of the universe as a

Creation and everything as a
revelation of the divinity to the observer's mind. 2 7 To be is
~

The fact that any x !!. (i.e., is ascending)

to be ascending.

he regards as a continuous miracle.

For, the ascension of x is

its movement to a plane beyond the power of production by any
causal source we might find at that point in our experience.
Thus the movement is a continuing manifestation of God.
everything is a miracle then there are no

specia~

If

miracles by

which to establish a special divine revelation, viz., Christianity.

The Unitarian appeal to miracles is pointless.
~e Ap~eal

to the Moral Sense

The second Unitarian argument he adopted in hopes of

24 McGiffert, !,!2, PP• 120-126.

25Emerson, Works, Vol. I, p. 129.
~6

~~··pp.

338-339.

27Rusk, Letters, Vol. I, pp. 1?4-175.
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uncovering the core of Christian revelation was from the moral
sense.

A fairly representative ve1:-sion of' the Unitarian appeal

to the :r;ioral sense was that of Levi Frisbie.

Fris1Jie' s approach

is of special interest because it reflects the thinking common

among many of EmtJrson' s Harvard pro.f'essors, and because as
Frisbie's student he was highly impreBsed by it. 28 Frisbie used
to appeal to the moral sense to argue to God's existence but the
basic form of the argument also served to establish many other
propositions--among them that Christian revelation was unique
and given at a definite point of time in history.
As we find it in Emerson's journal, Frisbie's argument for
God's existence begins with the observation that only for virtuous acts do we have a sense or feeling of moral approbation.

'We feel moral approbation neither in observing the utility of

material things, nor even in contemplating the beauty of a work
of art, though what grounds aesthetic pleasure is analogous to
what grounds our approval of moral activities.

Aesthetic plea-

sure has its roots in "the power we immediately recollect to be
28 Levi Frisbie (1783-1822) was Alford Professor of Natural

Religion, Moral Philosophy and Civil Polity at Harvard. JMN,
Vol. I, p. 23, n. 43. Merril Davis, "Emerson's 'Reason' and the
Scottish Philosophers," New England $uarterly, XVII (June, 1944~
pp. 220-221. :Emerson's interest in he argument may be gathered
from the following. Students were routinely expected to get the
salient points of their lesnons verbatim. To facilitate this
Emerson often set them dow11 in his journals. Frisbie' s argument
is recorded at length in 1820. JMN. Vol. I. P• 23-24. Whan
Frisbie died in 1822 Emerson noti'S!iis passing and repeats the
argument in almoot the same words. ~. Vol. II, p. 5. Again.
eight years later he wrote a clear resume of it. JMN, Vol. III,
p. 207.
---
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necessary to the creation of the painting."

Similarly, we find

the grounds for moral approbation in the power we recognize as
necessary for a moral act to have taken place.
Morals Ye see Virtue, what is it pleases us?

"So when in
Not the Utility;

but the idea of moral power and beauty which strikes us as
necessary to give birth to the action."

As a confirmation of

this view Frisbie points out that we feel impelled to stronger
moral approval tor displays of virtues requiring mightier effort
than for homely everyday virtues. which in fact usually have
most utility. 2 9
Frisbie's analogy between the moral and aesthetic is not by
chance.

He supposes that aesthetic experience involves an

integrated function of both the intellectual and emotional
aspects of man, and he intends to make the same case for the
functioning of the moral sense.

It too is a special synthesis

of both the intellectual and emotional.

Frisbie speaks as if

his audience were quite familiar with the workings of aesthetic
experience.

He also seems to suggest that the discovery of the

existence of God as the moral power is based on a sort of moral
experience at least as widely accessible as the aesthetic.
aesthetic stands as preamble to the moral.

The

Indeed later on

Emerson would maintain that because moral activity was the highest expression of beauty, the person most sensitive to all forms
of beauty, the poet, would be most keenly aware of the actual
relations between men and God.

29JMN, Vol. I, pp. 23-24.

Of course Emerson believed that
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all men could become poets.
As Rusk notes J'risbie's argument lacks full elaboration.30
Jully developed Prisbie's reasoning assumes this form.

First,

tor everything that happens a cause at least equal to it in
power exists.
given state.

J'urther, by itself a thing tends to remain in its
Bence whatever we discover transformed to a state

beyond its preVious capacities could not have elevated itself.
some power other than and superior to the object in question
aust by in.terence have e!!ected the elevation.

It is the idea oj

the moral power we recognize as necessary !or the moral activit7
to happen that excites aoral approbation.
lrisbie infers that the power which ultillately underlies
the moral sentiment and the moral elevation which ati.JBulated the
sentiment must be God.

Since man cannot account for his own

virtuous act (elevation) some other being possessed absolutely

ot the power to effect virtue, namely God, must account !or the
elevation.
!he tollowing passage shows that this is precisely how !Berson understood his professor's argwaent.

Bo man addicted to chemistry ever discovered a salt,
or an acid, which he thought divine, never discovered
a law which he thought God. !lo man devoted to literary criticism ever imagined that aD7 of the thoughts
that formed his study was God. But the man who cultivated the moral powers, ascended to a tho~ght and said
...
!h
..i..,s-. !! .is!!!• !he faith is the eVidence.-'.l
30aalph L. Rusk, The Li.te o! Ra~ph Waldo Emerson (1'ew York:
Charles Scribner's Sons-;-1'94ljJ,-p.
•
31~, Vol. III, p. 207. By "faith is the evidence" he
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As Emerson's journals indicate, the general structure of
the argument could be readily shifted to the case for a specifically and historically revealed Christianity.

He

relates that

close study of religious history shows the most morally elevated
features of an era are invariably associated with the presence
of Christianity.

it is.

But no epoch can elavate itself; each is what

Therefore, God must be the source of the elevation.

Further, moral elevation is a special sign of God's approbation.
Therefore, Christianity must be specially revealed.3 2
Abandonment of the Search for the Historical
and Unique Core of Christian Revelation
In the beginning Dnerson maintained that the moral sense
showed Christianity was both given at a definite time in the
past and was unique in history.

But over the five years follow-

ing his college graduation his perspective changed considerably.
At the start of 1826, he still believed in an historical
core of revelation. but he remarks that since revelation is
intelligible only through reason, reason might be called a
"revelation prior to Revelation."33

Soon after, he abandoned

his intention of establishing an historical deposit, concentrating instead on showing that Christianity was a unique
means this belief in God is a constitutional fact of human consciousness, and hence cannot be denied without imputing absurdity to nature.
32cr. JMN, Vol. I, p. 80 (1822).
33 JMN, Vol. II, pp. 160-161.
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revelation operative in the present age.

He reasoned that the

yardstick of moral elevation could apply just as well to events
now as to those of the past.

The highest degree of moral

development signified the presence of the fullest expression of
God's will.

Since each age progresses morally and since the

present age represents the current peak of the ascent. the highest degree of moral development discovered in the present would
serve to identify the unique body of Christian revelation operative now.

If moral truths develop in every age--as they do

par excellence in Christianity--the present status of Christianity not its history is importa.nt.34
But as the full tensions within the framework of his position occur to him he even rejects the notion that the moral
sense affirms the uniqueness of Christian revelation.

He

believes that, while it is true that moral elevation reveals
God's design and that the present elevation reveals it best.
human intelligence alone sets up the standards by which to judge
the presence of a moral advancement.
however, is that
Christianity.

What reason discovers.

!!.!. moral truths evolve--not just those of

Nor are Christian truths always the most advanced

Hence the moral sense does not disclose Christianity as a unique
revelation.35

Still, he notes, Sacred Scriptures remain the

richest mine for moral truth.

34Rusk, Letters, Vol. I. pp. 1?4-175.
35 JMN, Vol. III, P• 15 •
............

27
Thus though he had hoped the moral sense would show him
that Christianity was historically given and unique, instead it
convinced him that concern about an historical deposit was of
little relevance. and that belief in the uniqueness of Christian

revelation was unfounded.
Critigue of Traditivnal Christianity as a Whole

The difficulties he found in the appeal to miracles and the
moral sense directed Emerson to a still more basic criticism of
Unitarianism and the whole of traditional Christianity.

Regard-

less of how heartily Christianity insists on the goodness of
human nature it also claims that man needs a special store of
revelation to uncover true moral and religious beliefs.
fore it does not actually trust human nature.

There-

He levels this

criticism directly at Unitarianism, but since he regarded
Unitarianism the best manifestation of traditional Christianity,
it was intended for all traditional Christianity.

I! as Unitar-

ians claimed, nature and man's natural capacities are good,

i.~.,

if they are fit to reach their natural ends, then Unitarians

fall into inconsistency.

On the one hand they stress the good-

ness of natural capacities; but on the other hand they belittle
nature by insisting that without the Scriptures man has no sure
guide to a good life.
By stressing the goodness of nature, the older Unitarians
had merely intended to vindicate the ability

or

human intelli-

28

Unitarian theologians stressed that all our ideas come through
experience and reasoning--experience and reasoning taken primarily in the Lockean sense. but also significantly colored by the
German "higher criticism" of Herder and others.3 6 To interpret
scriptures properly meant to rely only om those positions consistent with the ideas gathered from experience and reason.
They thought this approach would purge Sacred Scriptures of thos
doctrines, for instance the Trinity, which seemed openly contrary to reason and experience.

,.Higher criticism" was to

strengthen respect for Revelati·on. 37
Though this strain ot Unitarianism deemed human nature reli
able enough to soundly interpret Sacred Scripture, it by no
means intended to declare that human nature was self-sufficient

to learn God's will without Scriptures.

The German rationalists

however, had claimed just that, and the New England Calvinists
were fond of warning the Unitarians they were plunging head-long
in the same direction.

But the Unitarians steadfastly declared

that reason could neither alter nor increase the content of
revelation.

The corpus of revelation closed with the Bible.38

36 Faust, "The Background of the Unitarian Opposition to
Transcendentalism," pp. 304-305; Rene Wellek, "The Minor Tran-

scendentalists and German Philosophy,"!!.! England

XV (Dec., 1942), p. 654.

~arterly,

3?Faust, "The Background of the Unitarian Opposition to
Transcendentalism," P• 299.

38 Ibid. , p. 303.
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Turn toward Self-reliance and Trust
~n

the P.riiiacy of LiVins

»nerson took the step the elder Unitarians had vowed should
never follow from their theology, reliance on natural living for
personal revelations of God's will.

He and many of his peers

became quite restive with the ambivalance they sensed at the
roots of Unitarianism.

If human nature is reliable as Unitar-

ians constantly professed why should they also believe that
revelation has come only through the Bible, as if man's intelligence were not trustworthy?

In fact only when one finds revela-

tions in himself can the revelations of the Bible become intelligible.
Emerson argued that even though a man may find the doctrine
of self-reliance in Scriptures, he will only find it there if he
has

discovered it already in himself, (through the moral senti-

ment).

"The Bible is a sealed book to him who has not heard its

laws from his own soul."

Thus there are at least two sorts of

revelation (personal and scriptural), the first being the norm

for

understandin~

Revelation."39

the second.

Reason is a "revelation prior to

In a sermon delivered first in 1830 he declares

that the study of the implications in the moral sense gives us
the fullest revelations.
A mind of generous nature is early taught to contem-

plate with delight and reverence its own faculties--

39McG1ffert, YES, pp. 111 l?Ot JMN Vol. II pp. 250-251.
Emerson had not ye"e""'t!oncluded ~hat Ch1'1'.'1J~ian revelation was not
a unique and special revelation.
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to reverence them for their use; to believe, that, as
God gave them, they are imperfect copies of his own
perfections; and that he is well pleased in the good
they produce; that the purposes of God are best deduced
from his works.40
Thus his investigation led him to several radical conclusions.

On the one hand neither moral nor religious truths could

be derived from the teachings of traditional Christianity as he
had formerly supposed.

Indeed the doctrines of Christianity

were distorted since they falsely presumed nature was not fully
reliable.

Moreover, special revelation and hence the need for

special miracles was superfluous.

On the other hand human intel-

ligence could well provide its own original religious and moral
inspirations. indeed every moment could bring a new divine revelation.

As yet he was not sure how this could come about.

But

he believed nature was trustworthy, and that if moral and religious truths were to be discovered at all, only natural intelligence would be able to find them.
As his hopes for a moral and religious standard within
Christianity dwindled. he increased his concern for the possibility of finding the standard within nature itself.

For a time his

critique of Christianity and of natural reason went on hand in
hand without perhaps too much differentiation of effort.

But by

1832 he was in the midst of making explicit attempts--aided by
philosophical writings from the empiricist and idealist traditions--at discovering how man's natural capacities could provide
40

McGiffert, YES, pp. 84-85.
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the standard.

His search culminated in a critique of both the

empiricist and idealist traditions, and in a positive statement
of his own philosophical thought.

CHAPTER II

EMERSON'S CRITIQUE OF TRADITIONAL PHILOSOPHY
Emerson developed a philosophical procedure of his own
because, contrary to his expectations, traditional empiricism
and idealism proved wanting.

He had turned to them for help as

he gradually recognized that reliance on Christianity was tutile,
and only natural intelligence could promise any hope of discovering truths about the world.

Empiricism and idealism failed

because, like Calvinism and Unitarianism on a theological plane,
they, on a philosophical plane, were each based on a one-sided
view of man•s nature and nature as a whole.

Empiricism accentu-

ated the senses at the expense of reason; idealism, reason at
the expense of the senses.

As a result both derived myopic

philosophical procedures and faulty descriptions of reality-the one overstressing the material, the diverse and changing;
the other, exaggerating the ideal, the unified and stable.
Emerson decided that since traditional philosophy in framing
its conceptions of the nature of man had not relied entirely
on natural intelligence, he would have to discover a genuine
philosophical approaoh for himself.
This chapter deals with his critique of traditional empiricism and idealism.

Though treated separately the same order

32
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o! study is used for each:

first, his use of the terms 'empiri-

cism' or 'idealism'; second, his understanding of their basic
positions; third, his study of their merits and weaknesses.

The

final section of this chapter shows how his critique contributed
to the development of his own philosophical procedure.
Meaning of 'Empiricism'
Emerson used the term 'empiricism' principally to designate
the positivist type of philosophy he associated with the British
tradition continuous through Locke, Hume especially, and in some
respects the "Scottish School."

Other terms he uses for 'empiri-

cism' are 'sensiam' and 'sceptical philosophy'.

He first con-

tacted empiricist writers in his classes at Harvard College and
the Divinity Sehool. 1 But not until a little later, when he
began to recognize the true value of Hume's thought, did he give
empiricism a scholar's attention.

Hume's forceful impression

on him led him practically to identify empiricism with Hume.
Most younger Unitarians seemed to have made the same identification.

They too considered Hume the supreme empiricist.

Moreover contrary

t~

many or their elders they maintained that

the basic assumptions of Locke led directly into the philosophy

or

Hume.

Hence the appellation of "scepticism" which they

stamped on empiricism.

By scepticism they meant that which

their teachers only suspected in Locke but which stood explicitlJ
1 Emerson read Francis Bacon, Locke, Montaigne, Hume and
others as school studies.

in Hume: doubtfulness concerning the rational foundations for
moral and religious statements.
The Empiricist Position
Emerson became most seriously interested in Hume's philosophy as his conviction grew that Hume's criticism of Locke was
correct.

Hume had pointed out that, contrary to Locke, given

the sensist theory of knowledge there was no way to confirm
religious or moral statements.

Jlaerson suspected, however, that

the sensist theory of knowledge rested on a faulty assumption,
the mind-body bifurcation of man.

He studied Hume and the posi-

tivistic frame of mind to learn whether his suspicions were
well founded.

He decided they were.

According to Hume's theory of knowledge--and that of the
positivistio 2 tradition following him--man performs two separate
cognitive functions, sensing and reasoning.

The former alone

directly contacts facts; the latter simply relates ideas derived from facts.

Ma.n's sole direct cognitive relation with

facts comes through sensing.

Moreover, only the quantitative

in sense-experience lends itself to valid factual generalizations.

Thus no non-quantitative, non-material, generalizations

about the realm of facts are possible.

Further, no evidence in

sense-experience supports factual generalizations about necessar'
2The positivistic view maintains that only those factual
generalizations are possible which are derivable (directly or
indirectly) from empirical science.
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connections between events or about the universal presence of a
particular factor among specific events past, present and to
come.
Hence some purported factual generalizations, such as those
affirming the reality of the causal relation or the presence of
universal order in the world, actually arise not from experience
but from a feeling of vividness which springs up in a natural
association with repeatedly recurring experiences.

Such general-

izations are belief-statements.3

Hume calls them "natural

beliefs."

Though of great practical

They are not factual.

value, natural beliefs have no speculative import.

Thus the two

chief cosmological arguments for God's existence--from causality
and order--are invalidated at a stroke.

Neither are grounded

in sense-experience and hence cannot tell us anything about
reality; nor can they rest on reason since reason depends
entirely on sense-experience tor its content.
Hume argued that moral statements in like manner are not
supported by sense experience or by reason.
by

itself only relates ideas among themselves, ideas which are

all ultimately derived from sense-experience.

or

In brief, reason

He gives a series

arguments to show further that only feelings not reason can

~otivate

human behavior.

An idea must be desirable in order !or

a man to act on it.
3A belie! is defined as "a lively idea related to or associated with a present impression." David Hume, Treatise on
Human Nature, Bk. I, pt. 2, Sec. 7.
--
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As long as it is allowed, that reason has no influence
on our passions and action, it is in vain to pretend
that morality is discovered only by a deduction of reason. An active principle can never be founded on an
inactive; and if reason be inactive in itself it must
remain so ••• whether it exerts itself in natural or
moral subjects.4
Moral statements are rooted in special feelings called
moral sentiments.

Feelings may indicate something about one's

subjective state, but nothing factual about the world.

Thus

some moral statements may be natural beliets--of great practical
but of no speculative significance.
Critigue of Hume and :&npiricism
:&nerson's critique of Hume centers about his failure to
recognize that reason does have a direct relation to matters
of fact, that reason makes factual judgments in a unified tunction with the rest of man's powers (his will, senses, feelings)
and that natural belie! or sentiment5 is the form these judgements take.

While Hume recognized only mathematics and empiri-

cal science as legitimate approaches to generalization, and only
the latter as !actual, Emerson regarded natural belief an
approach to generalization midway between mathematics and empirical science, and only the middle way as genuinely dealing with
reality.
4 Ibid., Bk. III,
..............

pt.

I, see. 1 •

5sentiment, for Emrson, means judgment unified with feeling.
He borrows the term from the Scottish School. Reid, Works, Vol.
III, p. 309; Stewart, Works, Vol. V, p. 160, in "Emerson's
'Reason' and the Scottish ~hilosophers," by Davis, p. 222.

--
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The middle region of our being is the temperate zone.
We may climb into the thin and cold realm of pure
geometry and lifeless science, or sink into that of
sensation. Between these extremes is the equator of 6
life, of thought, of spirit, of poetry--a narrow belt.
His thinking had been strongly influenced by the Scottish

philosophers, Reid• Stewart, and Brown.

The Scottish School of

common Sense considered natural beliefs as empirical data of
consciousness; they called these beliefs moral sentiments.
Thomas Reid in arguing that two of these beliefs--the reality of
the external world and the presence of order in it--had factual
significance, declared they could be considered fictional only
if there were no successful planning and carrying out of plans

in everyday life.

But since men did successfully organize their

activities according to plans, these beliefs must have factual
import.?

Emerson was especially taken by the insistence among

these philosophers that reason does have an empirical grounding,
and by their attempt to base their argument on an appeal to
everyday living.

As a college senior he was convinced that,

while the language of Reid's argument had obscured its thrust,
it decisively rebutted Hume's theory of natural beliet. 8 And
though he would in time build his own critique he always
6

Emerson, Works, Vol. III, p. 62.

?Book, "Anglo-American Common Sense and German Geist, 11
American Qy.arterlz, VIII (Summer, 1956), pp. 159-160.
8 Emerson, "The Present State of Ethical Philosophy," in
-ewr Unpublished Essa~s· ed. Edward E. Hale ((N.p.): Lamson,

f?e, and Co., 189 ).
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considered Hume weakest at this point.9
Emerson could find no true middle ground between Hume's
assertion that neither the senses nor reason nor natural belief
could establish the reality of order, and the implicit conclusion that no order exists.

For Hume that middle ground was

supposed to be the practicability of natural belief.

But in

Emerson's mind either belief includes no factual assertion, and
action on thst basis rests on illusion, or if action on the basii
of natural belief is not illusory, then the belief includes
factual assertion. 10 A belief which appears to be factual eithel
is or is not factual.

Insofar as a belief is true it can suc-

cessfully direct activities; insofar as it is false it cannot.
If all man's natural beliefs were false he would possess no
reliable way to live.

He would not know how he ought to act.

The result would be a paralysis--men would do nothing.
Emerson was threatened by such a paralysis while he struggled with the sceptical implications of empirieism. 11 He rescue(
himself with the decision that the factual claims of natural
beliefs (e.g., order in nature) could be trusted.

The test of

true belief would be its power to direct man to uttermost
commitment to living. 12 He often called his trust in natural

9cf. JMN. Vol. II, p. 20? (1830); Rusk. Letters, Vol. I,
p. 450 (183'5').
10.!!!'.1!• Vol. II, p. 252; .Emerson, Works, Vol. III, p. 51.
11 Emerson, Works, Vol. I, p.282; Whicher, Jrreedom and Fate,~
12!aerson, Works, Vol. I, pp. 136-137.

------
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beliefs "self-reliance," which was really a confidence in the
ability of native

intelligenc~

to work up norms for activities

out of the activities themselves.

Intellect and emotions, which

Hume took as primarily separated, Emerson regarded as twin
aspects of a single function, conscious human living. 1 3
:Emerson recognized that positivism had several important
strengths.

It affirmed the reality of matter; it recognized

diversity, multiplicity, change.

But he also believed it was

short-sighted in ignoring or rejecting the reality of "spiritual
tacts."
He called the empiricist to task for restricting attention

to generalizations based on quantitative measurements, for
assuming that only matter exists, and that the only order in
nature was that expressible in physical laws.

He linked these

assumptions to the mechanistic thesis that all activities including all those or man were entirely determined by changeless
physical lawa. 14 Man was thereby deprived of freedom and all
nature, of evolution.

He rejected these conclusions.

''It is

essential to a true theory or nature and man, that it should con·
tain somewhat progressive. should ascribe freedom to the will,
or benevolent designs to the Deity." 1 5
l3By this function man discovers his relations; he reconciles himself to life; he knows what he is doing; he becomes
tree; he lives. Q!• ~., Vol. I, p. 151; Vol. III, p. 12.
14
Emerson, Works, Vol. III, P• 255.

l5JMN, Vol. V, p. 182.
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He thought the positivists missed the spiritual dimension
of reality because they held to the unwarranted assumption that
only the senses had reliable access to matters of fact, while
reason and the feelings functioned in a subordinate role.

This

mistaken bifurcation methodologically excluded them from acknowledging the reality of those features in experience which could
not be discovered by the senses alone.

Freedom, creativity,

order, moral and religious truths, were some such.
ligence and feelings could grasp these.

Only intel-

Hume was forced to

explain man's affirmation of them as natural beliefs having no
objective import.
Emerson held that ordinary life experiences should be the
basis of all phil:Bophizing.

From his perspective ordinary liv-

ing did not support the empiricist claims for bifurcation.
Freedom, creativity, developmental order, stability, are just
as present in man's day to day living as are determinacy, diversity, and change.

The presence ot these features indicates that

the powers by which these features are grasped (intelligence,
feelings, senses) are all operative in experience.
Meaning

or

'Idealism'

Emerson did not work out his own view solely as a result of
his critique of empiricism.

His study of idealism also contrib-

uted substantially to his position.

For a while the force of

Hume's arguments on behalf of empirical scepticism threatened
]lnerson•s beliefs almost to the point of paral sis.

He took u
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the consideration of the idealist tradition in hopes of counterbalancing empirical scepticism and

or

shoring up his beliefs.

'l'O his disappointment he eventually discovered that idealism

also suffered from a faulty theory of knowledge, which indeed
rendered paradoxical those aspects

or

reality which by and

large empiricism did not.
Because he explored so many idealist ph1losophies 16 it is
difficult to link his use or 'idealism' with any one person or
in fact with any one philosophical camp.

For the time under

consideration (1828-1836) we may safely exclude Hegel from his
primary interest as well as any of the classic Neo-Platonists

in particular, and any ot the numerous Oriental mystics who would
draw the center ot his attention in the l840's.

From 1828-1836

he concentrated mainly on Plato, the classic Nee-Platonic tradition .!!1 general; Cudworth; and, through the works of 'Wordsworth,
Coleridge and Carlyle, Kant and the German Romantios. 1 7
Accordingly he uses *idealism• in either of two ways: to
designate the Nee-Platonic tradition, including Plato, 18 classic
16Among them are Plato1 Plotinus, Proolus, Porpbyr'T, Iamblicus, among the classical Neo-Platonists; Cudworth, among the
Cambridge Neo-Platonists; Kant and Hegelc Victor Cousin, a popu·
larizer ot Hegel1 several German and British Romantics, among
them, Goethe, Coleridge, and Carlyle.
1 7cr. William J. Sowder, :Eaerson'! Im.pact on the British
lrles aiiCT Canada (ObarlottesviIIe: The unlversitY l'riss o? V!rg n!a,~. 184-215.
18 Emerson read Plato through the bias or the Nee-Platonic
tradition. Many reasons support this view: hie extensive reading ot Cudworth betore and during the early l830's, preparing

"
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Neo-Platonism and Cudworth; or to designate the Romantic tradition, including the German Romantics, Coleridge, Carlyle, and

perhaps Kant by anticipation. 1 9 When applied to the former
group the term often carries with it a critical tone; when used
in reference to the latter it usually suggests approbation.

But in his critique

or

the idealist tradition he rejected both.

The Idealist Position
A general description or the idealist point of view comes

to us in Nature. 20

Idealism gives primacy to ideal unities;

physical unities (or structures) in experience are inferior to
and probably dependent on the ideal.

Ideal unities are in some

sense the reflected thoughts of God.

Insofar as they reflect

God they are beyond time and space, i.e., they are chanE§ieas,
necessary and most nreal."
fies the participant.

Participation in these ideals dei-

On the other hand material things searcel;r

reflect God because they are in time and space, i.e., they are
changing, contingent, and only barely "real.''

Heightened

him for such a reading; his heightened interest in Plato ooincid·
ing with his study of Coleridge and Carlyle, both ot whom inclined toward a rather Neo-Platonie view; most important, his
enthusiastic reliance on the translation of Plato's works by
Thomas Taylor, an avowed and almost fierce adherent to the NeoPlatonic interpretation of Plato. Ot. Walter Harding, 12nerson' s
Libra!2 (Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia,
1~61). Thomas Taylor's Work includes the chief Neo-Platonic
commentaries on Plato. ---l9Em.erson read Kant mainly through the eyes or Coleridge

and Carlyle.

20works, Vol. I, PP• 47-60.

:1. I·,

participation in matter is not deifying.

Man should concern

himself with the ideal realm rather than with materialities
since only by identification with the divine ideals can man
become like God.

Religion and ethics, Em.arson remarks, intro-

duce theory into life.

\.Jhen they adopt an idealist theory

they preach the subordination of physical nature to the ideal.
They make the material depend on the ideal, and next teach men
to suspect physical nature.

For since the physical is not
divine it cannot deity or lead man to true reality. 21
gritigue ot Idealism
Just as with empiricism he weights the comparative strengthE
and limits of the idealist tradition.

He admits that idealism

has its legitimate appeal particularly because it stresses the
reality of enduring unities.

It creates a view of the world

"desirable to the mind," with regard to both speculative philosophy and to practical morality.

..For seen in the light of

thought, the world is phenomenal; and Virtue subordinates it to
the mind."

!merson leaves his audience to inter why this view

should attract the mind.

The implication is that upon discover-

ing that the world is really only a dependent appearance ot
mind, it finds security in what up until then seemed an alien
and threatening env1.ronment.

Virtue somehow effects the
obedience or phenomena to ntind. 22

21

~·· p.

5a.

44

But idealism has further advantages.
in God.

It places the world

The mind of God unifies all actions and events in an

eternal present in which the turmoil of change loses signiticance.

Thus an idealist need be little concerned for the tri-

vial--for the facts of imperfection, evil, multiplicity, change-as if as empiricists contend, these tacts were absolute limits
to one's ability to discover truth.

Again Emerson leaves the

reader to find out why--and the answer waits near the surface.
For an idealist these !actors become inconsequential since he
believes everything reaches synthesis in the mind of an absolute
and all-good God.

But Emerson's praise already betrays impatience.

Idealism

••• respects the end too much to immerse itself in the
means. It sees something more important in Christianity than the scandals of ecclesiastical history •••
and, very incurious concerning persons, or miracles
and not at all disturbed by chasms or historical evidence;
it accepts from God the phenomenon as it finds it,_ as
the pure and awful form or religion in the world.~3
He himself did not flinch at scandal in religion.

But only

after a long struggle could he feign indifference to persons,
or miracles or gaps in historical evidence.

Christianity did

not stand or fall on such evidence for him, but the idealist's
repose in the Supreme Good has a fatalistic inclination.

The

idealist is so taken up by the end that he--mistakenly as it
turns out--construes the means worthy of only grudging attention.
Opposition and evil do not rouse him.

He is primarily a
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pectator and a doer only to become a better spectator. 24

Emer-

showed some sympathy !or this mood, since to begin by taking

world as it is man must be an observer.

Yet if observing

e man's primary occupation he will do very little of it, since
bserving depends in every case upon acting.
Idealism had several serious shortcomings.

Because it

ver-stressed unity it denied reality to matter and hence could
ot explain limitation, multiplicity and change.

Further, it

God from man by the absoluteness of God's perfection
d the degree of lowliness it attributed to man.

Moreover,

it falsely construed real structural unities as absolute
d static rather than concrete, active, and progressive, it
ompletely ignored the processive aspect of reality, and the need

o continually rely on action as man's basic source of truth
world. 25
Just as he decided in his critique of empiricism, he regarthe ideali.st theory of knowledge as the crucial problem.
ke the empiricists, idealists came upon most of their diffiulties because their theory of knowledge was one-sided.

Sen-

ism had separated the mind from the body, making the latter
hrough sense experience the sole mode of direct contact with
matters of fact; idealism with a similar bifurcation took
24Ibid.

2 5"It is essential to a true theory or nature and of man,
hat it should contain something progressive •••• All the uses of
ature admit of being sum.med in one, which yields the activity
f man an infinite scope." Ibid., p. 61.

--
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onlY the clearly rational as real, while relegating the sensible
to the level of mere appearance.

The idealist bifurcation was

just as unwarranted as that of the aensist.

From Emerson's

perspective matter, process, diversity, were just as present in
ordinary experience as were unities and stabilities.

The recog-

nition of both the material and the ideal in one's ordinary
experience meant to hirri that both the senses and reason were
operative in experience: both had direct access to matters of
tact.

Idealism he concludes may fulfill the desire of the mind

oecause it places matter under law.

But it does not satisfy the

iemands of spirit since in so placing matter under law it also
blurs the reality of matter.

Spirit requires that a true theory

-

ot reality render due account of both aspects of ordinary experience. 26

At most, idealism would make "a use!ul introductory

n;rpothesis."

But its descriptions are too narrow, its initial

assumptions leave too much out.

but a child's love to it.
~orn

and melons.

''I have no hostility to nature,

I expand and live in the warm day like

Let us speak her fair."

Unfortunately, ideal-

Lsm "makes nature foreign to me, and does not account tor that
~onsanguinity which we acknowledge to it. 027
26 JMN, V, pp. 182-183.
2 7Emerson, Works, Vol. I, pp.

59, 63.
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Inclusion of the Romantics in the
Critique of Idealism
Emerson intended his rather diffuse arguments to apply to
whole idealist tradition.

It is clear he meant to call the

eo-Platonists under fire since he specifically mentions Plato,
lotinus, the Manicheans.

It is less obvious. from the text o!

ature, that the Romantic idealists (Yordsworth, Coleridge. Oaryle, especially) were to be included too.

Yet the circumstances

surrounding the writing of Nature show that such was his intent.
'While in Eu.rope in 1832 he visited the British Romantics,
Wordsworth, Coleridge, Carlyle.
risis for him.

It had been a period of great

His wife had died, his dissatisfaction with

traditional Christianity at last forced him to resign his pasto
ate, and as he pursued his readings in philosophy his hope to
resolve the puzzles of human existence philosophically faltered
in a maze of divergent opinions.

As a result his outlook on lit

was seriously threatened with fragmentation.

!hough he held

firmly to his belief in self-reliance and that living would
ield intelligibility, he was at a loss how to concretize his
eliets.
!he

Britis~

Romantics appealed to him because, with their

doctrines of individualism and the primacy of Reason, they came
very close to restoring unity and balance to the philosophical
description o! lite.

It is not su;rprising, therefore, that when

he acceded to the suggestion

or

a recuperative trip to Europe he
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Be telt they could be instrumental in leading him toreaoh a
genuinely balanced view.

Once again he would be disappointed--

never with more positive effect.

~ut

Just after having completed his visits with Wordsworth,
Coleridge and Carlyle, Emerson observes in his journal that in
~rue

philosophical fundamentals all three lacked sufficient

insight.

He praises God for having shown him the men he wished

to see, Landor, Coleridge, Carlyle, Wordsworth, and for having
"comforted and confirmed him in his convictions."

Though they

showed him much, he admits, never again would he so naively live
by

idealized portraits of men whom "the world calls wise."

~ere

They

well-read, earnest, sensible men, but no more than that.

"Especially are they all deficient all these four--in different
aegrees but all deticient--in insight into religious truth.
1'hey have no idea of that species of moral truth which I call the
first philosophy. 1128
Emerson's Conception of First Ph.ilosol?hz
This criticism becomes quite significant, once his idea of
First Philosophy is grasped.
~ad

To begin with it indicates that he

worked out at least a nugget form of his own philosophical

stance by the time he reached England.

Indeed he was already

~aking notes for Nature. 29 More importantly this criticism or the
2

~, Vol. IV, p. ?9.

-

29Ibid.

-
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Romantics is basically the same he would level at idealists in
!his completed version of Nature four years later.
'First Philosophy' is Philosophy of Mind, the study which
catalogues the functions of the mind and specifies the limits

of their legitimate uses.
~her

It is called 'first' because no fur-

philosophical investigation can be undertaken until the

limits of hum.an understanding are clearly demarked.

Emerson

nad as examples before him the efforts of Locket Hume and Francis
Bacon, from whom he borrowed the term.30
In his First Philosophy the young American followed the
Romantics in making

R~ason

and Understanding the fundamental

aistinction among the cognitive powers.31

Reason is an integra-

ted function grasping an actual situation as a whole.

Under-

standing is a specialized and exclusive exercise of the mind.
Its function is to use one or another cognitive power in isolation in order, for short-range needs, to deal with some segmented
aspect

or

reality.

Reason is intuitive whereas Understanding

operates through multiple sense observations or explicit logical
sequences.

Only reason contacts reality--laws in the actual,

on-going, concrete.

Understanding handles appearances--rather

disparate concrete facts, for instance, or abstract laws.

The

one, since it respects dynamism promotes creativity; the other,
since it operates on isolated, static segments tends to
30i!!!• V, p. 50, n. 154.
31Rusk, Letters, I, p. 412.

-
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re-enforce the traditional and customary.

Moreover, Understand-

ing is supposed to serve Reason, but in an unbalanced life-scheme
it instead assumes an independent status--substituting appearances for reality.3 2 Traditional sensism and idealism both
resulted from such misuses of Understanding.
One further thing must be stressed.
~eality,

but Reason only functions when man is in the state of

µnprejudieed spontaneous behavior.
Reason to yield its truths.
~or

Only Reason contacts

Natural living alone stirs

Neither repeated sense observations

rational deductions suffice.

Thus Emerson conceived First

1•

.1

Philosophy as the science which relies entirely upon simple
~pontaneous

acts of natural living for its knowledge of reality.

Laok of First Philosoph;r among Romantics
When, therefore, he criticized the British Romantics for
lacking First Philosophy he meant they had not derived their
knowledge about reality solely from the actual experience of
living.

They asserted the doctrine of Reason abstractly.

But

$inoe they did not develop their doctrine through spontaneous
living they never actually relied on Reason and hence never
possessed true First Philosophy.

Instead they attempted to base

it on Understanding (i.e., through logical argumentation).

This particular criticism strongly supports the view that
:1,1

ne

intended to include the Romantics in Nature's arguments

I

]!

32JMN, V, PP• 269-2?6.
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against idealism.
isited them.

He was already at work on Nature when he

Moreover, he rejected Romantic idealism for funda-

entally the same reason he later rejected idealism in general
in Nature.

It tried to erect philosophy on the basis of Under-

standing, mistakenly assuming that one of the specialized funeions of Understanding (abstract reason) dealt with reality as a
bole.

Consequently both classical idealists and Romantics--

ut the Romantics less than the others--shared the same root
ailures in their philosophies, loss of real content and dynamis
Positive Directionalities Resultinf from the
Critique of 'f#ad\t!onal F§!1osoiffii
When he published Nature :Emerson was still somewhat of an
dealist though not in a traditional sense.

For him all empiri-

ist and idealist theories based on Understanding were tradiional,

By that standard Romantic philosophy was thereby tradi-

ional, while his was not.

He criticized the Romantics not for

eing idealists as such but for resting their idealism on Undertanding.

Indeed at first his thoughts closely resembled those

of the Romantics.

Living was the condition for discovering the

a priori ideas of Reason.
Yet he was far more drawn to modify theory in face of lived
experience than to modi.ty experience according to the demands of
Though at times he called his philosophy idealism, at
times he called it the philosophy of spirit to suggest the
tal quality of Reason.

In fact, he once referred to himself
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a.s a "practical idealist."33

The more he threw himself into

natural living the more his idealism softened.

Increasingly it

came to mean the recognition that developmental laws were genuinely operative throughout experience.

What before were regarded

as a priori ideas faded into natural directionalities within

beings, directionalities discoverable (for instrumental purposes)
only by spontaneous living.

Living became not only the condi-

tion but the source for truths about the world.

His mature

philosophy suggests an incipient pragmatism.
During the period in which he scrutinized the views of
traditional philosophers, he used the Romantic distinction

betwee~

Reason and Understanding not only as a foil from which to launch
his own philosophy but also as a tool by which to bring his cri-

tique into coherent synthesis.
Sensism recognized only brute matter, multiplicity, change;
idealism, only ideas, unity, st:ability.
the positive features of the other.
showed all features were real.

part o! the truth.

Neither could

incorporat~

Actual living, however,

Both theories had grasped just

Both rendered some aspects 0£ reality into

paradoxsa, irresolvable because eaoh had founded their theory
exclusively on one or another function of Understanding-··idealism
on abstract reasoning, sensism on sense observation.
~as

The result

a severence o! mind from body and the ideal from the mater-

ial.

33 JMN,

-

V, 135.
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Among the sensists the Scottish school of Common Sense
the strongest bid to mend the split.

They rightly asserted

reason had an empirical base for its generalizations.

They

orrectly attempted to support their view on the fact that the
opposite stance contradicts the universal experience of men,
their daily lives, do suppose a world accessible to
Their theory was insufficient nonetheless because while
hey appealed to the primacy of living, they did so in a specator-like way, as a generalization culled from sense observaFurther, they gathered their facts into logically disarguments.

Logically discoursive arguments and general-

from sense observations are proper to Understanding,
reason.
Among the idealists the Romantics came closest to successclosing the rift.

They proclaimed that Reason had an

ntuitional grasp of the universal in the concrete.
oo were unable to support their claim properly.

But they

For while they

tated that only actual living could give evidence of their posiion, they in fact remained entrenched in the spectator appeal
o living, rooting their beliefs in appeals to sense evidence
nd arguments of explicit logic rather than in actual spontanliving.

They too rested upon Understanding.

Emerson concluded that no philosopher had as yet presented
balanced view of reality because no one had tried to live an
ntirely natural life.
ower of Reason.

Hence, no one had significantly tapped

l
J'.:

I~

intention to make the attempt for himself--in hopes of at last
striking upon a truly balanced viable description of the world.
Summary
.Emerson's development from a traditional believer in
supernatural revelation to a self-reliant believer in natural
living reveals the gradual evolution of two key concepts in his
approach to philosophy.

The first is the setting aside of pre-

conceived opinions about reality; the second, the whole-hearted
effort to derive all beliefs entirely from natural living.
Chapter I concludes with his decision that only natural intelligence could reveal truths about the world, that somehow selfeliance and trust o! natural living were preferable to the halftruths of authoritarian religions suspicious of nature.

Chapter

II follows his attempts to support and concretize his beliefs
y natural intelligence with the help of traditional philosophe

e found their approaches wanting because they did not draw
their doctrines or overt justification from living.
distrusted nature.

They too

It became clear to him he would have to work

out his philosophy for himself.

As he progressed in his own

approach he translated his belief in self-reliance into the doctrine of simplicity (the suspension of prejudices), and his
belie! in the primacy of living into the doctrine o! spontaneity
(full dependence upon the experience of living).

These two doc-

trines are the subject-matter !or the next two chapters, which
comprise the positive exposition o! his philosophical procedure.

CHAPTER III
SIMPLICITY: THE RETURN TO THE EXPERIENCE OF LIVING
Emerson's philosophical procedure aimed at confirming
beliefs which claimed inclusion of true factual descriptions of
the world.

He had special interest in moral and religious be-

liefs, among them belief in God.

But just as his critique of

traditional religion convinced him that only philosophy could
confirm the claimsof moral and religious beliefs, his critique
of traditional philosophy persuaded him that only a new philosophical procedure could make possible the confirmation of any
belief--moral, religious or otherwise.

His new procedure con-

sisted of two interrelated phases, both found in the lived situation and derived directly from it.

The first, simplicity,

aimed at reaching or regaining an unprejudiced, natural lifestyle; the second, spontaneity, tried to make the natural lifestyle the ground for all theoretical beliefs about the world.
Simplicity is the subject of this chapter; spontaneity, the
focus of the next.
For clarity I have separated the study of the two aspects
of the procedure, though Emerson himself did not explicitly distinguish them.

He was disinclined to devote a thorough-going

speculative explanation of the two-sidedness of his theory,
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since he disliked malting what he thought bookish and merely technical analysis.

But the phases do show up in his working out of

concrete problems.
Two major sections comprise our study of simplicity.
first deals with the achieving of simplicity.

The

We begin with an

examination of the "youth metaphor," specially chosen by him to
convey his doctrine of simplicity.

According to the metaphor

man must regain the innocence of childhood in order to philosophize accurately.

As we shall see, the effort to recover inno-

cence involves on the one hand the negating of reliance on
Understanding, thus removing man from blinding cultural preconceptions; and on the other hand the affirming of reliance on
Reason, thus leading him into total commitment to natural living.
The doctrine of simplicity rests on the assumption that nature
is reliable.

The second major section considers the basis for

that belief.
The "Youth Metaphor"
Most often when Emerson intends to discuss the first phase
of the procedure, simplicity, he employs one metaphor among
several developed for that purpose, viz., the "youth metaphor."
It deserves close consideration.
One preliminary observation about Emerson's use of metaphor.
He was not a technical philosopher nor an academician ·and he
steadfastly refused that role.

Instead he saw himself in the
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radition of Plato, a poet-philosopher. 1
nd philosophy, Plato."

"Plato is philosophy,

To be a genuine philosopher, one "must

e more than a philosopher."

He must also be a poet in the full-

of the term--i.e., the man without impediment, who
aintains a balance between his speculative and active powers,
etween his tendency to reduce everything to unity and his tenency to stress diversity, between his inclination toward the
abstract and the removed and his inclination toward the concrete
and ordinary.

Plato closely approximated the ideal.

"Plato is

lothed in the powers of a poet, stands upon the highest place
He regarded Plato as the ancient proto-type to
he ideal American democrat.

"He is a great average man," who

of thinking with down-to-earth-living.

"A great

ommon-sense is his warrant and qualification to be the world's
nterpreter."

But Plato's short-coming was that he did not

etting his poetic power take its rightful command

uite achieve the balance.

He used his poetic gift.

it by his intellect.

Instead of

over him he

In his quest for intellectual

tried "to dispose of nature."

He tipped the scale

oward the speculative and to that extent distorted his deseripions of the universe.

Hence, like most philosophers he remained

1 John Dewey, ttRalph Waldo Emerson," in Emerson: A Collection
Critical Essa s, by Milton Konvitz and Stephan Whieher, eds.
g ewoo
s, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1962), pp. 27, et
(Hereinafter referred to as Critical Essays.)
-2Emerson, Works, Vol. III, p. 6; Vol. IV, pp. 40, 43, 47-56,
1-62, ?5-79.

a mere philosopher.

»nerson believed that to become the poet-

philosopher of the new Republic he must succeed where Plato did
not.

Thus his philosophical position dictated that his style

should be literary rather than literal.

Hence, his use of meta-

phorical language--which nonetheless was controlled and calculated for serious philosophical purposes.
The "youth metaphor" was designed to convey his notion of
simplicity.

The outset of Nature makes clear that only it a man

remains youthful in outlook can he hope to relate to his situation as it is.

Emerson notes how differently grown-ups and

children regard scenes of nature.

For example, few adults ever

really notice the sun except superfioially--they know just that
in daylight they can see.

By contrast the sun 'rshines into the

eye and the heart of the child."

He then makes this point:

"The lover of nature is he whose inward and outward senses are
still truly adjusted to each other; who has retained the spirit
of infancy into the era of 1'Ianhood. ~3

To be childlike evokes

the image of innocence, a frame of mind that lets reality unfold
itself as it is.

The cultural warp which blurs true vision has

been set aside for candor.
In Emerson's eyes a child would take things as he finds
them; he would act on what he finds merely on the basis of what
these things show him.
tion on what he sees.
3 ~., Vol. I, P•

The child does not engage in much reflecNor would he find it intelligible to

9; Vol. III, p. 26.
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color the world with the epistemological and ontological assumptions of his elders.

Such assumptions never confuse and hinder

hiS ability to act in everyday life.

Lastly a child will act

without guile and duplicity, unperturbed by formalized doctrine
or the social structures oi personal loss and gain.

He does so

calmly and single-mindedly according to the demands of the
present.

Thus the ideal was to recapture the simplicity of

childhood, to observe things as they show themselves--without
interposing any sort of preconceptions upon the observation-and

to act on the basis of the lived-experience rather than

tor any imposed motive of personal gain.
The "youth metaphortt discloses two sides to simplicity:
removal from trust in Understanding--the suspension of cultural
preconceptions; at the same time, a turn to commitment to Reason
--total surrender to natural living.
Removal of Preconceptions
Reenstatement of a youthful innocence demanded the purge of
customary presumptions about reality.

We have already witnessed

Emerson's odyssey through various previously established ways of
looking at man's situation in the world.

Each step of the ven-

ture, though it held out what seemed great and perhaps lasting
promise of human fulfilment, left his desires unfulfilled.
came to distrust any

ele~ent

He

of received culture especially

insofar as it would sug'sest itself as a ready-made and timelesacy
,I
·i'l,i
11'

,.,1,.,
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sure foundation upon which to build one's moral edifice.
suggestion which comes from society and even from one's friends
insofar as they reflect pre-established procedures are not to be
relied on.

They can mislead so many ways, sometimes purposely.

The ideal was to judge for one's self, recognizing, of course,
that even that has its pitfalls.
To procure the innocence of youth, it was not enough to
desert the city and retire to one's study to procure this innocence of youth.

"To go into solitude a man needs to retire as

much from his chambers as from society.

I am not solitary whils1

I read and write, though nobody is with me.u

4

The city, a man's

friends, his private lodgings all reflect a certain cultural
perspective.

A

person who desires to discover truth must not

let them prejudice his own view.

If they follow him into his

solitary search he will continue to apprehend things according

to the preconceptions of the established culture.

Putting aside

the settings of city-life represents a removal of the pervasive
source of pre-conceptions, one's received cultural beliefs.

But

to put them aside man must turn to nature •
.E}nerson believed man would be most apt to initiate the unobstructed state of mind among natural scenes rather than in the
city.

Being in the wilderness is "more dear and connate than in

the streets or villages.''

But he was not advocating a move back

to agrarian society, for that of itself would accomplish nothing.
4 Ibid., Vol. I, p.

?.
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The power which produces the natural outlook does not reside in
nature alone any more than in man alone--but in both together
when related in a special way.

Nor was he intimating that inno-

cence could not be achieved in the city but only that it would
be easier to discover in natural surroundings, the outmoded laws

and traditions cluttering the city confine man and positively
discourage creative responsiveness to new demands of living.

By

contrast the most impressive dimension of nature is its unboundedness and spontaneous capacity for continued growth.
pect of nature strikes a responsive chord in man.

This as-

"In the tran-

quil landscape, and especially in the distant line o.f the horizon, man beholds somewhat as beautiful as his own nature."

Man

too is part of nature; for him too should living be spontaneous
and

unbounded--just as it once was for him as a child.

woods--a man casts off his years--and is always a child.

"In the
In the

woods is perpetual youth. 11 5
:Emerson suggests that once man regains this youthful attitude its supreme value makes itself evident, .for he recognizes
it as a new and better state of mind.
and yet it is not unknown.

"It takes him by surprise,

Its effect is like that of a higher

thought or a better emotion coming over me, when I deemed I was
thinking justly or doing rightly. 116
The choice of the "youth metaphor" was quite strategic.

5works, Vol. I, pp. 8-31.
6 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 11; Vol. II, pp. 279-280.
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Michael Cowan relates in Citl

gt_~~'

Emerson's lectures

were addressed to "wild men re and farmers no more than were ·w-ordsworth' s poems directed toward •'idiot boys or solitary reapers.

11

His intended audience was primarily the young itmericans leaving
the f arma in rapidly growing numbers to spearhead westward expansion and urbanization.?

He was appealing to sentiments and

experiences still fresh in their minds, hoping to articulate
together with them an approach to social development consistent
with the ideal of freedom and equality among men.

The approach

was to live naturally, to construct within one's lived situation
social institutions which would promote further natural living,
to abolish those whiah would hinder it.

As Cowan puts it, Emer-

son intended to challenge the urban audience "not to destroy but
to remake the city ••• aecording to the organic nature of the city
dwellers themselves. 118
Surrender to Natural Living
One side of simplicity was the dispelling ot preconceptions;
surrender to natural living was the other side.

:Emerson proposes

?Michael Cowan, §Sty of the West (New Haven: Yale UniversitJ
Press, 196?), pp. 18- ; p-;-2~ -U-the time Emerson wrote
Nature (1836J he was 33. OVer ten million Americans were then
as young or younger than Emerson; only about tour million were
older. The median age was about l?.6. U.S. Bureau of the Census, ed., Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789-1945
(Washington,
Government l'Trnt!rii orrlce, 1949), p. 28.

D.c.: u.s.

8 cowan, City g!_ !h,!

~' p. 220.
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that the proper frame of mind should rely wholly on natural living and not belittle at the outset any human capacity--reason,
feelings, senses, or will.

To do otherwise would prejudice the

venture, as had traditional religion and philosophy.

The simple

man should let all his capacities .!:!,; he should allow his total
person, his body, affections, will, reason, senses, have free
rein.

"If we will not interfere with our thought, but will act

entirely, we know the particular thing, and every thing and
every man."9

Simplicity is specified by total involvement or

better perhaps, total commitment to nature.
Interference and partial activity--the counterparts to total
commitment--shed considerable light on the demand for total
involvement.

Emerson intends his initial procedure to foster a

return to spontaneous activity, whether cognitive, volitional
etc.

According to him, if one could set aside the interferences

with or obstructions to spontaneity the intuitions would come
almost all by themselves.

He complains that insight is smothered

as much by "too violent direction given by our will• as by too
great negligence."

He says: "We do not determine what we think.

We only open our senses, clear away as we can all obstruction
trom the tact and suffer the intellect to see.--But the moment we
cease to report and attempt to correct and contrive, it is not
9Works, Vol. II, p. 280; cf. pp. 2?5-280. The ideal for
true knowledge about reality for Emerson might be called the
"concrete universal," the general known in and through the
specific instance in on-going experience.
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truth •

nlO

He expressed the same idea in "Spiritual Laws.tr

If a

man says and does what strictly belongs to him nature will never
ieave him to intellectual obstructions and doubts.

Our young

people are diseased with problems which never were of practical
difficulty to anyone who didn't go out of his way to find them-such proulems as original sin, the origin of evil, predestination
and the like.

"A simple mind will not know these enemies," but

will live by firm integrity.

(Emerson casts the same aspersions

on much of academic and professional education.)

We must simply

avoid vitiating nature by the interference of our will.

Instead,

we must obey--i.e., rest secure in our spontaneous acts.

"Only

in our easy, simple, spontaneous actions are we strong, and by
contenting ourselves with obedience we become divine."
for this surrender to nature is nature itself.
of things goes to teach us faith.

The basis

"The whole course

There is guidance for each of

us, and by lowly listening we shall hear the right word. 1111
The interference of the will thwarts spontaneity; selfsurrender promotes it.

Yet this obedient surrender must not be

misread as a cancelling

~

of the use of will.

I say, do not choose; but that is a figure of speech
by whicn-r-WOuld distinguish what is commonly called
choice among men, and which is a partial act, the
choice of the hands, of the eyes, of Mie appetites,
and not a·whole act of the man. But that which I cat~
right or goodness, is the choice of my constitution.
lOibid. t Vol. II, p. 328.
11
Ibid.' Vol. II, pp. 133-139.
12Ibid. t p. 140. Italics ·ander "partial act" are mine.

-
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!}le will act obstructs spontaneity i! and only if the good which
elicits the choice is a partiality of man--exclusive preference

tor intellectual pursuits, bodily pleasures, or whatever; only
that will act which Emerson calls the whole act of man--which
chooses the good according to the promptings of man's constitution--invites a free !low of spontaneous action.

The meaning

and importance of "partial" and ,.total act" now becomes plain.

Total action involves all the functions of the hum.an constitution properly integrated (in spontaneous action); partial actions
involve erroneous choice favoring one or another function as if
that selected were supreme.

Total action is action of the man

prompted by the features of his constitution as an integral
whole, and responding by his own directionality to the rest of
nature.

Partial actions obstruct the natural directionality.

As Emerson remarks, what we usually call man, :i.e., the eating,
drinking, planting man is a misrepresentation.

Spirit, or soul--

the fully related integrated constitution of man directing himself--that is the man.

he

ma!!

It is the soul we truly respect, "would

let it appear through his [total] action."

Partial acts invariably have paralyzing effects.
The blindness of the intellect begins when it would be
something of itself. The weakness of the will begins
when the individual would be something of himself.
All reform aims in some one particular to let the soul
have its ~ay through us--in other words to engage us
to obey.l'
13Ibid., Vol. II, p. 271. "Something o! himsel!"--i.e.,
the-w!'ll decides to make its own destiny impervious to the
natural directionality in the man's nature.
~hen

~·
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BY contrast total action, i.e., the natural, full function of
soult "when it breathes through his intellect it is genius, when

it breathes through his will, it is virtue, when it flows through
14 Genius, virtue, and love are the
bis affection it is love."
three foremost expressions of the natural life-style once
achieved, expressions incidentally which frequently tie into the
"youth metaphor."
In summary, the "youth metaphor" unveils several important
features of simplicity.

First, cultivation of simplicity aims

at putting into action and language no more and no less than
experience yields.

As Nature relates, 1 5 simplicity is a love of

truth and a desire to communicate it without loss.

Loss

occurs

when a person is possessed by any desire axcept for truth--for

instance, for riches, fame or generally what Emerson refers to
as the cowardice of being ignorant.

Ignorance includes any form

of self deception in which some value is placed above truth.
Ignorance is cowardice simply because continually to seek and

to face facts requires heroic self-discipline, whereas to make
any other value supreme does not. 16 In short, simplicity requires man to try as far as possible to regain the uninhibited,
unself-conseious, innocent vision of youth. 1 ?
14

Ibid.
l5Ibid.,

Vol. I, pp. 26-31.

16Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 293-294; 103-104; Vol. I, p. 104.
l?Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 8-9; Vol. II, pp. 2?3-274; Vol. III,

pp. 275~.

__________________________
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Furthermore simplicity, purity or innocence is not primarily

-

an intellectual attitude--it is more than that, it is a life-

style.

The simple, the pure, the innocent let the facts carry

them to their course of action.
What is the doctrine of infallible guidance if one will
abdicate choice, but the striving to act uneonscious!y,
to resume the simplicity of childhood? It is so to act
on the last impression from a knowledge of all the facts
and not wilfully to secure a particular advantage. The
single-mi~ded actor insists on the tranquility of his
own mind.18
Thus, simplicity is the attitude by which one places himself in
the right Qrder of action.

The end of the procedure is not a

system of truths but a better man--and hopefully a morally
improved society.
Lastly simplicity is reached through a dual effort.

On the

one hand, an individual must begin by setting aside the judgments
about man and the world made by sooiety--i.e., those which
reflect the social mores, formal education, the arts, philosophy,
religion--then he will be able to judge for himself what is true
about man and his world.
surrender to living.

On the other hand, man must wholly

Hence :Emerson's insistent return to expres-

sions such as "human activity•" "total or partial action,tt to
pinpoint the locus of truth for man.
involvement.

Simplicity demands total

A person may not surrender only one or another

Side of himself to spontaneous behavior

~

everl

~;

he may

not dictate that, to procure his individual and personal desires,
18

~, Vol. IV, p. 318; Works, Vol. II, PP• 328-329.
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one or another side should dominate his life-style.

The proper

relations should spring up out of the natural directionalities
in concrete actual situations.
Of course, simplicity is an ideal.
it admits of degrees.

An individual's hold on

On the factual level simplicity is reli-

able but always open to further development.
selfishness do continual battle.

Integrity and

The simple person thus strives

daily to further purify his intentions.

As we have already

seen, the best environment in which to recover simplicity is in
nature itself, where, away from the distractions and inhibiting
forces of society, one might feel the relaxing goodness of an
immediate relation to nature.

The proud, the selfish, the

cowardly--but not the lowly--will miss the primary value of this
relation in man's life.

The value is life-supporting truth.

Simplicitl as an Assumption
Simplicity aims at the suspension of unwarranted assumption
and at a turn to total reliance on nature.

But Emerson's high

trust of nature is itself a rather fundamental assumption.
what did he base this assumption?
this question.

On

The following section concern

First we will consider in general the grounding

of fundamental beliefs• and next specifically Emerson's way of
grounding his belief in the reliability of nature.

Support for

a basic belief about the world does not come as much from arguments within a system of thought as from the fruitfulness of
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regarding Emerson's fundamental belief in nature.

For him the

appropriateness of trust in nature rested on the fruitfulness of
this belief in living.

Inattention to the way he grounded his

trust in nature has given rise to the mistaken notion that his
optimism resulted instead from an inability to admit seriously
the presence of evil in the world.

The final section of the

chapter will comment on his supposed dewy-eyed optimism.

--------

Basic Belief in General

The creation of any procedure for describing the world must
inimally lean on some assumptions about the reliability of the
world in general and about man's faculties in particular, since
to construct a valid method already supposes the mind capable of
judging the validity of a method.

Furthermore, if one supposes

the reliability of human intelligence to make such judgments
and if, moreover, one asserts that a given method actually suits
existing states of affairs, then one must lean also on the assumption that these states of affairs are trustworthy enough,
stable enough, to permit the assertion.

Without some stability

it becomes pointless to claim any method applies.
As a matter of fact we hold all sorts of notions as true
ithout challenge, notions received from our culture and which
our experience over a period of time supports.

Only when they

come in conflict wi ti: other and more basic truths do we begin
to doubt them.
initial certaint

As Bertrand Russell remarks, "Wherever we feel
ent to make us doubt

not

~
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an argument to make us believe." 19 In other words the proper
frame of mind in which to begin philosophizing is to accept convictions and principles to the extent they do not give occasion
to doubt them.
Granting that we begin by accepting many principles at hand,
the larger issue is whether the principles, especially fundamental ones can be justified.

In one sense justification for first

principles about a man's world-view cannot be given, if justification means to give speculative reasons which validate or verif)
the principles.

First principles are belief-statements and hence

do not call for speculative verification.

They express more the

speaker's acceptance of a point of view as basic than that these
statements are true or false.

But in another way they can be

supported.
William James' study of belief is helpful.

According to

him most of the time sound intellectual reasons direct our
choices. Still when it comes to genuine options 20 regarding
fundamental beliefs we seem to have no good reasons for our
l9Bertrand Russell, An Outline of Philosophy, Meridian Booke
(New York: The World Publiihlng Compiiiy, I96o), p. 1?4.
20 James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays (New York: Dover Publicatio'ii'S;' Inc.,-r956), pp.~4. (Hereinafter referred tc
as The Will to Believe.) An option is genuine when a) living,
b) force<rana-c) momentous. An option is living according to thE
degree of willingness to act on it; forced when "there is no
standing place outside the alternatives," e.g., "Either accept
this truth or go without it.1t1 momentous when it offers a unique
opportunity, the stake significant, the decision unalterable-1.e., ideas are in an unalterable relation to the situation
either for or against it. Example: a trip into outer space.

~

------------------------------------------------~7~1---,

cb.oice.

Rather the reasons are defensible only within the on-

going lived-situation.

11our

We

~

our choice.

A case in point.

belief' in truth itself, for instance, that there is a truth,

and that our minds and it are made for each other."

The will to

believe, James holds, is a normal element in making up one's
mind.

When an option cannot be decided on intellectual grounds,

a man must decide by his "passional nature."

For

111

Do not de-

cide, but leave the question open,' is itself a passional decision--just like deciding •yes' or 'no' and is attended by the
same risk of losing truth."

In either case we act, we choose. 21

What then of the options between a trust of nature and
. I

scepticism?

Nodding to Emerson, James states that logic can

neither prove nor refute either intellectual or moral scepticism.

-and resolve

"When we stick to it that there is truth (be it of either kind),
we do so with our whole nature,
the results."

to stand or fall by

No argument can prove whether he or the sceptic

will have at last taken the wiser stand.
But his choice is still defensible.

He maintains that from

his perspective experience itself seems to suggest goodness and

trustworthiness.

If this life is not a real fight in which we

gain some lasting success for the universe, then life is no
better than a private little play from which one may withdraw at
Will.

"But it feels like a .fight--as if there were something

Wild in the universe which we, with all our idealities and

21~ •• pp. 9, 11, 19. 31.

'[,

-
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faithfulness, are needed to redeem. 022
The sense in which basic belief a are defensible is clarified by Carnap's discussion about the "external question."
nap suggests that to ask whether x is

~

Car-

or not is to ask whe-

ther x is an element within a given system, (internal question).
Means at hand exist by which to answer this question within a
system--by some means of verification or by some logical princiIt is inappropriate however, to ask such a speculative

ple.

question about a system ! !

~

whole, (external question).

In this

case the word 'real' cannot meaningfully be used because 'real'

arises as a term employed in response to questions where there

are on hand the means within
tions.

~

system for answering such ques-

But there is no similar means by which to raise specula-

tively either the question or its answer outside the system.
Instead, Carnap proposes, when an individual asks whether '*x is
real" as an external question, what he means to ask is whether
"xis suitable to his own basic point of view about the world."
Or more precisely it is to ask a practical question regarding
the fruitfulness of adopting x as his own framework or as a fea-

ture of his framework, as the case may be.

Thus when a person

states that "x is the case," he may be answering the internal
question affirmatively, viz., "xis an element within my system,
as has been established by the proper means of verification or
logical principle;" or he may be responding to the external
22

-Ibid.,

P• 61.

~
'
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question affirmatively, viz., "acceptance of x as a totality has
truit!ul consequences for me, as practical testing has established."

The latter is a belief statement.

It reflects some

justification but not speculative.
Applied to first principles, there is no way within the
system to verify or establish first principles since the system
itself including acceptable norms for verification and justification depends on them.

To ask whether these principles are

therefore, cannot be an internal question.

rea~

I wish to maintain

that the appropriate means to establish them is pragmatic--i.e.,
one must test them in terms of their range of fruitfulness tor
his life-style. 2 3
My purpose in interjecting these summary remarks about
basic assumptions has been not to make my own act of personal
belief regarding them but to clear an opening in which we might
more readily sit down to a discussion of .Emerson's way of
supporting his choice of first principles.
Emerson's Grounding .Q! Trust!!! Nature
Emerson maintains that we begin by believing and require
definite arguments to reject a belief, especially as regards our
fundamental assumption about the reliability of nature and of
~an

within it.

The "youth metaphor" serves us again.

For we

2 3Rudolt Carnap, ".Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," pp.
178-193, in ContemEorar~ Readin~s in Lo~ieal Theoml' ed. by Irving M. Copi and James A. ~ould NeW-Yor : Tlie Haem llan Company,

1967).

?4
have seen that the child, the innocent youth, accepts the day as

it comes to him.

He simply trusts nature.

The youth's assump-

tions are derived from his on-going experience which have geners.llY sustained him; he has little store of past experience or

social conditioning which would close definitively many future
possibilities.

By Emerson's standard a position loses credibil-

ity if it does not aid man to live more satisfactorily, for it
does not fit into the range of human importance.
He insisted that man ought to begin by trusting nature.
need call up only a few examples.

We

Nature opens with the forth-

right complaint that the present age spends too much of its
energies mulling over the bones of past generations.
generation beheld nature face to face.

Each prior

Why then should we mas-

querade in their faded wardrobe?
Undoubtedly we have no questions to ask which are unanswerable. We must trust the perfection of the creation
so far as to believe that whatever curiosity the order
of things has awakened in our minds, the order of things
can satisfy. Every man's condition is a solution in
hierglyphic to those inquiries he would put. He acts
it as life, before he apprehends it as truth.24

Each man must find truth for himself or go without it.

Truth

comes by genuine living, by self-reliance, self-surrender.
Three years after Nature he wrote that the true fall of
man came when he held himself in disesteem. Self-trust, however,
is man's redemption. 2 5 In an 1844 lecture we read, "We shall
24 Emerson, Works, Vol. I, pp. 3-4.

25Rusk, Letters, Vol. II, p. 213.

-
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rely on the Law alive and beautiful which works over our heads
and under our feet.

Pitiless it avails itself of our success

when we obey it and of our ruin when we contravene it."
men secretly believe in it.

All

"They believe that the best is the

true; that right is done at last; or chaos would come." 26

Else-

where, he throws this challenge at himself--"Believe that the
world exists for you.

For you is the phenomenon perfect and

what we are. that only we see." 2 ?
Enerson believed that one had to trust totally because any
other approach would make living impossible. He held with the
Transcendentalists 28 that the most unassailable feature of experience is that man is alive, and that living itself urges the
striving for continuance of life on levels far above the merely
biologicai. 29 Any principle which blurs or opposes this fact,
that is, which if followed through would reduce life or make it
absurd, is not true.

''This is a true account of our instinctive

faith--simply that it is better in the view of the mind than any
other way, therefore must be the true way.
must be the truer way."

Whatever is better

What is better in the view of the mind?

26.Enerson, Yorks, Vol. III, p. 283.
2? JMN, Vol. Vt p. 182.

-

28 c:r. Brownson, "fhe Convert," p. 46; also Reed. "Observations o'll9the Growth of the Mind," p. 54; also the remark in the
second number of the Dial, that youth was not so much protesting
the past as beginning~live in the present; p. 22, in ~
!Fanscendentalists, ed. by Miller.

29 Enerson, Works, Vol. III, P• 64; p. 113.

,,,
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"That is always best which gives me to myself'."30

11

What gives

me to myself" is another way of saying. "what enables me to live.t1
According to his criticism of established descriptions of

man in his world, both sensism and idealism severed one or
another aspect of' man from his daily world• thus paradoxically
rendering life on speculative grounds impossible.

The best is

what joins man together whole with this world so that he may be
alive, healthy again.

(One of Emerson's common themes was Piety

restores man to Health.)

We should recall an earlier passage.

that all men secretly believe the best is true "or else chaos
would come."

In another place he warns that as soon as I sus-

pect the reliability of nature "already the long shadows of
untimely oblivion creeps over me, and I shall decrease forever.1131
Emerson was not merely stating that man could no longer
give speculative reasons f'or his conduct; he would simply not be
able to !£]_.

He could not live.

For the denial would involve

man in a 1·1orld where all states of affair3 would move chaotically, including man himself.

In a world of complete disorder--

a dire dominion of cha.nee, he calls it--life and specifically
human life could not sustain itself.

It made no sense to stand

by theories of the world which if followed through would make

living "an impossible curse."3 2

30JMN, Vol. III, P• 31? (Jan., 1832 ) ; Works, Vol. It pp.
13l-132:-3lworks, Vol. III, P• 283; Vol. I, pp. 131-132.

~-··------------------------~
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He recoiled from phJ.losophies which held. positions that made
the ordinary world of daily experience paradoxical.
could not run counter to the natural li.fe-style.

Speculation

As the "youth

metaphor'' underscores, our living is the primary experience.

Human living, its content and relations, are the unassailable
facts.

Statemen:~s

which would make living impossible are .false;

only those which arise in the lived situation and which promote
living are true.

He was .fond of stressing that the most abstract

truth is the most practical.33

Living rather than speoulat!ve

arguments persuades man of his moat basic beliefs.

Emerson

opted for trust in natural living, because only that belie.f
seemed to promote human living.
Emerson's Optimism
The quality of his optimism requires special comment.

Com-

mon aphorism has it that he looked upon the world with the incautious, rosy-glassed eyes of youthful idealism, that his world
was a bower of fairy-tale dreams, that he could not grow up
enough to taste and admit the bitterness of a harsh but real
world.34
Llilliam James comments that Emerson• s

32~' Vol. II, P• 6; P• 252.

33 Emerson, Works, Vol. I, P• 4.
34E.g., James T. Adams, "Emerson Re-read," pp. 31-39; for az:
opposite view, cf., Ralph H. Gabriel, "Emerson and Thoreau," pp.
55-64, in The Transcendentalist Revolt Against Materialism, ed.
George WhiClier (~ostont fi.C. Yeatli ana Oompany, 1949).
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••• optimism had nothing in common with that indiscriminate hurrahing for the Universe with which Walt Whitman
has made us familiar. For Emerson, the individual fact
and moment were indeed suffused with absolute radiance.
but it was upon a condition that saved the situation-they must be worthy specimens--sincere, authentic, arehet;}'-pal; they must have made connection with what he calls
the moral Sentiment./ 5
fhiS assessment is particularly noteworthy because James usually

contrasts t•optimism" with his own belief in "meliorism."

By

"meliorism" he meant the view that the world improves only by
generous involvement and trust on man's part.

11

0ptimism" was

untenable because it suggested a world at its very best now,
needless of the additions of hum.an effort.

But evidently James

found Emerson's breed of optimism closer to his own thinking.
Rightly so.

The

p~cture

of Emerson as incurably, overly optim.is

tic was originated largely by the fancy of the New England Victorian mood coming after his death, which seemed to be in search
!or a clean sexless American gentleman hero who would not embarrass the public mores of the day.3 6

The fact is, Dnerson's years saw many dismal clouds.

His

childhood was hard because of the early passing of the man of
the household.

Calvinist rearing, according to his biographer,

Rusk, was severe.37

Yet when h~ want off to college, he was

almost heady with the prospects he dreamed o! ahead of him.

But

35uames, "Address at the :&rlers<>n Centenary in Concord.," p.
22. in Critical Essays. ed. by Konvitz and Whicher.
36.Q!. ill!!!' Vol. I, pp. xiii, ~ .!!.9..9.•
3?Rusk, ~ 2f Ralph Yaldo :.Frierson, p. 55.

',I
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as hiS journals show, the more he studied the less sure of his
8
destiny he became. The Humean crisis almost overcame him.3
AS he began to rebuild his hopes during the earliest most promis-

illS years as a minister, his frail wife of deepest romantic
attachment passed away.

The very next year he found he had to

set aside regular Christian ministry.

rekindle his confidence again.
801 ved

His trip to Europe did

We have seen that there he re-

upon his own philosophical posture.

hero worship for his European mentors.

But it cost him his

Home again, soon after

in 1834 his brother Edward with whom he was very close died-leaving Ralph Waldo stunned.

him (1935).
Charles.

But remarriage seemed to straighten

Again however, death struck, this time his brother

The birth of Ralph's first child, Waldo, sparked his

enthusiasm once more.39

In January, 1842, the child died at

tive years of age.
Nor did he turn his eyes away from the deep social difficulties which were plaguing the nation.

He was associated with

the Transcendentalists and could scarcely have avoided contact
with these troubles.

Most members of the intellectual community

in which he held active voice were dedicated to some type of
social reform.

Nam.es such as Horace Greeley, Sumner, Garrison,

Dorthea Dix, Horace Mann, even John Brown, come to mind.

Closer

to home Theodore Parker, also a social reformer and conscience

i

i

l

38 JMN, Vol. II, pp. xi-xiv •
............
39Rusk, Life Sl!.. Ralph Waldo Emerson, pp. 2;0-232.
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o! the Congress, was Emerson's friend.

Brownson, enthusiastic-

allY received into the service of the Transcendentalists (for a
relatively short while) was writing remarkably strong and incisive attacks against the exploitation of the laboring classes by
their employers.
cisms.

Some of :Emerson's writings express like criti-

We have yet to mention the most excruciating social cri-

sis of all--slavery and the Civil War.

Emerson shared the haunt-

ing concern of the Transcendentalists over Negro slavery and the
restless premonition of an impending Civil War.

He can scarcely

I
\

1,

be accused of imperviousness to the bitter facts of human exis-

1

tence.

I

Yet he insisted on an optimistic stand.
ience appeared to support it.

The American exper-

Progress in materialities and in

~

~

oral uprightness seemed to come to those who took their norms
111

tor conduct from natural living rather than from received traditions.

Despite its problems America was in a unique position to

offer that approach and those rewards to everyone.

The possi-

t

I

I

bility for American democracy to bring about the fullest develop-

~

ent of man's capacities was largely taken to have already prove

I
j

itself in the eyes of Emerson's American contemporaries.

His

11'1

friends made it a frequent subject of their journalism.
The same optimism burned in Emerson too.

I

In the beginning

paragraph of Nature, Emerson demands. why should we not have a
Poetry and philosophy of insight and a religion revealed to

why should we settle for a philosophy, a poetry. a religion,

~

.!!§.;

r

'J

I

'I

I
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that bas come to us second-hand through history and traditions?

ttEmbosomed for a season in nature, whose floods of life stream
around and through us, and invite us, by the powers they supply,
to action proportioned to nature,'' why grope diffidently in the

past?

"The sun shines today also.

in the fields.

There is more wool and flax

There are new lands, new men• new thoughts. ,, 4 o

The American Scholar proclaims: "Our day of dependence, our long
apprenticeship, to the learning of other lands--draws to a close
••• , Events, actions, arise, that must be sung, that will sing
themselves.

Who ean doubt that poetry will revive and lead in

a new age?"

Confidence in the unsearehed might of man belongs

to the "American Scholar" because freedom teaches the true importance and .force of the individual.

When the American scholar

recognizes his importance then "a nation of men will for the
first time exist, because he believes himself inspired by the
Divine Soul which also inspires all men." 41 The major force
motivating him to hold to a reliance on man and trust of nature
in general was that the American experience supported it.

Where

men could follow the promptings of their intrinsic makeup, and
unfettered by social institutions distrustful of nature men
could deal directly with their environment, there they would
prosper most.

40
4

Emerson, Works, Vol. I, p. 3.

1~ •• pp. 81-82; pp. 114-115.

~
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Conclusion and Resume'
In one sense no reasons--i. e., no speculatbre support--can
ground a fundamental belief, we have also shown that in another
sense practical reasons--reasons within lived-experience itself-can be mounted to endorse a genuine option.

Two facts should

now be clear regarding Emerson's understanding about his basic
convictions.
belief.

First of all, he regards these assumptions as a

He calls his optimism a belief, or instinctive faith,

a primary faith. 42

Furthermore, the weight that secures his

belief is pragmatic, though he does not strip the pragmatic of
important speculative implications.
James called a "genuine option."

His optimism suggests what

If trust in nature actually

makes living a more valuable enterprise, then to that extent this
belief has speculative importance.

It indicates something posi-

tive about the actual states of affairs--"the best is true.rr
Emerson's position is in the order of belief, but a belief which
as its evidence within a particular life-style.

He musters on
its behalf that any other view would make living impossible. 4 3

In

r~sume",

this chapter first described the attitude of

simplicity, the attempt to recover a life-style free from unwarranted assumptions.
42

The effort required both removal of

E.g., JMN, Vol. V, P• 182; Works, Vol. III, p. 283;
Vol. III, p. ;I'?; Works, Vol. I, P• 127.
4

l

~'

.3"The soul refuses limits, and always affirms an Optimism,
never a Pessimism." Only with that attitude can one live.
Works, Vol. II, p. 122.
-
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preconceptions. and total trust of natural living.

Next came an

examination of the support he brought to his own assumption that
nature was trustworthy.

In one way, within a system of thought,

no convincing argument could be given for a fundamental belief
such as this.

In another way. his belief could be confirmed

pragmatically, by the experience of living according to the
belief.

His optimism was tempered by his experience.

The aim of simplicity was to have man yield to spontaneous
living, since only spontaneity would reveal a balanced, lifepromoting approach to reality.

In the next chapter we take up

spontaneity, concentrating on its procedural dimension--on the
means for Yerifieation which spontaneity yields.

~-----------------------------------....,
,.

CHAPTER IV

SPONTANEITY: THE .EXPERIENCE OF LIVING
Simplicity ushers in phase two of the procedure--spontaneity, full reliance on the promptings of natural living.

The

childlike man commits himself totally to the experience of living which then becomes the source for his beliefs about the
world.

It also offers him a reliable procedure by which to test

the conformity of these beliefs to fact.
topic of the present chapter.

This procedure is the

We find that the verification pro-

cedure not only arises out of but is the experience of living.
Emerson harbors no a priori reasons for holding that
beliefs require a testing procedure of some sort.

Yet that he

finds one necessary marks the strength of his philosophy.

He

had deep misgivings about the assumption common among Transcendentalists that whatever passes as a spontaneous intuition may
be trusted to reflect without further ado the actual state of
affairs. It seems that he refused to join actively the Brook
Farm1 episode not because he was socially awkward, nor because
1 In 1841 a group gathered at Brook Farm to form a self-sustaining transcendentalist community, founded on the belief that
if each individual performed those tasks he felt were most natural to him the association would flourish both intellectually and
financially. Though invited, Emerson refused to join. A few
years after its inception the association in its original form
tailed • .Q!. George Hochfield, ed., Selected Writings 2£. ~
84
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he regarded corporate high-mindedness with suspicion but because
he recognized that the participants had not girded their good
will for the fatal eventuality that their "intuitions" might at

iast conflict with those of the other participants.

For they

all believed that truth was one and that they were one in the

truth.

He hedged his enthusiasm with a procedure to insure

a~ainst

self-deception.

In his eyes, a doctrine of intuition

which overlooked this procedure would not have let nature speak

for herself, or perhaps better, have allowed her full say.
Three principal tasks confront us.

The first is to explore

Dnerson's meaning for 'the real'--his procedure for tests whether
beliefs conform to reality having been tailored to fit the supposed stance of reality.

The second is a twin task: to show he

actually made natural living the test of truth and that the test
involved a procedure.

The third is to outline the norms and

structure of that procedure, which as we shall see indicates an
incipient pragmatism.
Emerson's Notion of Being
The procedure for verifying beliefs about the world is to
determine whether they actually relate to something real.

It is

important to specify Emerson's meaning for 'the real' or 'being'
in order to determine the scope of the procedure.

It must be

broad enough to cover all general aspects of reality.
I

l

He

rnerican Transcendentalists (New York: The New American Library,
nc., 1966), pp. 313, et." sqq.

rr .--·___- - - - - - . . ,
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equates 'being,' 'living,' 'evolving.' The procedure for verification will be to discover whether a given belief relates to
'fital qualities in experience, to a kind of evolution.
To be real, to exist, does not suggest the relation to time
and space as modern philosophy commonly used the term, nor the

•aetus

-

~"

of scholastic philosophy.

Being subsumes the sensi-

ble and the ideal, as well as essence and existence.

Emerson's
theory of being runs a remarkable parallel to Hegel's. 2 To be
real is to be whole, possessed of self-subsv.·ning degrees.
it also differs from Hegel's in important ways.

But

Hegel admits

the aesthetic dimension of experience but makes the aesthetic
subservient to Reason; Emerson insists that a philosopher who
2 Emerson was in touch with Hegelian thinking all through his
career• Several of his assooiates--George Bancroft, F. H. Hedge,
and later Theodore Parker--were conversant with Hegel's writings
in German. Bancroft, for a while, even attended Hegel's Berlin
lectures. Emerson also knew the St. Louis Hegelian, w. T. Harri
even contributing articles to Harris' Journal of Speculative
Philosophy. Through this acquaintance he poss'IDly had access to
Harris' translations of Hegel, and his "Outlinestt of Hegel's
works. Emerson's philosophy was well formed when around 1850 he
began serious study of Hegel. He gave closest attention to The
Philoso~hy of Art, and The Lectures on the Philosoph~ of Histo'ft·
Or. lis !ng-rn-itarding'~eraon's LI'6riri. Biit h8 ound Hege
too abstract, preferring instead to glean Hegel's notions from
works by his followers--those by Victor Cousin, for instance.
The book which, perhaps opened Hegel's thoughts most to Emerson
was The General Principles of Nature (1848), by the American
Hege!iin, John Stal!o. toy(i9D. Easton, H~el's First American
Followers (Athens, Ohio: Ohio Universityess, 1966), pp. 4=9;
pp.

43-49.

Cousin, 1792-1867, a French populizer of Hegel, was a rathe
ecclectic philosopher who tried synthesizing Kantianism and Gerllla.n Romanticism with Scottish Common Sensism, to provide a rational basis to the contingent propositions of science and the
absolute of morals and religion. Cf. Joseph L. Blau, Men and
Movements in American Philoso h (~glewood Cliffs, N.J:! l5rin-

.

i
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subordinates the aesthetic to the rational in his over-all desoription of being will end up with an unbalanced, intellectualistic philosophy.

He holds that even Plato succumbed to the

temptation to overemphasize the rational.
closed and completed description of being.

The result was a
The philosopher's

quest for unity leads him to ignore the equally present and important features of multiplicity and evolution in his over-all
description of being.

Hegel is susceptible to that charge too,

as Dewey would later specifically point out.3

For Emerson, how-

ever, being is in principle open-ended, having no final complete
phase.

'Being,' 'Living,' 'Evolving' Eguated
'The real' or 'being' first of all signifies life.

On the

one hand being is identified with the good and positive, while
on the other, non-being is identified with evil and negation.
Just as being means good, so good means life.
Good is positive. Evil is merely privative, not
absolute ••• All evil is so much death or nonentity.
Benevolence is absolute and real. So much benevolence as a man hath, so much life hath he.4
Since being is the good, and the good i& what has life, being is
what has life.

In the "Poet" he relates: "!t'hat will recvncile

,,'

,;I

me to life and renovate nature, to see trifles animated by a

3newey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, enlarged edition (Bos
ton: The Beacon Press, !948)-;-p. 106; Art as :Experience, Capricorn Books (New York: P. Putnam's Sons-;-I'9°5S'), p. 289.
4

Emerson, Works, Vol. I, p. 124.
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endeney, and to know what I am doing."

r

He calls this "the sci-

the real,"5 meaning that by contact with the real a perthe power of life •

.Bein' also means the developmental, the evolving.

:Enerson

ictures the cosmos as an organism endowed with being, life, dirctionality by its soul.

He distinguishes two views of the world

nderstanding sees all changes as ever-recurring movements beeen opposites.
reaotion.
ce versa.

For every action there is an equal and oppo-

For every evil, an equal and opposite good and

Circumstances eventually balance themselves accord-

ng to an ine>capable leveling justice.
othing new happens in the long run.

Change is repetitious,

But Understanding deals

th appearances, the surfaces of life.

Reason on the contrary,

ecognizing a deeper fact than repetition,

.!!!•t

unreversed erea-

development. has the true grasp of reality, life itself.
fundamentally is
••• the aboriginal abyss of real Being. Essence or God,
is not a relation or a part, but the whole. Being is
the vast affiruative, excluding negation ••• Nature,
truth, virtue, are the influx from th~nce. Vice is
the absence or departure of the same.6
ice, since it is non-bing, "Nothing, Falsehood," can beget no
"can it work for it is not."

Only being can do any-

The activities of being are necessarily creative, involving

.
l
.

_________
5IE.!£., Vol. III, P• 12.

6

~., Vol. II, pp. 120-121.

_____.

-

89
For creativity is just

the achievement of new phases of life.?
another term for living or being.

He comments that at times man

is conscious in himself of a "life above life in infinite de-

isrees. tt

Tb.is 'uhbounded substance' has had such inadequate

titles as "Fate, Minerva, Muse, Holy Ghost," which were meant to
~onvey

the notion of creative directionality.

But "in our more

[Correct writing we give to this generalization the name of Being,
~nd thereby confess that we have arrived as far as we can go." 8
In their fullest sense being, goodness, life and creativity
apply to God.

Man insofar as he is good, i.e., truly lives,

shares in the being of God.

To the extent man betters himself--

-

lives according to his nature--he is.

As Emerson says, the deep-

est fact in the soul is its own nature.

-

It is a life; it is.

The law of the soul is growth, the enlargement of life proper to

man.

It is present in man in degrees.9

The more an individual

shares in the power of the soul the more real he is.
~ay

Thus one

according to strict usage say that man is in the process of

~ealizing 10 himself; man gradually opens himself to an ever
fuller reception of being.
Self-existence is the attribute of the Supreme Cause,
and it constitutes the measure of good by the degree
?Ibid., pp. 122-124.
lwill be-ei'plained later.
8 Ibid., Vol. III, P•

The "novelty" aspect of life or being

?3.
9 Ibid., Vol. II, p. 122.
1011 Genius realizes and adds."

~.,

Vol. III, p. 11.
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which it enters into all lower forms. All things real
are so by so much virtue as they contain.11
Emerson could state that wisdom and virtue are proper addi~ions

-

"In a virtuous act I properly am •••• 1'b.ere is no

of being.

ta.x on the good of virtue, for that is the incoming of God himI am my "soul"--! .2 to the degree
the divine Soul (Being) can extend itself in me. 12

self or absolute existence."

His was not a spectator-view of reality.

The soul manifests

itself to man not so much by giving man answers in words but by
becoming him whom it enlightens, i.e •• by giving man's actions
their direction.

Emerson considered this manifestation the

highest event in nature.

It was this sort of manifestation he

called "Revelation," a surge of divine goodness and intelligence
in man's actions. 1 3
Placed in its social context Em.arson's thinking on the soul
takes on added meaning.

Early New England theologians could not

understand how in a society individual men could be both free
and yet morally upright.

Human nature was depraved.

own devices it would tend to evil.

Left to its

In the covenant of the

Redemp~

tion God agreed to direct soe:iety toward the good, but only
through its leaders.

But in Emerson's day, many younger Ameri-

cans, including Emerson, argued that since God created all

ll~., Vol. II, p. ?O.
12Tb.is explains what he means by, "!fb.at is best which gives
me to myself." Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 185, 124, 122.

-

13Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 280-281.
lates living, virtue, being.

Note how once more he re-

','

1','

I!,,

~

'I
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natures (i.e •• intrinsic constitutions of things) and directs all
things according to their natures. the directionalities of one•s
nature must be good.

Therefore, the freer men could be to follow

this natural directionality in their own lives--the more they let
God direct them--the more morally upright they would become.
Democracy was to bring about a New Eden and a nation of New
14

[Adams.

All beings share in divine Being.

To do so is to share in

the divine life of the Soul which is ceaselessly creative.

Hence all beings have some degree of creativity. manifesting
itself as an evolutionary process.

'To be,• therefore, means not

only 'to live' but in some sense 'to evolve.•

Clarification of

nis notion of evolution sheds light on his notion of being.

As

study of his sources and writings reveals, evolution is the progression to ever higher degrees of self-fulfilling relations
~ith

the rest of nature--each stage with an aspect continuous

~ith

the past and yet with another aspect better and entirely

new in nature.
Sources Influencing His View of Evolution
A great variety of sources influenced Emerson's evolutionary
~heory

of nature.

Actually he was quite slow in adopting it.

14cf. R.L..B. Lewis, The American Adam (Chicago: The Univer~ity ot-miicago Press, 19~, pp. 1-10-:---r"The face of character
is cumulative ••• That is it which throws thunder into Chatham's
~oice, and dignity into Wkshington's port, and America into
1dam•s eye.'' .Emerson, Works, Vol. II, pp. 59-60.

,,.-________________________________
-

~
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In college the idea of growth and progress was widely discussed,
both inside and outside of class. 1 5 From the early 1820's to

l835 especially, while he engaged in a rather informal but
serious dialectic about it he read several philosophers for help,
among them Plato and Plotinus.

Though he rejected both--Plato

because he took the relations between forms to be static rather
than dynamic or organic; 16 Plotinus because his doctrine of emanation seemed to render the material side of experience insignificant, not to say, unreal--he still found evolution difficult
to accept. 1 7
His remedial trip to Europe in 1833 settled him into a more
sympathetic reception of evolution.

In Paris, he toured the

"Botanical Garden," where specimens had been arranged according
to structural similarities.

He was fully aware at the time that

Buf fon and Lamark had already made im~ortant discoveries there
supporting evolution, 18 and he too was deeply struck by the order
l5:&nerson moved from one side of the debate to the other and
back again, in an effort to examine its worth. Mildred Silver,
"Emerson and the Idea of Progress," American Literature, XII
(March, 1940), pp. 3-4.
16Johnathan BishoF• Emerson on the Soul (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1964), p. 236,
Cf.Richard P. Adams,
"Emerson and the Organic Metaphor," PLMA-;-LXIX (March, 1954), pp.
117-130. Emerson more than any of t'fi'e'i.franscendentalists exploited the idea of the organic metaphor--that nature is to be conceived of as a vital growing organism. Hochfield, Selected ~rit~
~ .2! ~ American Transcendentalists, p. xvii.
-

n. nr;

l7Henry D. Gray, Emerson (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 191?), pp. 44-45, 51.
18Lamark greatly influenced him during the 1830's at the
height of his search for a viable unifying theory of reality. He

~·
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suggested by the arrangement as his comments soon after reveal.
EVerY form "is an expression of something in man the observer ••••

an occult relation between the very worm, the crawling scorpions
and man." 1 9

In a lectu2e "Use of Natural History, 0 given upon

returning home, he declares:
••• the system of La Marek aims to find a monad of
organic life which shall be common to every animal,
and which beeomes ••• a mastiff or a man, according
to circumstances. It says to the caterpillar 'How
dost thou, Brother! Please God, you shall yet be
a philosopher.•20
In 1835, he confesses "I cannot but think that mere enumeration
of the objects would be found to be more than a catalogue;-would be a s:ymmetrical picture not designed by us but by our
Mak er,

••• 0 21

He had become sympathetic to the theme of develop-

ment but the clear recognition of the primary role of process in
the scheme of evolution would be lacking until about 1840.
Nothing extensive has been done to answer why Emerson at
last moved so certainly in favor of an evolutionary perspective.
drew much of Lam.ark from Lyell's Principles o.f Geology. Though
in Emerson's eyes a ttmere catalogue of .facts-;ir It had the merit
of depending for its theory on Lamark. 'Whicher suggests Lyell
also had the special significance o.f showing him nature's move•
~ents in a time-perspective so vast that his initial optimism
~bout its submission to human power required much modification.
'Whicher, Freedom and Fate, p. 146; Vivian C. Hopkins, S~ires of
Form (Cambridge: Rarvarcr-university Press, 1951), p. l~ •
-l9Rusk, Life of Ralph Waldo :Elnerson, pp. 188-189;
Vol. IV, p. 1~m;;vor.
t
p. 4:;.
20
Rusk, ~·• i[l;!!, V, p. 220.
21 Rusk, ibid.

v.

-

£!• ~.

re:- s•1gg~stion

4

is simply that he saw the implications o: a
22
scientifically rev~aled universe and fa.cad them squarely.
In
good

rief, the scientific attitude declares that norms for dealing
with experience should ::i.rise from experience its elf.

In Emer-

son's case the experience was the procesn of human living.
Indeed "Circles" does read like a manifesto on behalf of the
experimental :rmthod. 23

It is quite plausible his close atten-

ion ·to scientific t 11inking did most to convince him of the

evelopmental quality of nature.

He sustained life-long interest

n the work of a number of scientists.

With some--notably Rich-

had. first-hand acquaintance. 24
Darwin's works were certainly among those he read. 2 5

d Owen and Agassez--he

But

pparently Emerson had already settled on his own theory before
rwin's was published.

In .fact he seems to have been little

n!luenced by Darwin's work.

Darwin merely supported his philo-

ophical conclusions with additional scientific facts.
Emerson's notion of evolution differs significantly from
22
Silver, "Em.arson and the Idea of Progress," p. 1, n. l;
uard Lindeman, "Emerson's Pragmatic Mood," American Scholar.
(Winter, 1946-194?), pp. 59-60.
2" "Emerson's ideal of the American scholar whose proper
ondition is 'man thinking' seems to have no more adequate embodent than the scientist at work." Marx w. Warto.fsky. Conceptual
oundations of Scientific Thought (New York: The Macmillan Comany, 1
,--p. 410.
24

Silver, 11 .Emerson and the Idea of Progress," p. 13; Linde' ".Emerson' s Pragmatic Mood , " pp. 59-60.
2 5cr. Stanley T. Williams, ed., "Unpublished Letters of
ersou"';'"' Journal of English and Germanic Philology, XXVI, pp.

?7-4?8.

-

-

-

-
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For Emerson evolution is organized growth--not

that of Darwin.

a process directed by chance natural selection and survival of
the fitt0st.

Moreover, Darwin was concerned only with biological

species; Emerson, with human experience and nature as a whole.
Evolution was more than the reconfiguration of basic particles--

it was spiral, nature repeating the same process on different
planes, each adaptation a step higher.
place at each ascent.

Genuine growth took

Something qualitatively

~

happened at

each ascent, something which no forms of nature previously could
.
26
achieve.
Emerson's Notion of E.volution
Emerson's concept of evolution only insinuated itself in
his earlier essays, as when for instance he asks regarding the
American scholar:
What is nature to him? There is never a beginning,
there is never an end, to the inexplicability o.f this
web of God but always circular power returning into
itself. Therein it resembles his own spirit, whose
beginninf~ whos~ ending, he can never find--so entire,
so boundless.2"/
fhe passage suggests a working tbroup;h of the Nee-Platonic theory
of divine power retu:-ninr; to itself.

But the groundwork for the

!breakthrough and his later thin:king is present.
endless change; it also returns to itself.

Nature is an

In what sense?

Ii

!i
,I

~6

- Hopkins, Spires of Form, p. 123; Whicher, Freedom and
~' p. 141; Henry H. CIT"ark, "Emerson and Science," l?liilosophi~ ,Quarterly, X (July, 1931), P• 241.
2
7Ernerson, Works, Vol. I, P• 85.

i·'
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pirst of all, the change which is a foremost mark of nature does

not suggest constant overturn, upheaval, and reversal.
is a certain self-regulated motion or change."

"Nature

Further, nature

iS "the rapid efflux of goodness executing and organizing it-

self."

In the "return", the termini of change are laws and con-

cretions--general laws and particular facts in the process of
ever-further development.

"Every ultimate fact is only the

tirst in a new series.

Every general law only a particular fact
o! some more general law presently to disclose itself." 28
The way Emerson uses the word 'return' undergoes very subtle

changes from essay to essay as he inches toward his evolutionary
position.

At first the ttreturn" connotes some gradually develop-

ing identity between concrete instances and their changeless
governing ideal type.

In most of his later works each return

ot particulars is to a law which is itself developing, growing.
~o

changeless laws underlie the growth of nature.

In these es-

says, the "return" often evokes the image of a coming back to the
divine creative source to imbibe once more new energies for fur-

I[,
1,11
1

ther evolution.
~alls
~as

By about 1850 &aerson had abandoned what Beach

"scale-of-being" theory of development in which "return"

a key function, and adopted a strictly evolutionary view in

~hich"growth" took over the central role. 29
28 Ibid., Vol. III, p. 22; Vol. II, P• 310, P• 304.

-

29Joseph Beach, The Concert of Nature in Nineteenth-Centnrz
Erurlish Poetry (New York: Haem lliii, 1936),-p. 339.

I
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The following passage from "Circles" exemplifies his full-

bloom view.
There are no fixtures in nature. The universe is fluid
and volatile. Permanence is but a word of degrees.
Our globe seen by God is a transparent law, not a mass
of facts. The law dissolves the fact and holds it
fluid.30
0nce again the contrast between Reason and Understanding comes
into play.

Understanding grasps "facts," which it considers

absolute; Reason recognizes that no fact is ultimate and abso-

lute.

·11

,,,'I

He confesses that if reason would not force itself on us

trom time to time, we would so easily and once for all adjust
ourselves to live within those beautiful limits, "the perfect
calculation of the kingdom of known cause and ettect ••• [whereJ
Manly ••• ad.herence to the multiplication table ••• will insure suc-

cess."3l

But Reason does force itself on us at times.

It is

then we realize that "in nature every moment is new, the past
always swallowed and forgotten; the coming only is sacred.
Nothing is secure but life, transition, the energizing spirit."
lo fact, no law is absolute and fixed.
every law evolves.

Every tact and indeed

"Every ultimate faet is only the first of a

series.

Every general law is only a particular fact of some more
general law presently to disclose itself."3 2 The world is not a
ass of disparate facts but a mass organized according to cease30Ibid., Vol. II, P• 302 •
..............

3lFlnerson, Yorks, Vol. III, P• 6?.
32..............
Ibid., Vol. II, PP• 320-321; P• 304 •

i,'
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iesslY evolving laws.

Evolution, or ascension aims at lifting

the soul to higher forms, to fuller degrees of self-realization
together with the rest of nature.33
Bearing of 'To Evolve' on 'To Be'
His notion of being now becomes more definite.
being, living, evolving.

He equates

Since 'to evolve• means to move throug

•tages to ever higher degrees of self-fulfilment, 'to be' means
to ascend through these stages.

Applying this notion of being

to his verification procedure, by simple identity the test of
the relation of belief to reality will be a test for the relation of belief to what creatively advances into newer and higher

torms.
Important to note, he identified being with evolving be-

cause in lived experience theev-olutionary process seemed the
alance point for the tensions between all the other factors in
experience--unity and multiplicity, permanence and change, mat-

ter and spirit, etc.

No description o! a being could be real if

one polar factor loomed larger than the rest, or if another
dropped out of the picture entirely.

For instance, to make
', ,1

unity the pivotal factor would eliminate multiplicity; to over-

atress permanence might remove change.

But it evolution became

oentral, then all the other factors would be present and properl
inter-related.
3

Unified, all the polarities constitute what is,

3~., Vol. I,

p. 133;

Vol. III, p. 24.
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1fbat evolves.
A second observation.

According to the ordinary use of

•real,' 'living,' and we might add 'virtuous,• his language is

odd, seeming to suggest that insofar as anything--man, beast or
roct--is real it is living and virtuous.
generally thought

or

But animals are not

as virtuous nor rocks as living.

avels with a closer look at the term 'life.'

The puzzle

He intended to

)roaden its meaning even at the risk of blurring the classical

4istinction between life and non-life.
To be is to live.

Just as to be is to share in divine

Jeing, so to live is to share in divine Life.
take in the divine life of the Over-Soul.
evolve.

~o

be is to par-

Moreover to be is to

Since all beings share in divine Life they also share

41v1ne creativity, as divine life is creative.

fests itself in beings as growth, evolution.

Creativity maniEmerson conceived

the whole universe as a gigantic organism moving creatively
through stages to ever higher forms.

In its broadest meaning

living and hence being suggests any organic evolution.
riddle--at least on the level

or

The

imagery--is thus solved.

To be

is to live, i.e., to come to ever fuller self-realizing power
according to the divine prompting of the Over-Soul; to be is to
e virtuous, i.e., to come to ever fuller self-realizing power,
obedient to the Divine Yill.

The Yerification Procedure
The verification procedure tests the relation between

l"':.------------------------------------------------~l~O~O~
belie! and the real, the evolving.

aure?

What constitutes the proce-

What are its norms and order?

are our next considerations.

Row does it arise?

These

Natural living is the source for

all knowledge of reality.

It also provides the procedure for

yerification of beliefs.

Put succinctly the process of verifi-

cation is natural living.

Beliefs are tested in actual lite.

Pu.rther, human living has norms and an order regularly operative
which constitute the procedure for verification--one which suggests an incipient pragmatism.

The following sections, after

tirst touching on his pragmatism, aim at establishing that his
process of verification was natural living and finally at uncovering the features of his procedure.
The Pragmatism of His Approach
In his procedure tor verification Emerson was in a broadly
philosophical sense something of a pragmatist.

Concrete actual

living grounded all statements about reality; ideals served as
instruments for an improved vitality.

The degree of serviceabil

ity of beliefs marked the degree of their truth.

Truth was

reached experimentally.34

34Many writers, some if only on the way to another thought,
have noted the experimental and experiential tone in Emerson.
!:.g., Dewey, "Ralph Waldo Emerson," pp. 24-30; Gray, Emerson, p.
33; Rusk, Life of Ralph Waldo Emerson, p. 23?; Whicher, freedom
and ~ p:-cj6-;-(thou.gh lie thought It was a passing phase In
erson.3 Mildred Silver recognizes that Emerson had a marked
tendency to test theory by practiee--whieh, she observes, kept
.Emerson from joining in the socialist movements of Owen and Four
ier, and specifically from actively entering into the Brook Farm
Venture. Silver, "Emerson and the Idea of Progress," pp. 16-1?.
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Re-

His stance on evolution already hinted at pragmatism.

call the remark quoted before that every ultimate fact is only
the first of a new series; that every general law is only a particular fact in relation to some more general law about to disclose itself.

Evolution specified the sort of relation ideas

have to experience--they relate to reality inasmuch as they
contribute to the qualitative betterment of actual living.
are tested by the extent they may foster evolution.

They

Moreover,

since things in experience evolve, ideas about things in order to
remain accurate descriptions of them require repeated returns to

lived experience for adjustment.
becomes false.

"i'b.e truest state, rested in,

Thought is manna which cannot be stored.

It will

become sour if kept, and tomorrow must be gathered anew."

The

manna image suggests that thought is to serve the present neeas

tor living, nothing more.
entation" he continues:

Playing on "East," "Orient" and "ori"Per~etuallz

we must Ea.at ourselves or

we get into irrecoverable error, starting from the plainest
truth and keeping as we think the straightest road of logic."35

It might at first seem stqrtling to hear Ellerson called. an incipient pragmatist.

Usually the so-called idealist strain in

Lindeman notes that Emerson was caught up in two approaches to
truth--the Transcendentalist, which he used at first to stimulate
his critique of culture, and the pragmatic, his later procedure
tor testing ideas. Lindeman, "Emerson's Pragmatic Hood," pp. 5?64. Emerson did not have a pragmatic theory of meaning, however.
3 5JMN, Vol. V, P• 38 (1835); ct. Works, Vol. III, P• 23?.
lor ftirtner study on Emerson and evol ut!on, et. Beach, The Con~ept ..2f. Nature .!!'! Nineteenth-Century English-,>oetry, pp-:-3°3G-343.
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.aaerson commands the reader's first attention.
0

Unless prepared

give »nerson a closer look a second time around, one may under

tandably find it difficult to believe Emerson is pragmatic.
tter all, pragmatism and idealism are not thought to mix.
But we must not con1'use Bew :England idealism ot the nineeenth century with European idealism, regardless of how much the
irst borrowed from the second.

For New England '!Tanseendental-

sts distinguished themselves emphatically from the Europeans on
he grounds that the latter were not concerned seriously enough
1th the living out of ideals.

Two centuries of North American

uritanism, which maintained that superior beliefs had to usher
n superior actions, was making itself telt.36
Admittedly the emphasis on. practical follow-through need
ot entail an experimental or pragmatic outlook.

On the other

and, in some sense, an idealist position need not preclude a
ragmatic method.

A basic tenet of idealism is that ideas are

rior to our experience.

In this sense the pragmatic and ideal-

st approach might be mutually exclusive.
hey need not be.

But in another way

An idealist--a Romantic, for instance--might

36 aome measure of the way American transcendentalists looked
t their idealism may be gleaned from Sampson Reed's "Observaions on the Growth of the Mind"--which incidentally had great
ntluence on young Emerson. "The best affections we possess will
ind their home in the objects around us •••• If the eye were
urned inward to a direct contemplation of these affections, it
ould find them bereft of all their loveliness; tor when they are
ctive, it is not of them we are thinking, but ot the objects on
hich they rest •••• !he mind will see itself in what it loves and
sable to accomplish. Its own works will be its mirror." Cited
n !h! Transcendentalists, ed. Miller, P• 55.

~---------------------------------------------~1~0~3-,
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iJ1Sist that since the material world reflects the ideals hidden
ill man, man must engage in living to recover these a priori idea

in some sense of recover. a lift into consciousness, or remini-

icence.

'l'b.e unique feature

or

a pragmatic test would be that

onl1 the actual range of fruitfulness and not logical ineluctaility could guarantee that x or y were truly ideal.

I do not

ish to stand behind the merits of this approach but simply to
oint out its possibility.

Josiah Royce took a position much

ike this. 37
What I have said of the .American Transcendentalists, I may
still greater assurance ot ]gaerson.

lor him it was a

feature of his approach to test the truth of ideas
bout reality by pressing them into concrete use.
s a full-blown pragmatist.

Bot that he

That would be more properly re-

erved tor those who claimed that designation, who made an expl1it discipline ot the pragmatic method, and who made a technical
tudy of its philosophical dimensions.
some form of experimentalism.

:&nerson struggled to
But as he was a pio-

no guide-posts to assure his path, he managed only to
eeognize the tool but not to focus fully on its wide-spread
plications.

His was an incipient pragmatism.

Natural Living, Source of the Procedure
:&aerson maintained natural living was supposed to be the

3?cr. Max B. ~1seh, ed., Classic Aaerican Philosophers (New
ork: Appleton-Century-Crotts, Inc., 1951), p. ~7.

rr----------------,1~
10

uree ot all true beliefs about the world and the test of their
His "American Scholar" expresses this view most

~erifieation.

clearly.

The theor:y of books is noble, he says.

Yell used,

ooks are the best of things; abused they are among the worst.
"The scholar of the first age" received the world around him as
lite, as lived actions; upon what the primitive scholar received,
e brooded.

And what he grasped he expressed in ideas which, to

the extent they captured the world satisfactorily, were important
and long-lived.

Ideas have creative torce--insotar as they
1rror life, they carry man to a higher plane of life.38

But the danger is this: "The sacredness which attaches to
he act of creation, the act of thought, is transferred to the
ecord."39

Instead of prizing the creative force of ideas tor
to promote the quality of present vital activities

en too often tall down before the ideas of the past and before
ooks, the shrine of past ideas, as it there were about ideas
everedtt'om lite something sacred and unimpeachable.

No book,

o body of ideas, however, perfectly and lastingly mirrors the
orld.

Ot course, with the scholar the lite of action is

subo~

but it is nonetheless essential.
Without it he is not yet man. Without it thought can
never ripen into truth ••• !he preample ot thought, the
transition through which it passes from the unconscious

38 •Good thoughts are no better than good dreams unless they
e executed." Yorks, Vol. I, P• 3?; ........
ct. PP• 8?-88 •
I

l

39~ •• p. 88.

-
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to the eonscious 1 is action.
as I have lived.~0

Only so much do I know,

Living serves the scholar in two ways.

First, "If it were

only for a vocabulary, the scholar would be covetous of action.
Life is our dictionary." 41 Language should reflect reality or

life.

Only those who face life tor themselves can reflect it in
ianguage. 42 But more important, lite also serves as the resource

ror further insights into living.
and each fit reproduces the other."

"The mind now thinks, now acts
'When the artist, for in-

stance, exhausts his materials, when the scholar finds ideas no
longer of service and the books tedious, "he has always the resources l2, !!!.!• Character is higher than intellect.tt4 3 With
the image of substance and accident before him he explains that
living is the functionary, thinking only the tunetion.
The stream retreats to its source. A great soul will
be strong to live, as well as strong to think. Does
he lack the organ or medium to impart his truths? He
can still tall back on this elemental force ot living 44
them. This is a total act. Thinking is a partial act.

40

Ibid., PP• 94-95•

41 Ibid., p.
p. 25. -

9a.

"\lords are signs ot natural tacts."

Ibid.,

420 As I am, so I see; use what language we will we can never

say anything ~ut what we are." ~·• Vol. III, p. ?9. Italics
mi.ne--the notion of ·beingWI'll be explained later.
43ttCharacter--a reserved torce, which acts directly by presence and without means. It is conceived ot as a certain unde111onstrable force ••• by whose impulses the man is guided, but whose
counsels he cannot impart." ~·, Vol. III, pp. 89-90; Vol. I,
P• 99e
44

!l?!!!•t Vol. I, p. 99.

Italics mine.

1
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remarks elsewhere ot man's grasp of nature, •Ifie acts it as
ife, before he apprehends it as truth." 4 5

8

The Process of Living
Broadly stated, the procedure tor verification is the experBut how does Emerson conceive the process ot

living.

What a.re its elements and its relations?
eveal more about the procedure itself.

The answers

At the same time 1 we

these questions with the full realization that to atomize a

k

onorete process runs the risk of reducing the actual process
the elements as they are considered in the analysis--abstract

0

d

unreal.

Obviously we cannot make an abstract study of the

lements of a process without analysis.

There is nothing dis-

about an abstract study as long as we bear in mind that
actual relations in tha concrete process are these eleents real, that they are not each by themselves to be regarded
subsistent.

Pa.erson himself regarded the unieity ot the

•initial relation" inviolable.
or doubled.

"Lite will be imaged, but cannot

Any invasion ot its unity would be

The elements in the initial relation

or

living are three:

environment, the relation of vital process.
Peet of reality.

Man is an

He is living and aware ot liitng.

45Ibid., p. 4.

J'urther he

The passage resembles Dewey: "Things are
before they are known."

4

6rbid., Vol. III, P• ?8.
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possesses given qualities whose relations and functions gradually
4J.sclose themselves through the process of living.

Moreover,

one feature ot living for man is that he possesses a desire to
preserve and promote those qualities which promise to yield bis

]1ighest fulfilment.

Emerson frequently emphasizes that "man's
life is a progress, not a station."4 ?
What we may call man•s environment is the second aspect of

the living process.
80

"So much of nature as he is ignorant of,

much of his own mind does be not possess."

Bnerson remarks,

drawing undoubtedly on his college theme on Socrates, that the
conflict between the ancient and modern precepts is at an end.
••:mow

~h.ysel!'

•axim."48

and ••• •study nature,• become at last one

Only when actively engaged in his environment does

aan live and come to know truth.
Let us call "environment" whatever atfects life.

In Emer-

1on' s scheme it includes a plurality of things and persons which
possess both structure and process.

••ntal.

Anything can be environ-

Structural unities, causal nexus, principles of con-

•tancy and organization are operative in environment.

On the

level of Understanding, tacts may appear to lack unity, direction
JD.d organization.

But successful living following on oelief in

these factors belies that impression.

Nature he commented once

ls the same and yet not the same, but it only reigns to contra-

4

?Ibid., Vol. II, P• 122.
48 Ibid. t Vol. I, P• a7.
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ict itself.

49

The reality of the unified and stable in nature does not
iJtplYt however, the unreality or the material, diverse and chang-

1J1S in nature.

He

chides the schools of philosophy tor sliding

into the clutches ot their occupational hazard, idealism.

Ye

tend to merge particulars under a single law, where the singular,

the material, is lost.

But life restores us to health since it

1Dsists on the reality ot matter.

Emerson coaxed those whose

reverence for ideas made them queasy about his proposed alliance
with material processes not to tear the new generalization.

Por

i! they think it degrades their ideas it also elevates their

The third feature of living is the concrete relation between
and his concrete situation--living itself.
living is the given "initial relation
TI.ronment.

11

The process of

between man and his en-

fhe organic living process of evolution, as we shall

substantiate shortly, specifies exactly the type of primitive
relation which exists between man and his world.

It is a devel-

opmental process--one of "ascension" which takes place between
aan and

his situation and in which both are constantly bettered.
Living, the Initial--lg>eriential-Relation

!he process

or

4 9Ib1d •• Vol.

181, 23-g-;-

-

50Ibid.

t

living is man's "initial relation."

His

I, P• 85; Vol. II, P• 302; Vol. III, pp. 22,

Vol. III, p. 171; Vol. II, P• 306.
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primary function is to live.

The process is initial both chrono-

1ogiaally and in order of ontological importance.

An

individuar

earliest concern is for living; moreover onl7 in acts of natural
living is he directly involved in reality.

Man responds to the

many dimensions of his environment and escapes from the myopia

of sensism and idealism only when his various powers--will,
affections, senses, intellect--operate together as an integral
it.

But his powers operate as an integral unit onl7 in acts

of natural spontaneous living.

To

borrow a term from Dewey, the

process of living is man's primary experience--direet, active
and conscious responsiveness within the concrete on-going environment.51
As a matter of terminology, :&aerson rarely called the proess of living 'experient1a1.•52 More frequently he referred to

51Primary as contrasted with reflective, secondary experi-

ence, which is abstract thinking about primary experience. Dewe7
intimates Emerson•s resemblance to him on this point. Dewey,
"Ralph Waldo Emerson," in Critical ;Ess!l's, PP• 25-26; s.!• also
t ! ! EJcperience, p. 28.
52 Emerson does at times use •experience' to convey the same
eaning as 'intuition.• "So much only ot life as I know by ex-.
erience, so much ot the wilderness have I vanguished and plante
or so tar have I extended my being, D17 dominion. I do not see
ow any man can atford ••• to spare a~ action in which he can parake." Works, Vol. I, P• 95. In another place he relates that
1th a true friend we can for long hours "continue a series ot
incere, graceful, rich communications, drawn trom the oldest,
secretest experience, so that they who sit by ••• shall teel a
ively surprise at our unusual powers." Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 19293. 1'he poet he describes as • ••• the person in whom these
owers are in balance, the man without impediaent, who sees and
andles that which others dream ot, traTerses the whole scale ot
experience." Ibid., Vol. III, p. 6' But this usage is excepional; usually he preters the term 'intuition.•

.......

110

it as 'intuitional.'

But his preference was not to suggest a

removal from the concrete order

or

the here and now.

To explain,
;

,,1'

recall that in his view of first philosophy natural living was
the exercise of Reason--a single unified act involving in duly
proportionate order all the functions of man in concrete practical situations.

Reason's direct perception ot reality, termed

'intuition•' covered a very rich extension not intended to exclude the concrete and singular.

Intuition included not only

what man does, endures, strives for, but also how he acts, endures, believes, etc.

Further it recognized no division between

act and material, subject and object.

It grasped nature,

which ruan and the rest of his world are aspects.

or

Finally intui-

tion was primarily esthetic and action-oriented--ineluding the
enjoying and enduring of objects--and was secondarily cognitively
significant.

It meant the human living o! every-day life.53

He had a special design in preferring 'intuition' to 'exper-

ience.'
~hom

believed the sensible manifold to be atomic.

~ttached
~dopt

He had rejected the sensism of Locke and Hume, both of

The meaning

to •experience' gained currency through them.

So to

this term would have been to invite contusing his thought

with sensiam.

On the other hand the meaning of 'intuition' popularized by
the Romantics came much closer to his own view.

It suggested a

53John Dewey, ~erience and Nature (New York: Dover Publi-

~ations.

Inc., 1958~p. ~9;
Essays, PP• 26-28.
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ified relation between man as a whole and his concrete environIt also occurred only in spontaneous actions.

»Aerson

term but consistent with bis critique or Romanti1sm he also modified the term to stress the prilnacy of actual

to the concrete direetionalities of natural living.
notion or intuition was in no way supra-empirical.
His conception of the process of living gives basic shape

verification procedure.

First, spontaneous living is a

conscious relation between man and his environment.
ther. spontaneous living arouses beliefs about the various
imensions ot reality--the material, spiritual, stable, changing,

Moreover these beliefs are tor 11Ving, i.e., for promoting
positive qualities or lite.

As a consequence these beliefs

e tested and modified by actually living according to them.

!he Process of Living and the Verification Procedure

The testing o! beliefs is not a random process; it involves
procedure, some order and standards.

As to be expected :Bmerson

evotes little of his writings to the technical analysis of the
as such.

Typically his direct concern tor concrete

ot belief mantles the presence of the factors and
tructure ot the procedure.
n the resolving

or

Yet they do function clearly enough

his concerns to make explicit treatment ot

possible.

Our study of his conception of living has brought some of
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,pecial attention.

Contribution to 'organic evolution' or 'ascen

ion' 1s the test for true beliet.

Though these terms have been

onsidered earlier they demand further discussion in the context

t the procedure.

Second, the special sentiment by which a per-

on detects the actual oecurence of ascension, and next, the role

t community in the verification

p~ocedure

require investigation.

1nally, a note of explanation about the self-reformatory quality
beliet.
Basic Outline of the Verification Procedure
Much of the procedure may be gleaned from previous discusIn outline, once man surrenders to nature he discovers

hat human intelligence is the means by which to adjust to changg situations and by which to improve the quality of life.

e products or the mind--ideas, statements--have as their tuneion and hence as their claim to be the instruments by which to
vital activity.

~e

extent ot their

itfulness in actual living is the measure of their truth.
There is a eorrespondenee between the human soul and
••• everything that is known to man. Instead of studying things without the principles of them all may be
penetrated unto within him. Every act puts the agent
in a new condition. The purpose ot lite seems to be
to acquaint a man with himself. He is not to live a
future as described to him but to live .. to the real
future by living in the real present.::>'I'
again:
~

0

The great impression which a doctrine makes on us,

.!l!!!t Vol. IV, p. 84.

,,.. _______________________________
-

~

113

r think is the test ot its truth. It it trees and enlarges--it
it helps me, then it is trm.l; and not o·cherwise. ,.55

Moreover, human intelligence provides this lite-promoting
tunction only when engaged in concrete lite activities.

Only

than is intelligence unified with the totd.l man and his surround-

ingo.

The intellect is anterior to an:;f division of function--

"it melts will into perception, knowledge into act."56

Only on

the level or concrete activities does the intellect experientially grasp things as they are, as organic, evolving continuities

or

structure.

Lastly living not only requires that living itself be the
test ot ideas but also that all ideas be returned time and again
to 11ving for further reformations.

truth ceases.

Oth~rw113e,

their claim to

(One need only reoall »neraon's likening of ideas

to manna which each day must be gathered anew.)

We have hero,

1n nugget torm Dnerson•s philosophical procedure as living itself.
our primary GA1Jerience, reveals it.
The test

or

actual improvement consists in noting that a

statement serves in the way it, as an instrument, claims to--Viz.,
aa a means for issuance into concrete Vital activity w·hich,

according to a standard
qualitative betterment.

or

satisfaction, one regards aa trul7 a

But a number of specific questions about

the procedure present themselves.

What does 'qualitative better-

55ausk, Letters, Vol. III, P• ?7 (1842).
56.aaerson, Works, Vol. II, P• 325.
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ent' mean; how do we know that qualitative betterment has taken
p1aee in any given concrete instance; what makes the means tor
discovering its presence reliable--and just how reliable are the
eans?

First. the meaning ot qualitative betterment.
Notion

or

'Ascension'

Qualitative betterment is another term tor 'ascension,•
•elevation' or 'novelty.•
nature.

Novelty is the general and pervasive

"In nature every moment is new; the past

s always swallowed and forgotten: the coming only is sacred."5?
ther, we may remember that the novel is beyond prediction.58
ovelty should not be taken to signify upheaval or chaos but
rogressive development.

"Nothing is secure but lite, transi-

ion, the energizing spirit."

Lite. which he envisions as the

nergizing spirit in nature, is developmental.

The movements of

ture from one elevation to the next take place "without shock
or leap. n59
A basic Eaersonian thesis is that what is so tor nature in
eneral is so as well tor man as part of it.
evelops, ascends, so does man.

Since nature grows,

"Nature has a higher end, in the

roduction of new individuals, than security, namely ascension,
r the passage of the soul into higher forms."

As he proclaims,

57~., Vol. II, PP• 319-320.

58or. t

.!.!.!•' ~·' Vol. III t P•

a.

59Ibid., Vol. II, PP• 319-320; Vol. III, P• 1?9.
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"Life only avails, not having lived.

Power ceases in the in-

stant of repose; it resides in the moment of transition from the
past to the new state." 60 Living, hence beipg, involves continuous movement to a higher state.
!he poet, incidentally, holds high office in this scheme
because the poet recognizes and expresses the primacy of ascension, discerns the possibilities of ascension, and alerts the
eyes of his generation to its presence.

He "perceives that with-

in the form of every creature is a force impelling it to ascend
into a higher form." 61 !he poet attempts to display in words
the beauty of people and things.
the force ot ascension.
act.

Dllerson says the poet perceives

Ascension is the mark of the natural

Its upward movement is graceful, beautiful.

Thus »aerson•s

equation ot the natural, the beautiful and the real.
natural, graceful actions are called virtues.
1fatural man,
graceful and beautiful.

tue, man lives or is.

Kan 1 s

B7 growth in vir-

the virtuous man, alone is

Each ascension, which takes place in all nature, and in a
special way in and through man, effects a new condition in which
~an

finds himself lifted to an entirely new relation to all as-

pects ot nature which affect him.

Hence, Emerson's "law of

laws~

The simple rise as by specific levity not into a particular virtue, but into the region ot all virtues. They
60 Ibid., Vol. III, P• 24; Vol. II, p. 69; g.v. as a capsule
of Dnerson's doctrine ot alt-reliance.
61 Ibid., Vol. III, P• 20; Vol. II, P• 312.
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are in the spirit which contains them all. The soul
requires purity, but purity is not it; requires justice and is not that; requires beneficence, but is
something better.62
s this passage indicates, the sort of betterment man finds most
fulfilling is virtuous living.

Ellerson here wishes to explain

that moral life does not lead an individual on a sort ot scaven-

ger hunt tor virtues to be collected, here and there, helterskelter--nor even to be steadily collected one atter another.
Instead moral lite directs him into a steadily increased possession of an overall power to elevate corners of his lite togeher. 63
.A1'ter its own law and not by arithmetic is the rate
ot the (soul'sJ progress to be computed. !he soul's
advances are not made by gradation, such as can be
represented by motion in a straight line, but rather
b7 ascension of state, such as ean be represented b7
metamorphoses.64
But full Virtue is not reached as it by a single metamorphosis.

Plnerson explains that "the search atter truth is always by

pproximation."
f the value

At first we have but an "instinctive perdeption

ot certain ideas."

By testing them in action we

iscover the extent or their value, the extent ot their truth.
ut while each act places us in a new condition, each also has
"some falsehood ot exaggeration in it." 6 5 B7 Reason or intuition

Vol. II, P• 2?5.
Vol. I, P• 121; Vol. II, P• 280, ,.!!
Vol. II, p. 2?4.

,!.g,Sl•

r'·--------------------,
117
.......

a person must continually reassess the instrumentality ot ideas,
discovering a new perspective that will lift him to a still more
satisfactory plane of existence.

It is in this sense he means

"to make habitually a new estimate--that is elevation."

'Within

lived experience some qualities are of positive, some of negative
value.

The soul draws upon those of positive value in order to

conserve and promote the positive qualities ot experience.

And

it is in this developed sense that Emerson uses elevation, novelty and ascension, tor evolution.

Means tor Discovering Ascension
!ut the most crucial issue is how to detect genuine ascension.

What standard decides whether and to what extent an

ascension truly has been effected by a belief having been implemented in lived experience?
~edure

!Prom what we have seen ot the pro-

so tar. the simple man finds various ideas or principles

arising in him spontaneously in his daily lite.
~hem

To consider

properly he must regard these principles not abstractly but

concretely--as actually directing a particular activity here and
~ow.

On this level ideas are judged to be true insotar as man

tinds them (in the activity they effect) to be self-tultilling,
~r

satisfying.

~hich

According to Dnerson man knows the extent to

a principle satisfies by means of a sentiment ot approba-

tion that arises in the presence of the ideas as related to the
concrete. 66 Basically this sentiment indicates eelt-fultilment,

b6ot. ibid., Vol. I, pp. 121-122; 126.
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satisfaction.

By this sentiment man feels that a particular pur-

suit fulfills him--not just tor instance as a farm.er or as a
scholar but as a !!!!!!•

In the presence ot this sentiment he

reels that total dedication to a certain line ot action will
assure him his fullest and highest happiness, the fullest freedom to live, to be.
The "Divinity School Address" and "The 0Ver-Sou1• give the
most extended treatment of the sentiment ot approbation.

Since

the subject matter of those essays is God and our mode of behav-

ior toward him, the slant on the topic of the sentiment will be
specifically moral and religious.

Still we can manage to pick

out the general features involved.
Reminiscent or Johnathan Ed.wards, Em.arson tells us the sentiment is one of delight, reverence, and awe, in the presence ot
certain divine laws. 6 7 These laws are those principles which in
tact efteot ascension.

Initially an individual may regard these

laws solely on a physical plane; at a later stage or development
~e

discovers them to have moral and religious dimensions as well.

The sentiment governs all elevations of reality, at first only
physical but at advanced stages, spiritual--moral and religious-also. 68
Delight, reverence and awe imply an enthusiasm for the prin~iple

or law under consideration--where enthusiasm means a
G7Ibid., Vol. I, P• 121; Vol. II, P• 281.
68 Ibid., Vol. I, PP• 121-122; 126; Vol. II, P• 275.
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feeling of whole-hearted trust and commitment to the effectiveess of the principle.

The delight indicates to the individual

is fullest happiness or beatitude.

Reverence and awe suggest

total self-surrender to the object of beatitude.
is the synonym.

Here enthusiasm

But the basis !or the awe, the delight, the

enthusiasm, is the feeling that now man has reached the height
of the exercise of his abilities.
titude of man.

"This sentiment ••• is the beaIt makes him illimitable." 69 What men seek in

eatitude is the energy of full self-realization.

Tb.is energy does not descend into individual life on
any other condition than entire possession. It
comes to the lowly and simple; it comes to whomever
[sicJ puts off what is foreign and proud; it eQmes
as insight; it comes as serenity and gra.ndeur.70
other words, the sentiment tells man in concrete eases that
he best is true.

Regardleno of the stuge of development the

entiment tells man what concretely given him fullest power to
once refined to a moral plane (as the moral sentiment) it
man what he ousht to do.71 Eventually man discovers what
him truly creative is belief in God.
Basis tor 1'rust in the Standard ot Satistaction
But what gpounds the reliability of the standard ot satisaction?

This standard, the moral sentiment, gets its support

69 Cf. ibid., Vol. II, PP• 281; 293; Vol. I, P• 125.

--

70ibid., Vol. II, pp. 289-290.
7libid., PP• 293-294.
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on the same basis as all other features of reality that arise
ipontaneously while a person lives the lite ot self-surrender,

or simplicity.

Recall Emerson's fundamental assumption that we

st trust nature enough to believe that whatever question nature
raises it will answer.

'l'his beliet he implements in the atti-

tude or simplicity, a surrender to living as the source tor all
~sting

nature means trusting that vital

provide answers to all the questions that living
tselt brings up.

Whatever spontaneously springs up as a retor the pure of heart--tor one who has com-

tted himself totally to trusting nature--must be true, though
in a limited and retoraable sense.

The alterna-

ive implies tor Emerson that nature is chaotic and unreliable.
t then we would live in a world where living is impossible,

hich is not the case.
Perhaps he first alerted himself to look tor some mark by
hich to know in any given case whether nature has answered a
question tor us, because he believed that one ot the most cen-

tral questions that living could raise was "How shall I know that
I do promotes ~ite (is true) or not?•

As it turned out the

oral sentiment was the only standard which nature ottered him

in response to the question.

Once sentiment appears on the scene

it can be doubted as a standard. it and only i ! it is doubtful
hat nature is reliable.
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Role of Communitz
It does not appear that Emerson rests content to make ...........
his
moral sentiment stand as the solitary judge or truth. Curiously,
bis individuality and aloofness dominate the typical portrait of

him not only as a man but as a scholar.

Self-reliance gets

thrown against other-reliance as if he could not reconcile the
two.

Why this should be so stems from several facts on which we

cannot tarry--among them his personal ambivalencies regarding
social attachments, and the exaggerated picture of his ambiva-

lence which resulted from the unfortunate oversolicitous editing
or the Emerson-~orbes journala.72
!he tact is that he exercised his self-reliance within a

definite social framework.

Re regarded as a further check on

the worth of his ideas their acceptance among honest simplenearted men.

It they found his observations agreeing with their

own lived experiences he had a further assurance tor the truth of
those observations.

essays.

This side ot him may not be obvious in his

He did not theorize much on this point, but there are

strong supporting reasons for this position.

JI
,:1''1
:11''I':

,,,II''
''II,,

~I

First of all he

shared with the Transcendentalists a belief in nature and in the
reliability of the simple person.

What the simple man claimed

to be true would have to be true.

Th.is was the reformulation ot

the theoretical basis tor democracy which he and the New England
',j

72l!!!• Vol. I, PP• xiii-xxxiv.
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fl'anscendentalists were seeking.

For him• the simple men would

be most apt to be among the young Americans.

He went to great

iengths to come into contact with this audience as often as possible.

To test and develop his beliefs he placed them before

these simple natural souls whom he hoped to tind in this special
audienoe--tew though these simple men may be.

He adjusted his

thoughts according to their responae.73
Self-Retorma~orz

Qual\'tf: ot True Belief

Ye have seen that ideas are true insofar as they effect
ascension, and that ascension is discovered by practical tests,
in which the sentiment of approbation-individual and collective
--determines the extent of ascension.

Ascension, however, never

reaches an absolute or ultimate level.

All reality constantly

evolves.

Therefore, the proper theory about the general state-

ents and beliefs relating to the world must be developmental
too.

Of the power of a general principle Emerson explains that

the moment confers "a sort

or

omnipresence and omnipotence which

asks nothing of duration but sees that the energy of the mind is
commensurate with the work to be done," and only of enough energy
to work .!2!•74 Yor application to a future case, the generalization requires adjustment, refinement.

"Every- aet"--and hence

?3or. Oowan. Cift ot the west, pp. 10-12, 18-19; Carl Bode,

The .AmerI'can !!Zeeum
p. 2~5.

eWI'orit: Oitord University Press, 1956),

?4 Em.erson, Works, Vol. II, p. 31?; Vol. III, pp. 243-244.
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14eal--"has some falsehood of exaggeration in it." Man inclines
~o aake his ideas or his achievements absolute.
Tb.at tendency
i• the exaggeration.

We live in a world where there is no final

iuecess; each achievement is a promise to further achievement.

-step by step we scale this mysterious ladder: the steps are
actions, the new prospect is power."75
cover that insight is limited.

In other words, we dis-

A new situation uncovers a dis-

iatisfaction with the previous level of insight and achievement.
A new search begins tor that general principle which will insure
a further degree of selt-tulfillment.
being outdone.

"Every action admits ot

Our life is an apprenticeship to the truth that

around every circle another can be drawn; that there is no end
to nature, but every end is a beginning."76

!he need tor turther

eri!ication never ceases.
The sbitt in the obJect of self-tultillment does not entail
alsity of the previous object.

Nor is doubt cast on the relia-

ot nature, on which the procedure rests.
to a topsy-turvy world.
ontinuous--but growing.

We are not com-

The structuresof the world remain

Bence statements verified in a past

ntui ti on remain true when subsumed into the present 11ved exper-

I,
~ '

ence; they become false only when regarded as final.

"Truth is

element of lite, yet if a man fasten his attention on a sine aspect of truth it becomes distorted and not itself but
75Ibid., Vol. II, P• 305; Vol. III, PP• 185, 190.
76 Ibid., Vol. II, P• 301.
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falsehood."??
tions.

!rue generalizations subsume prior generaliza-

The artist, for instance, creates something new, but he

still begins with the first elements, though on the most advanced
stage.

!he reason .&nerson gives tor this is poignant.

1se all goes to ruin."
true insight.

''Other-

What he says ot the artist applies to

The artist, after all, and the poet are they

have developed the ability to see the truth by intuition.
!he real or true is beautiful, because it is natural and grace-

tul.

Ye may recall the earlier quote from "Ciroles•--that each

tact is but a generalization on the way to another fuller generalization.

The test of a proposition is the extent to which it

laces man satisfactorily in specitic--though not total--power
over his environment.

Bo generalization is tinal; each promises

a fuller satisfaction.

Satisfaction is discovered only by liv-

ng according to the latest generalization.
Re'sum.e' and Conclusion

Simplicity opens man to spontaneity"• which in turn ,-ields
procedure for verifying beliefs about reality.

Since to be

eal means to evolve, the procedure guages the relation between
and what evolves or ascends.
living.

Belieta are tested by

Insofar as they promote ascension, tuller de-

ees of self-realization or creativity they are true.

The mark

77Ibid., Vol. II, p. 339. Nature "puniahes abstractionists
••• It is not the intention ot Nature that we should live by
general views." Ibid., Vol. III, P• 237.

';I
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of a genuine ascent is the arousal of the sentiment of approbation for the sort of actions resulting from commitment to a given
belief.

A community of like-minded men provide a cross-check on

the credibility of an individual•s assessment of his beliefs.
Since the achievement of any level of power opens man to still
higher possibilities, no final test of belief is possible.

The

procedure must espouse an evolutionary theory of truth.
Of all beliefs confirmed by his procedure the supreme ease
is his belief in God's existence.

For if fullness ot power is

the key to satisfaction, can there be any highest or lasting
principle which will direct the widest satisfaction of man's
~otential?
~aintained

!he following two ehapters establish that Emerson
in accordance with his procedure that a supreme bound-

less souree of creativity whom he calls God exists.
~an

God opens

to his fullest development, to his .tullest ascension.

,...._____________,
~

~

CHAPTER V
THE TERM 'GOD'
Faerson contends that to be real is to be creative, and that
~he

test or belie! is its fruitfulness in promoting creativity.

He turther asserts that there exists a primal boundless source
tor all creativity called God.

!his chapter concentrates on the

w8" he arrived at 'the primal boundless source of creativity" as
the designation for the term 'God 1 ; 1 the next chapter takes up
bis argument tor God's existence.
:rlnerson declares that God cannot be "intellectually dis~erned"

by

but God can be "felt."

In other words God is not known

Understanding but by Reason.

Natural situations give rise to

these feelings which indicate what 'God' means.
~t

this chapter focuses on these situations.

!fhe first part

What arises in them

is a feeling or religiousness toward something regarded as both

present yet somehow inaccessible.

~e

second topic is the mean-

ing of this •presence and inaccessib1li't7·'

It yields the desig-

aation 'boundless source of creativity' tor 'God.'
1 •Tb.e primal boundless source of creativity' will serve
~•reinatter as a shorthand for a fuller description to be given
•hortly. .Q!. n. 28, below. !his shorthand was selected for
convenience and because it indicates the predicates Emerson
aeems to eaphasize most.
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In that :&lerson held God could not be discerned intellectuallY his position falls within the mainstream of much Christian
thinking. 2 Christian theologians and philosophers have tradi1onally insisted that God is beyond human comprehension.

Still,.

the qualities of certain activities within primary exrience or intuition, he does give a description of the term
•God' derived from the tact God's presence can be felt.

"I say

circUJ1stance; but it you ask me, Whence I am?

I feel

I make

1lf1'

ike other men _.,. relation to that

~act,

which cannot be spoken,

or defined or even thought, but which exists, and will exist."3
e must remind ourselves that 'feeling' as he uses it means the
primary intuition, 4 which occurs onl~ when the
senses and feelings, operate in a single organic
ty in concrete acts
of God--sense

or
or

conditiona.5

spontaneous living.

!'he feeling of the

being, Eaerson also calls it--arises
Since it is present in consciousness it

s open to some description.
2Jl1li, Vol. III, p. 2?4. God is the "Unknown, the Inevitable
he Diiiiie." !Berson, Works, Vol. II, p. 352. God is that "deep
orce, that last fact behind which analysis cannot go. 11 Ibid.,
• 64.

3P.merson, Works, Vol. I, P• 335.
4 Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 8? •
..............

5"fhe sense ot being which in calm hours rises, we know not
ow, in the soul, is not diverse from things ••• but one with them
d proceeds obviousl7 trom the same source whence their lite
d being also proceed." ~., Vol. II, p. 64.

,,I
,1i1

128
Situations Revealing What 'God' Heans
The discovery of his meaning for 'God' requires investigation of the situations in which the simple man spontaneously
becomes acquainted with what 'God' means.

The most obvious and

typical situation occurs when a person "communes with nature,"
when for instance he looks up at the stars, gazes at a panoramic
1torizon or basks in the solitude of a woods in summer-time.

But

these are not the only events which reveal divine presence.

Acts

of gracefulness, genius, character, virtue, all manifestations of

beauty, are natural events which have this power too.

Indeed any-

thing grasped in intuition, in ordinary experience--without artificiality, duplicity, !ormalism--is natural and hence may open us
to recognizing the presence of God. 6

ot
the familiar and low. Give me insight into today •••
What would we reall7 know the meaning ot? !he meal
in the tirkin; the milk in the pan; the ballad in the
street; the news ot the boat, the glance of the e7e
••• ; show me the ultimate reason of these matters;
show me the sublime presence of the highest spiritual
cause lyrking ••• in these suburbs and extremities ot
nature.?
I embrace the common, explore and sit at the feet

Character, genius, virtue, gracefulness, beauty, all bear
in a striking way on the extent to which man is tree to exercise
power of selt-determ.ination.

Oonsequently they are especially

provocative instances ot natural e-venta.

As a case in point,

6 Ibid., pp. 129-1301 Rusk, Letters, Vol. I, pp. 1?4-175;
McGitfert, ~' PP• 120-126 (January, 1831).
?:&Berson, Works, Vol. I, p. 111.
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.mnerson tells us that what we admire most in a man of character
is his freedom, his self-determination, his consequent wisdom and

power.

Similarly the power of genius comes to man only upon

self-abandonment to nature.

Virtue, too, arises only when man

gives himself over to spontaneity. 8

Indeed gracefulness and

beauty are the necessary results of natural actions since whatever tends unimpeded to its end must be graceful and beautiful.

Meaning of 'Present Yet Inaccessible'

All such natural events share two important features which
~eveal

what 'God' means.

First they awaken a feeling of rever-

ence or of religious commitment.

Second this feeling is toward

something felt to be both present yet inaccessible in the event.
Somehow presence and inaccessibility specify the object of religious feeling.

But how?

We could easily understand that stars

and the horizon suggest presence and inaccessibility since they

may be visually present yet be7ond reach.

But !aerson had some-

thing more in mind than sensible presence and insurmountable
physical distance.

!he woods, beautiful flowers, are present and

also quite accessible.

Still they too occasion the revelation ot

the divine--the present yet inaecessible.9

It is important to

learn how 'presence and inaccessibility• designate the object of
~he

128.

religious sentiment.

8~·• Vol. II, PP• ?-11; Vol. III, p. 26; Vol. I, pp. 1209Ibid •• Vol. I. nn. 8-11.
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Emerson believes that something invariably happens in the
natural event which elevates it beyond what any calculation from
given forces on hand could explain.

For instance, he states:

"!his is that which we call Character--a reserved force, which

acts directly by presence and without means."

Genius and virtue

aove forward in qualitative leaps, rending time and space, contradicting by their evolution the laws of sensuous experience.
There is always more to an event than we can solidif)' into everlasting concepts.

Beauty too always ultimately eludes our quest.

Indeed a man might come to resent this were it not that this tantalizing characteristic ot beauty converts all nature into a vast
promise. 10 Han is turned by constitution toward the inaccessible
Whatever he does he will outstrip by further and rurther stages

ot development.

.Each natural event promises another and a better

one.
Emerson maintains that confronted with the novelty in these
natural events man feels spontaneously that some source of ereati vity is present which brings the evolution to pass.

fhis

source is boundless in its capacity for further novel stages.
Its possibilities can never be lastingly circumscribed either by
intelligence or in reality. Like a horizon it forever outstrips full possesaion. 11 It is to this boundless source ot
~um.an

10Ibid., Vol. III, P• 89; Vol. II, pp. 2?2-2?6; Vol. III,
P• 393;~,
........... Vol. V, P• 129 (1836) •
11 Emerson, Yorks, Vol. I, PP• lOt 16; Vol. III, P• l?l.
Unattainable, the !lying Perteet, around
Emerson calls God
~hich the hands of man can never meet." .............
Ibid., Vol. II, p. 301 •

"ine
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~reativity

in a natural event that the religious sentiment at-

taches itself.

Since it is the source ot an actual ascension, it

is present; since it is boundless in its perpetually creative
drive toward higher stages

or

asceunion, it is also inaccessible.

Human Soul Suggesting this Notion ot God
Texts which expressly discuss the meaning of the term 'God'
confirm this conclusion.

I wish to

cent~r

on two

or

them.

In

the first, the departure is tha human soul.
What is God? !he most elevated conception or character
that can be formed in the mind. It is the individual's
own soul carried to perfection. Jor no other deity can
he conceive. He is infinite as I am finite; He is sinless as I am sintul ••• 12
Several typically !:mersonian beliefs are suggested in this passage.

To say that God is the soul of the individual carried to

perfection implies that God is soul stripped of limits.
~oul

'!he

in the classical philosophical tradition is understood as

the principle of lite.

!hie see.ms to fit Emerson's perspective.

The Over-Soul, another term for the divine, Vivifies all reality.
Pressing this thought, it is apparent that 'being• and 'life' are
~ynonymous

with 'ascension' or •creativity.•

Hence we may say

that God is infinite life, infinite being, infinite creativity.
Further, the line "He is infinite as I am finite.
~inlesB

He is

as I am. sinful," conveys the contrast between the bound-

less creativity of God and the limited stagnated state of man by
12Jl'1Jf, Vol. III, P• 182 (1830).

rr--------~
~

elf.

.&aerson linked human limitation with sinfulness.

He

that the only way we can establish that we are not simply
of divinity is through our free will.

"Your reason is

your virtue is God, and nothing but your liberty, can you
all securely and absolutely your own."
iple limitation.

Our liberty is our prin-

Just how this limits us he makes plain when

e insists that to live a aan must act spontaneously rather than

interfere with the directions ot nature.

In-

erterence limits living.

For this reason Em.erson could exclaim
hat "the only sin is limitation." 1 3 Self-will is limiting and
Lillitation is sintul because it implies the individual's
of will over and against natural process.
scension, the action ot the divine force of lite.

This thwarts

To act

ainst nature's directionality is to counter God's will.
God, however, is limitless.

He is spontaneity itself, the

creativity.

fhe magnetism which all original action exerts is explained when we inquire the reason o? self-trust. 'Who
is the Trustee?

Vb.at is the aboriginal Self, on which
a universal reliance may be grounded? What is the
nature and power of that science-battling star, without
paralax, without calculable elements , which shoots a
ray of beauty even into triT1al and impure actions, it
the least mark of independence appear? The inquiry
leads us to that source, at once the essence of genius,
ot virtue and or life, which we call Spontanirty or

1iist!iict. 14 -

-

-

l3McGittert, YES, p. 4; Ellerson, Works, Vol. II, p. 308.
14Eaeraont Works, Vol. II, p. 64.

Italics mine.
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Bature in General Sugsestipg this Notion of God
The second passage takes as its departure observations of
natural events surrounding man which suggest the presence of God
within all nature.
The sovereignty of this nature whereof we speak [God]
is made known by its independency of those limitations
which circumscribe us on every hand. The soul [God]
circumscribes all things. As I have said, it contradicts all exper11nce. In like manner it abolishes
space and time. '
Once again in describing what he means by God, he alludes to an

unlimited principle--1.e., one which abolishes the limitations
0£

existing under the conditions of time and space.
Be is not suggesting that the meaning of the word 'God' in-

volves transcending reality, that it requires us to abolish 'tille
and space' in every use or the term.
'God' patently meaningless.

That would make the word

He has in mind instead to distin-

guish his view from the standard philosophical notion of 'time
and space• shared by Locke, Huae, Kant.

!'his standard usage im-

plied first, that all objects in time and space change, and
second, that each change is entirely explicable by its sensibly
observable causal antecedents.

To

conceive of being this W&.'¥

under the conditions of time and space suggested a world in which
given the knowledge

or

all causal antecedents

or

all events,

every event would be determined and entirely predictable.

15nli•t Vol. II, P• 272.
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Emerson refused to accept this view.
How easily, if fate would suffer it, we might keep forever these beautiful limits, and adjust ourselves, once
tor all, to the perfect calculation or the kingdom of
cause and effect. In the street and newspapers, life
looks so plain a business that manly resolution and adherence to the multiplication table through all weather
will ensure success.16
"Perfect calculation" and "adherence to the multiplication table"
connote the level of operation directed by Understanding, in
which experience is subjected to mathematical generalizations.
He here

re~eets

what he regards as the approach typical ot the

scientist of his day, and insists reality includes far more than
sense-observations reveai. 1 7
Only Reason or Spirit, not Understanding, contacts reality
directly.

"But ah! presentl7 comes a day, or is it only a half-

hour, ••• whieh discomforts the conclusions ot nations and of
7ears."

These rare moments transport a person to another way ot

seeing the world, through the eye of Reason.

'l'he usefulness

or

Understanding depends on Reason, which is to Understanding as
power is to torm.
exercises of power.

Understanding abstracts torm from concrete
When power assumes a new function new torms

16Ibid., Vol. III, P• 6?.
17In remarking that the sensist operates on a "journalistleve1 • of experience, :&Berson is not unlike Kierkegaard, who
stormed mightily against the journalist-e7e description ot reality. But Emerson ditfere from Kierkegaard in that Emerson still
finds a somewhat kindly place tor that level. "Calculation of
the kingdom of known cause and etfeot" gu.ages the level of Understanding, which !llerson accepts as an important though derivative
grasp of the world.
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arise.

Hence Understanding, to retain proximate contact with

reality must draw oft new form.a, since man now faces a whole new
situation.

Old forms cannot be successfully imposed.

~o

immor-

talize old schemes dooms one to sheer formalism, to living in the
past.
Power keeps quite another road than the turnpikes of
choice and will; na.mely the subterranean and invisible
tunnels and channels of life •••• Life is a series of
surprises, and would not be worth taking and keeping
if it were not. God delights to isolate us eyery day,
and to hide us from the past and the future.18
Instead we are commanded to

!!!!. !!2!• Living involves trulJ

new lines of behavior, new in the sense that they are not entirely predictable from their causal antecedents.

Soae further

source accounts tor the novel aspects of the action.
!he ardors of piet,' agree at last with the coldest

soeptioism--that nothing is ot us or our works--that
all is ot God •••• I would gladly be moral and keep due
metes and bounds which I dsarly love, and allow the
most to the will of man; but I have set my heart on
honesty in this chapter and I can see nothing at last,
in success or failure, than more or less of vital force
supplied from the Eterna1.l 9

Man plans, works long and hard to make tor himself a better da7,
and indeed does achieve improvements.

But still "the results of

life are uncalculated and uncalculable •••• !he individual is always mistaken.

It turns out somewhat new and very unlike what

he promised himself." 20

18Ibid., Vol. III,
P•
l9Ibid., p. 69.
20Ibid.,

PP• 69-70.

67.
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When, therefore, Emerson declares that God is known as what
abolishes the limitations of time and space, he does not intend
to reserve the use of the word 'God' to what is entirely removed
from the world.

Of the two ways of looking at the world, Under-

standing grasps it as though all events were entirely explicable
in terms or their causal antecedents; Reason, however, recognizes
that events point to a source other than those open to "the perfect calculation ot the kingdom of known cause and effect."
After its own law and not by that of arithmetic is the
rate of its progression to be computed. !he soul's
advances are not made by gradation, such as can be
represented by motion in a straight line, but rather
by ascension o~ state such as can be represented by
metamorphosis. 1
Abolition of space and time means that the traditional philosophical conception of space and time must be set aside in order tc
speak meaningtull7 about God.

God is what reason discovers to

account for what Understanding cannot in the Rresent, viz.,
novelty, lite, being.
The feeling of the presence of God does not imply removal
trom lived experience.

Quite the contrary:

The sense or being which in calm hourse arises, we
know not how, in the soul, is not diverse from things,
from space, trom light, from time, from man, but one
with them and proceeds obviously from the ~ame source
whence their lite and being also proceed. 2
Indeed man's substitution of what he devises in Understanding by
abstraction for what he first found to be real by liVitJ:g explain.a:
21

~ •• Vol. II, p. 274.

22 Ibid., P• 64 •
...............

rr. ·I - - - - - - - - ,
13?

r

bOW

he originally tell into a confusion about his unity with the
of reality.

"Ye f'irst share the 11!13 by which things exist

d afterwards see them as appearances, and forget that we have
eause.*'

Emerson considers God to be the primal source or creativity.
is said and done, since reality constantly ascends
it is impossible to reach any lasting comprehension of

appropriate name tor God.

Natural events around us,

ur own feelings, attirm God's presence in concrete activities.
t this aouree

ot creativity outstrips every formulation ot it
grants us.

It forever outstrips what it has

it has revealed to us ot itself in transforming
daily acts ot living.

Yor this reason Eaerson also calls
power "the Unattainable, the flying Pertect." 2 3

!his primal source takes many other names too. In tour
ges of "Ex:perience" 24 alone he lists 'Chance,• 'First Oause,•

•rortune,• 'Minerva,• 'Kuse,• 'Holy Ghost,• 'unbounded substance.•
t because the source is boundlessly creative every term falls

of designating only some facet, some particudivine.
, I

!'he over-Soul
'What of the term •over-Soul'?
23 Ibid., p. 301.

-

24Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 70-?4.

Popular memory ot Emrson

,,....__~·----------------------------------------------~l,~8~
•ight suggest this as his chiet designation tor the divine.

Cur-

iously he almost never used the term though he did so entitle an
i,aportant essa7.

ma,- inter that •over-Soul' was considered
just one ot man,. terms applicable to the divine. 2 5 Regardless
Ye

o! its intrequent usage, however, it is a singularly appropriate

term for the divine within his over-all ontological tramework.
It underscores what is primary in nature--namel7, vitality or

creativity.
All the terms used in the essay "Experience" to designate
<Jod serve as feeble attempts to verbalize the unbounded source

ot creativity.
ing, being.

This source is also the source or living, evolv-

Indeed, •1n our more correct writing we give to this

generalization (vast tlowing TigorJ the name Being, and thereby
confess that we have arrived as tar as we can go.• 26

Since the

source of being or ot living is the soul, the supreme source ot
both may be called the Over-Soul.
grow is to ascend, to

~·

Be~ond

It supplies growth.

But to

the entirely determinate series

ot events which Understanding supposes and which grounds the
aoral beliet in compensation {that every loss is a gain and vice

rt"ersa) runs a deeper .tact, Tis.,

!h!.

soul itself.

~e soul is not a compensation, but a lite.
!J!he soul
is ••••• Essence, or God, is not a relation or a part,
lnit the whole. Being is the vast attiraation, excluding negation, sell-balanced, and swallowing up all

2 5aobert Detweiler, "!he Over-Rated •over-Soul'•" American
Literature, XllVI (March, 1964), PP• 65, .!i .!li•
26

Eraerson, Work§• Vol. III, P•

?3.
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relations, parts and times within itselr. 27
Being is creative.

Events in the dimensions ot time and space

as Understanding takes them up are not.

But insofar as they are

swallowed up by Being they become alive and new and real.

The

term Over-Soul suggests the pervasive force ot creativity.

'God'

is 'the pervasive primal source of creativity•'
lllnerson's 'Divine Creative Source'
!radltlona! lotion ol G04

ana the

Other properties ascribed to 'God' indicate that lmerson•s
•eaning for the term. does not differ vastly from the common
Judeo-Christian notion of God. 28 For instance he attaches intelligence, will and uniqueness to 'God'.

!hough l!merson found tra-

ditional Christianity deficient as a religion he continued working through its long established theological framework, particularly along the Augustinian lines.

According to Augustinian

thinking, Christ is the divine Word, the repository of all divine
ideals which serve as the patterns tor created beings.

!he

27Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 120-121.
28By the comm.on Judeo-Ohristian notion ot God I have in mind
a description approximating that formulated, e.g., by John Hick:
"God is the unique infinite personal Spirit who has created out
of nothing every-thing other than himself; he is eternal and uncreated; omnipotent and omniscient; and his attitude toward his
human creatures, whom he has made for eventual fellowship with
himself, is one of grace and love." The Eristence of God (New
Yorki The Macmillan Company, 1964), PP: ~-~. Ve fiid corresponding predicates affirmed ot 'God' throughout .Emerson's writings,
with the possible exception of personal immortality implied in
Hick's description. 7or Paerson 'God' is the unique personal
Spirit, etc.
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Jather's utterance of the Word issues into creation, the expression

or

the divine intelligence and will.

world as the spiritual language

or

God.

implied divine will, as the language

or

:Emerson considered the
As created, the world

God it implied divine

intelligence.

:Emerson points to the divine will in the attribution of such terms as "Beauty,• "Virtue," "Love" to 'God•. 29

Divine intelligence is asserted in sueh terms as th9 "Omniscient."
"Supreme Mind,• "Divine Mind," eto.30 Uniqueness is also a property of the maersonian 'God.'

On the negative side, divine

uniqueness meant that 'God' is not identical with the sum total

ot all the workings of persons and things in creation.

Positive-

ly, it meant 'God' is the supreme maker of the world--which is
finite whereas 'God' is not.

"!hat central life is somewhat

:something] superior to Creation, superior to knowledge and

thought, and contains all its circles."

!hus Ellerson predicates

the rather traditional properties of uniqueness, intelligence and
will to 'God.'

"'!he world is not the product of manifold power,

but of one will, of

one mind; and that one mind is everywhere

active."3l
~e

ascription of these three properties to 'God' makes it

also possible to describe 'God' as a perso?, i.e., as that which
29Jor example: "Love ••• is the essence of God." P.mereon,
Yorks, Vol. II, p. 200. Ql• Vol. II, p. 64, ,08; McGittert, ~'
p. 4.
30!Derson, Works, Vol. II, pp. 276-r 280, 288.
3lib1d., Vol. I, p. 123; Vol. II, P• 318 •
272-280.

.Q!• Vol II, pp.
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has intelligence and will ot its own right.

But this conclusion

requires further comment since the way Emerson uses the term.
•personal' would at least semantieall' render his notion of God
impersonal.
In Emerson's use of the term, 'person' signifies the particular man.

Particular men can be regarded exclusively, or as

related to a common divine source.
persons.

nrn youth we are made tor

Childhood and youth see all the world in them.

But the

larger experience of man discovers the identical nature appearine
through them all."

The former way of looking at persons is an

exaggeration, the latter is the truth.

The analysis ot the reli-

gious importance ot Obrist brings this out.

Jesus

"•81'• that God

incarnates himself in man and evermore goes torth anew to take
possession of his world."

!bis is the "doctrine of the soul."

Historical Christianity instead offers "an exaggeration of the
personal, the positive, the ritual.

It had dwelt, in dwells,
with noxious exaggeration about the person ot Jesus."' 2
Signiticantl7 the positive, the ritual, the personal are
called exaggerations, in contrast to the "doctrine ot the soul."
Elsewhere Paerson repeats the contrast, remarking that the spritual principle should be allowed its tull expansion in man "without the admission ot anything unspiritual; that is, an:,.thing positive, dogmatic, persona1.n33

He again is calling the distinc-

32Ibid., Vol. I, PP• 129-131; Vol. II, P• 277.
33Ibid., Vol. I, PP• 335-336.
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tion between Reason and Understanding into play.

Understanding,

the faculty which considers objects in isolation, creates cxaggerations--the positive, the ritual, the dogmatic.

Evidently,

"person," or at least the "exaggeration of the personal," is to
be located within the sphere ot Understanding.

Understanding,

looking on individual me:n merely as individuals, takos each only
as an

end to himself; by contrast Reason, recognizing the relat-

edness ot all individual men to God, surrenders private aims to
the spontaneous direction of the divine will.
persons.

"!'h.e soul knows no

It invites every man to expand to the :f'ull circle of

the universe and will have no preference but those ot spontaneous
love."34 Viewed according to Reason persons are introductions to
God.
Persons themselves acquaint us with the impersonal.
In all conversation between two persons tacit reference is made, as to a third part7, to a common nature. !hat third party ••• is impersonal; is God.35
What is meant b7 the "impersonal"?
ing the properties ot the personal.

Ye learn this by negat-

It is not something consi-

dered in isolation, that much is clear.

Even more, the imper-

sonal involves a non-symmetrical relationship with individual
men.

It is their "common nature," "what invites ever7 man to

expand to the full circle of the universe," rtthe identical nature
appea:-ing through them all."

.&:lerson tells us "the sovereignty

of this nature ••• is made known by its independency

34 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 130.

35Ibid., Vol.
-

II, P• 277•

or

those

-
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limitations which circumscribe us on every hand.
cumscribes all things."36

is

1'he relation

The soul cir-

according to this image

that of the container to the contained.

But more precisely

the soul is the cause of the world, taking possession ot the
-orld by incarnating itself in particular forms.
One mode or the divine teaching is the incarnating of
the spirit in a form--in forms like my own. I live
in society; with persons who answer to thoughts in 1IJ.'1'
own mind •••• I see its presence in them. I am certified of a common nature.37
!thus God is impersonal--he is the one spirit who gives being and
life to

ma~

particular huan forms.

!he term person on the eon-

tra.?7 belongs to these dependent forms, not to the collllBon informing spirit which forever outstrips these torms.38
'!he statement that God is impersonal must be considered in

light ot what we have already noted, i.e., that God is unique,
intelligent, and possessed ot will.

God is not iapersonal in the

sense that a falling rock would be.

He is conscious ot and in-

volved in the evolution of the universe.

God is not impersonal

in that the divine is simply identical with the sum total ot processes, things and relations in the universe.

He is not.

impersonal in that he is the maker ot the world.

He is

He is the com-

mon omni-related source ot being, goodness, 11.te, in the world.
DiVine aims and acts are not private (personal) aims and acts.

36 Ibid., Vol. II, p. 2?2.
37Ibid., Vol. II, p. 276.

38!!?.!2:•t

'fol. II, P• 314.

,,i:
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To be the divine creative source is to be impersonal.

Nonethe-

less, m&erson's description ot God includes properties--intelli-

gence, will, uniqueness-which together correspond to the what is
commonly meant by the term 'person' in the usual Judeo-Oll.ristian
notion of God.
!i
r1'

Suamarz

~
;1:1

I
I
1.

Any natural situation in which a simple man surrenders to
the promptings or nature arouses in him a feeling of religious-

l!''

'!

·.W
:11,1

,11/'
,I

:'1.i

ness toward something regarded as present yet inaeeessible--present in the sense that it etfeots ascension, inaccessible in tha
it is boundlessly creative.

'?b.us the divine or God means the

boundless source or creativity.

Many names are applied to this

source in order to express some tacet of it.

'Orer-soul' is an

especially appropriate term but because this source is boundless
all terms fall short ot describing it.

Moreover Ellerson attaches

a number of predicates to the term 'God' which indicate that he
did not intend his notion of God to differ greatly from the usual
Judeo-Ohristian notion.

Some of these predicates are intelli-

gence, will, uniqueness, love, lite, Creator, Spirit, etc •
.&lerson believed that the notion of the divine arose in
natural situations and that God's reality could be established
the verification procedure which showed God to be the source of
all creative advances which took place in nature.
chapter studies the reasons for these beliefs.

The final

1,11·,

'jl.'
Ir
I

CH.APTER VI

THE ARGUMEBT J'OR GOD'S .EXISTENCE
»aerson appeals to the moral sentiment to establish God's
existence.

Since the moral sentiment affirms the claim that the

boundless source of creativity exists, that source must actually.
This affirmation of the moral sentiment must be accepted because
the opposite position would imply the moral sentiment as such was

.

unreliable,, nature untrustworthy and life absurd.
nas two major stages.

The argument

!he first shows that the moral sentiment

actually claims God exists.

J'ollowing the general lines of the

verification procedure, the claim is established in part by the
orima facie case that the claim arises spontaneously, and in part
by

testing the purported claim. for its fruitfulness.

~ajor

The second

stage mounts support for the credibility of the claim.

In

short, all genuine claims of the moral sentiment are to be believed on the general thesis that nature is reliable and that

nature reveals the moral sentiment as the means tor ascertaining
true beliefs.
Before dealing with these stages two preliminary remarks are
in order.

Jlirst, the force of his argument from the aoral senti-

I, I

•ent is not demonstrative but 'probable( in a sense to be ex-

I ,,
I
,1''

I

11,'

plained.

Seoond, the term. 'aoral sentiment' broadly taken is
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another term tor 'verification procedure.•
Logical Force of the Argy!ent
Emerson's argument is not strictly demonstrative.

He did

ot intend to construct a logically ineluctable proof in which
God's existence is established by strict logical entailment, by
causal inference.

or course he would insist that logic is impor-

tant to the argument.
it a firm. logic.

Every good argument must have implicit in

He would also agree that the notion or cause-

etfect is present in the argument, since it concludes that God,
the causal source or creativity, exists.
But the argument does not turn directly on the logical entailment from given effect to the necessary inference ot its
cause.

Instead !aerson maintained that man finds a strong rela-

tion between his ability to do good and his concrete adherence to
the belief that God exists.

Upon making an option for the real-

ity or God as causal source (and most tully only then) man discovers himself doing things previously beyond his power.

One

ight suggest almost a ratio between man's ability to do good and
the degree or explicitness with which he recognizes God as the
source or this new ability.

Since the moral sentiment declares

to man that God is the source or this power and since man experiences little or no evidence to encourage him to think he himself
is its source, man accepts the testimOIQ" ot the moral sentiment,
or ordinary experience, that God is the source ot this creative
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the credibility ot the moral sentiment.

If Emerson did not intend his argument to follow by logical
or mathematical necessity it is equally clear that he did not
think of its force in terms of logical or mathematical-type probabilities.

He strongly opposed casting intuition regarding

reality into the forms of logic or empirical science, tor that
~ould

falsify the intuition.

conviction that God exists.

Yet he was unshakably firm in his
The kind or likelihood--perhaps even

necessity--he had in mind differed basically from the sort which
gained currency through logic and mathematics.
'!'he standard of likelihood grounding his argument was not
merely the extent to which his position could admit aspects ot
reality lost from speculative sight by other approaches; nor the
degree or success with which his theory rescued a certain dimension or experience from its paradoxical status in other theories.
The standard was what best engendered a healthJ" lite-st7le, where
best was decided by living according to a belief with two consequenees--tull extension ot power of self-realization and reeling

ot full self-satisfaction.
Thus his argument is not demonstrative.

Its merit does not

rest solely on necessary logical entailment, nor on logical or
mathematical probabilities.

Logical and mathematical conceptions

of necessity and probability are foreign to his approach.

!he

force of likelihood and necessity is guaged non-mathematically
by the fullness o! self-realization resulting from commitment to

a given belief.
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Moral Sentiment a Broad Term
tor Vefitlcat!on Procedure
Before considering the argument we must also specify that
{.

the term moral or religious sentiment--just as Reason and intuiti on--i s used broadly to designate his verification procedure.

The test of truth is moral fulfilment.

If acting according to

belief in x results in moral fulfilment x is good and hence real.
Recall the word 'feeling• is used to mean 'sentiment.•

Unlike

Hume's conception of sentiment as something radicated in imagination rather than intellect, Emerson's theory of sentiment unifies
the activity of reason with affective states, so that sentiment
means a direct affective-cognitive relation of a man in a cone
present situation calling tor active response.

If under a speci

fie set of conditions a person feels morally attracted to attain
x, and if acting for attaimaent of x in tact begets the moral
satisfaction anticipated, x must be real.

Bow man reaches this level of insight--that the best satisfaction is a key to deciding what is real and that moral satisfaction is the best--eomes about by means

or

a trial-and-error

procedure directed by insight or intuition at more primitive
levels of development.
conditions.

'!he procedure is governed by a series of

Since intuition and moral sentiment are at bottom

the same, the conditions proper to intuiton are proper also to
moral sentiment, the difference being that at the latter stage
the standard of satisfaction has been established to be moral
rather than biolo ical or utilitarian.
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fhe conditions governing the claims of the moral sentiment
are three.

Yirst, truth comes through intuition only on condi-

tion ot simplicity, total dedication to making the lived experience alone the source tor all attirm.ations or denials about
reality.

This is roughly similar to phenomenological reduction

whereby an individual as he enters into the search tor truth, intends to exclude all preoccupations, preconceptions, and partialities toward one or another view about self or the object of consciousness.

Emerson regards this an absolute precondition tor

moral sentiment.

Secondly x or y arises as that which claims to

be most fulfilling of man's real selt-illage.

X or y arise spon-

taneously but only a.t'ter much struggle tor simplicity.
arise spontaneously but not always without prior ettort.
beyond becoming aware of the claims of the

ob~ect

!hey
JinallJ

a man must tesi

its claims in practice in order to distinguish whether the objec1
truly issues from intuition or whether it is bred from self-delusion.

Emerson's dealings with the Transcendentalists with regarCl

to their conflicting intuitions seems to have impressed upon him
that insights required .further justification than simply their
arising in the mind of an honest man.
must be tested practically.

Their practical claims

He holds that when all conditions

are present, the moral sentiment indeed reveals God as the supreme object tor moral commitment.
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That the Moral Sentiment Claims
Q§d as !ts Supreme Objec!

The nucleus of the argument is that since the moral sentiment claims God as the supreme object of moral fulfilment, God
exists.

The first task is to show the moral sentiment genuinely

claims God as its supreme object.
has two steps.

Establishing its genuineness

'fhe first studies the various objects which the

moral sentiment claims as proper objects.
love, are examples ot these objects.

Materialities, frifllds

The purpose is to show tha

all such objects while proper tor moral commitment are not supreme objects, and that commitment to them eventually leads to
the spontaneous belief in God as the supreme object.

The other

step fortifies the pri:ma tacie credibility of the spontaneous
belief by testing the belief for its fruitfulness.
The argument begins with a study of four sorts of objects
which offer fulfilment--materialities, timeless laws ot the mind
persons, virtues.

Emerson was particularly interested to know

why they called forth a total religious and moral commitment whe
in every case they eventually failed to give full satisfaction.
He also wondered wh3" upon disenchantment, pursuit began anew.
He examined the various aspects of this phenomenon to learn whether the sentiment attached to the various concrete objects indi
cated a pattern revealing any fundamental inclinations in the
sentiment itself.

As we shall see, Emerson decided that these

objects draw our religious commitment because they dimly suggest

i

1:1

~--------------------------,
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friends, honors, etc. breed eventual discontent with them and a
renewed search because they are not themselves the highest objec

tor bum.an happiness.
Stud.z ot Objects and the Feeling ot Religiousness

11

All sorts ot objects propose themselves to man as the su-

11111

,I

preme object tor moral striving.

Because they promise the high-

est fulfilment man totally dedicates himself to their pursuit.
Peculiarly, regardless ot the object selected, he feels in his
dedication a sense

or

religious submission.

Focusing on this feeling ot religiousness, Emerson notes
that certain insights, those that discover central principles
governing reality, are attended by the emotion

or

the sublime.

By the emotion ot the sublime he meant the feeling of delight an
satisfaction which arises in those moments when we stand in awe
before the principles we have discovered.

At such moments we

are impelled to regard our discovery with obedience engendered
by the awe, and with a certain enthusiasm begotten by the del:Sgb.t.

Quietist rapture, Oalvinist reTival, ftethodist
instances ot this enthusiasm.

e:xperiene~,

are

It can range in intensity from

"the taint glow of virtuous emotions, to its rarest appearance,
prophetic inspiration."

or this religious enorder or activity far su-

!he direct result

thusiasm is to place the person in an

perior in quality and effectiveness to what he could rightly expect on the basis of his own given capabilities.
tant to bear this in mind.

Insi hts

It is impor-

or "Revelations" as he

11
I

~------------------~~
--
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calls them, do not issue forth so much into words but into actiyities.
11an

Revelation is not fortunetelling but a force inclining

to truly!!.!! in the present. 1

111

!1

.,1

i)

Emerson calls this feeling of awe and delight "religious"
because its features are the same claimed for religion b7 sincere
worshippers, !1!.•t reverence and submission.

The word 'awe' in

contemporary usage most often signifies having reverence for some
thing other than and superior to the one having the feeling.

!he

object of awe is usually taken to be endowed with great authoritJ
and power over the one feeling it.

!he implication of reverence

and submission is not lost in Emerson's use of 'awe•.

One clear

textual basis for this conclusion rests on a passage in the
•Divinity School Address," where in describing the religious sentiment he substitutes "reverence and delight" tor "awe and delight."

!he element of submission is shown in that upon coming
into the religious sentiment man feels a desire to obey. 2
])aerson feels quite free to identify the religious sentiment
with the moral sentiment.

The principles discovered which cause

the religious feelings carry with them moral commands; conversel3

the commands which give rise to the moral sentiment excite religious feelings.

!he moral sentiment is an insight into princi-

ples which turn out to be divine laws.

The sentiment these laws

«rouse is one ot reverence and delight.

Olose study shows that

1 JWerson, Yorks, Vol. II, pp. 281-285, 290-293.
2Ibid., Vol. I, P• 121; Vol. II, PP• 281, ,!1 !9.S•; PP• 290,

.tt ~-=--

·''1I··
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these laws express the "sublime creed that the world is not the
product of manifold powers but of' one will, of one mind; and that
one mind is everywhere active;" that all evil is so much non-entity, whereas benevolence, or the good, is alone absolute and
real; that so much benevolence a man has so much lite has he.
!fhe perfection of the la.ws

or

the soul tell us that man is real

or living insofar as he partakes

or

this power to do good; and

that the results of this power far outstrip man's personal capabilities.

"The perception of this law of laws awakens in the

mind a sentiment which we call the religious sentiment, and which
•akes our highest happiness.

Wonderful is its power to charm and

icommand."3
The various objects to which man reels religious commitment
eventually fail him.
~eveals

Study of these objects and their failures

that they serve to direct man to the eventual recognition

of the primal source

or

creativity as the supreme moral object.

!he Material and the Mental as Objects

Materialities--man•s physical surroundings in whole or

part-~

•re the most evident sort of things which promise self-fulfilment

on condition

or

total dedication to their pursuit.

In time, how-

ever, man comes to realize that in tact materiality exists to
serve him, not the other way around.
tall short as moral objects.

Materialities then will

As Emerson says of our enchantment

3ng., Vol. I, P• 125; PP• 122-125.

J.7'f"
1

1th scenes of nature, of the rainbow, stars, shadows in the

1

till waters, if we hunt them out too eagerly their unreality

eks us.

10

Once we realize that all our rapture turns upon no-

•hing more significant than an accumulation of globes or water,
pecks of dust, light and our given physical perspective we react
,,ith embarrassment and disappointment.

We then seek elsewhere

"or the true object or our craving, an object worthy ot our dedi~ ation. 4
Man may teel he has found it in the recognition that envirserves him, or more precisely that it obeys his mind

~nment

~ccording

to timeless laws.

Even the most primitive level or

,his revelation, when man first merely suspects he is different
~rom

what he observes, stimulates the moral or religious senti-

lent.

(ThereJ arises a pleasure mixed with awe; I may say a low

egree of the sublime is telt."5

Insight into this principle in-

eed renews the moral sentiment.

But the tendency to tix upon
i I

,he mind as the object tor moral commitment runs off too easily
nto adulation tor some changeless, absolute ideal wherein both
~he

process and materiality of our given existence get lost.

l:merson believes that formal institutional Christianity and phil>sophieal realism exeapli.ty this extreme.
~o

He rejects the appeal

this dedication to the intellect basically because the enthufollowing upon it is sterile--it does not incite and demand

~iasm

I
I

4

~.,

Vol. I, PP• 19, 49; .£!., Vol. III, PP• 192-193.

5Ibid., Vol. I, P• 51.

-
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a better quality of human behavior in daily living.
other Persons and Virtues as Objects
Short of carrying to the extreme of idealism the realization that matter serTes man 9 an individual may as readily settle
upon the belief that the object of the moral sentiment is anothe
mind, another person with whom he must relate,

•8.7•

friendship and loyalty, or by honoring that person.

in love, or
Emerson

takes each of these possibilities under consideration.
Love, and the admiring loyalty we call friendship, address
themselves to a person on whom we wish to bestow all our affection and attention.
individual.

We are interested at first in some specific

But not only do lovers and friends pass away leav-

ing us with a void, continued acquaintance with them when they
are with us eventually conveys to us that their power to grow,
to do the better thing, has limits.
the goodness we saw in them.

What we desired in them was

!he discovery that they can only

do so much good before they get trapped in the circles or their
own routine instigates the return of uneasiness.

Ye conclude

that the true object of our desire was not the person but the
ideal of goodness or creativity we at !irst thought resided
unbounded in the person.

It is a common enough experience that

sooner or later we move on to higher objects--some ideals we saw
in the person--in hopes to find there the !ulfilment we sought
in our attachment to the person.
limited ideals

some virtues

Ye now set as our goal certain

tor instance •

But the same

r
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easiness carries man even beyond commitment to these limited
ideals.
A pattern begins to emerge.

Whether the object

or

the love

is concrete or ideal the passion is the same--a teeling tor tota
devotion and selt-saeritice tor the

ob~ect

and a desire tor a

sort of goodness that seems invariably to escape man's grasp.
Priendship discloses that "man wants to feel himselt backed by a
superior nature," and that "the mind was made with this intent-to go outside itself and apply its attections to some other
eing."6

!his "other being" will turn out to be a superior bei

eserving ot man's obedience.
friendship satisfy.

No finite

ob~ects

ot love or

!bey do not measure up to what we thought

the moral sentiment claimed they would achieve tor us upon our
otal commitment to them--the happiness ot full self-possession.
Honor has an advantage over love and friendship as a means
o leading us to the true moral object.

In honoring a person,

he sentiment is never prof tered to the person as such but to a
quality in that person.

We pay honor to a "delicate sense ot

ight which, when sealed in a noble breast, quick and correct in
judgments," is trul7 a rit representative of those central
d divine principles that evoke the religious sentiment.
aw earlier divine principles are creative principles.
reative judgment is meant here.

As we

Hence

Yet just as love and triend-

hip, which have limited objects before them, honor too fails.
6iaicGiftert,

!!§, pp. 153-154.
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l man may be honorable only in some respects.

He may have total

aedication to certain ideals yet with regard to other ideals he
•aY be quite immoral.

In short a hero's ability to make creative

judgments turns out to be limited.

But that, the ideal of bound-

less creative judgment, is what we intended to honor.?
Whether the object is material or ideal the result is always
disappointment--invariably for the same reason.

The object tails

to give man sufficient measure ot freedom and creative power.
The destiny ot material things depends on man's mind, not vice
~ersa.

Dedication to the products of intelligence, timeless

laws, also inhibit creative development.

Love, pursuit of vir-

tues in general, also disappoint because they too fail to deli~er

those endless possibilities of .further creativity which first

~ttachment

to them suggested.

Yet throughout, the religious

sentiment directed commitment to them for their promise ot boundless creative dominion.
Analysis ot the Religious Sentiment Itself
At this point Emerson•s focus shifts.

He proposes that tor

analysis, the sentiment which these objects roused is more
ieserving of attention than the objects themselves. 8 Perhaps
~is

~he

sentiment itself indicates the highest moral object.
Turning attention directly upon this "impulse to believe,"

7Ibid.,

155·
8 Ibid., PP• 157-158; l!merson, Yorks, Vol. II, pp. 45, 171 •
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tbiS "strong instinct to worship," he remarks that man has an

overwhelming inclination to magnify certain things to the point
of idolizing them.

We glorify natural spectacles; we exaggerate

the qualities of a good friend beyond fact; a great man we claim

ia very great, even literally the very best sort ot man.

The

reason for this exaggerating is not adulation or vanity.

Ve

really wish to oonvinoe ourselves that the object
is truly the highest and most perfect.

or

our regard

Ot course such overstate-

ments are faults; yet beyond what we apprehend in the qualities

we praise, lurks something true which, if explored, will bare the
true object of the moral sentiment.9
the superlatives

s~ggests

The tendency to magnify

that the object proper to the moral

sentiment is something other than man, superior to hill, the
highest good, the most graceful, becoming or beautiful.

That is

what man believes he is attaching himself to in friendship or in
honoring a hero.

I

1.

It would seem as if the soul had been made to go outside
of itself, to apply itself in all its length and breadth
to something else--that is, to God. Therefore we approve
when it goes out or itself and does thus devote itself
to true friendship or to Science--we approve for we compare this action with selfishness. But when the idea
of God is suggested we feel these are but halt, that the
act is true but the object is untrue.10
Two points stand out in this passage.

First, selfless dedica-

tion implies that the soul was made for something other than itself.

Secondly, upon placing the idea of God before the soul,

-

9JMN, Vol. III, P• 166.
lOibid.

'
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it realizes that the true object for its self-sacrifice is God,
the boundless source of craativity.

In other words, the soul

moves away f'rom dependent ..:>bjects with whose possession it feels
restless; it moves toward that source upon which earlier objects

depend--the source with which, upon discovery, the soul both
reels satisfied and which it concludes was the truly intended
object for• its dedication all along.

The human soul has a propensity to refer all its higher
feelings, all its veneration for virtue and ~eatness
to something wherein this attribute (or power) is supposed to reside. Cause and effect is another name for
this sentiment. T.t is felt by all.11
The object for moral commitment, therefore, is God, which we

have seen means the botmdless source of creativit7.

II;
'111'1

!;I
1·11

Ris belief that the nature ot the primal source is bound-

11;
1

111

less, grows out of his reflection on the human tendency to magnify the worth or the object of dedication,

X!.!•• that what we

are doing in effect is attempting to create objects adequate to
our desires.

The moral aen.timent prevents the man from settling

11
II"
l,1
ilj
l,11

l
I'

I

into a final belief that objects which do not promote ever .turther ascension can really serve this purpose.
r~lax

its

Ae~roh

It refuses to

tor an object matching what we believed were in

such objects to discover, i.e., boundless creative power.

The

reason man decides the boundless or infinite is the proper object

or

the moral sentiment does not rest on analysis but aimpl7

upon the tact that when he coaes to the awareness of the
11 JMlf, Vol. I, p.

Vol. IIl";"""'pp. 228-229.

?6;

.!!•

Emerson, Yorks, Vol. II, p. 169;

1 1
1

1

11

ij
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infinite, he feels that is the supreme object of moral satisfac!o keep the logic ot the argument clear it is worth

tion.

stressing that though the moral sentiment points to God as the
boundless source of creativity, the argument is not intended as
causal.

!he belie! in the boundless source of creativity arises

as a spontaneous claim.

fhe weight of the logic is what arises

in such a way is to be believed, not the analytic inference trom
effect to cause.
Retormulation ot the Analysis

To restate the first phase of :Emerson's study, we have
round that man feels he must do what is best for him, i.e., he
ought to do what is good.

The moral sentiment, the developed

form of intuition, discloses that the good means the creative,
that which improves the quality of lite.

Other equivalents tor

the good are the natural, the gracetul, the beautiful, the real.
Han may believe he has found the good in love or friendship, for
example.

But invariably there arises a feeling ot dissatisfac-

tion with the object of love and friendship.

Discontent grows

out ot the eventual Blld gradual recognition ot the limits ot the
object.

Goodness is creative; the creative does not involve

repetition ot the same kinds ot act.

Inti.mate acquaintance with

one's beloved discloses that what seemed genuine goodness or
creativity in the person was not.

The acts ot the beloved may

follow each other in an ascending plane.

ot creativity).

(Hence some semblance

But sooner or later we find that the acts are
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parts of a wide circle ot acts which repeats itself, ever

the same, over and over again.

Repetition is not creativit7.

Pathoaing the limits ot the object ia disillusioning.

I1an

recognizes that be has mistakenly committed himself to a partial
reflection ot the good rather than to the source

or

the good.

!'be moral sentiment suggests that it is with the source that man
must concern himselt.

While as a matter ot tact a person in

turn places his homage at the teet

or

many objects that are

sources ot the creative--nature teaches ua slowly, each step ot
the revelation preparing us tor the next--none ot these relieve

the iapulse to resume the search tor too long a time.

At this

point man ma7 come to recognize the unlimited source of good as
the true object ot the moral sentiment. 12

A person needs a span of tiae to arrive at this conclusion-·
not so much to s7stematicall7 eliminate finite goods class by
class, since tJ'picall7 men do not operate that wa7. but more to
note and study the

~

facto pecul1ar1t7 of the natural operation

ot the moral sentiment.

!hat peculiarity is the refusal of the

moral sentiment to rest secure with finite objects ot any number
ot various kinds.

An individual wonders why he feels restless

with finite sources.
serves a pattern.

Stuqing the span or his experience, he ob-

When man moves froa object to object in hia

quest tor the good, in all cases he seeks a pul"er form ot creati'9'1.t7.

Perhaps then he is destined for creativi.117 in itself--the
12Jmf, Vol. I, P• 76.

-

l

absolute good.

Even when a person commits himself to very limi-

ted concrete objects, such as a friend or beloved, the exaggeration of the good in the object

or

commitment reflects his inten-

tion to commit himself to the infinite good or creativity in itself.

~e

human heart impatient with finite things, "loves to

lose itself in the contemplation of the vast and unbounded,"
source for all the good in human action. 1 3 Upon coming to the
suggestion that the absolute good, the absolute source of creativity, should be sought in all things the sentiment of moral
approbation stirs again.

Now, as &Berson says, man feels God is

the proper object for moral dedication; that in all previous
searches the activity was appropriate but the objects sought
were not sufficient.
fhe previous levels of the struggle !or lasting fulfilment
suggest that beatitude comes to man when he exercises fully his
illimitable creative "realizing" power.

At this point man feels

that only belief in God as the boundless source of creativity
opens him to the fullness of this power.

!his source is the

supreme object of the moral sentiment becauBe upon coming to tha1
suggestion the moral sentiment !eels that such is so.
!est of the Claim tor its !Pruition
Yet the credibility of the assertion has not been finalized,
A !rranscendentalist might urge that whatever the upright simple

l3PlcGif!ert,

I!§, PP• 152, 151 (1831).

.!
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man feels (intuits) as true, is true.
reliance on feeling was too facile.
be

li~ited

Jor Emerson this sort of
Simplicity demanded trust

to those cases in which the worth of an ideal had

tested in practice.

bee~

Only when he lived according to the ideal

which indeed simplicit7 and integrity placed before him and, in
so

living, came to feel that the ideal achieved what it promised,

could a man claim thP; object was true.
an

The pragmatic test was

important hedge against self-deception.

has yet to be tested in practice.

Th.us

J
11l

\I

Ii!

belief in God

!hat is thP, final condition.

When the moral sentiment presents x object for moral commitment it does so with the claim that acting to attain x will make
man most happy.

~erson

considers human self-fulfilment to be

that happiness.

!hus the claims of the moral senti.llent are such

that x will be most self-fulfilling.
fulfilment is some self-image of man.

The standard for selt!hat image the process of

intuition determines and clarities by the following procedure.
First the self-image reveals itself as a given desire or feeling
for the attaining of x object.

Second, the validity of the

image is tested to discover if indeed acting to attain x gives

man the feeling that x or objects
image.

or

x-sort satisf7 the selt-

Limited satisfaction with achieving x indicates some-

thing in the initial feeling which demands further clarification.
Next, y spontaneously offers itself.

Activity prepares for more
1',

thought.

This procedure is repeated again and again until ideal-

ly full satisfaction and full insight are reached.

Ettects

Rf Belief'

in God

Emerson is cle.a.r about the self'-tul.filling etf'eets commitment to God will have.

Reliance on God frees man to be himself--

he will be most natural, uninhibited, most capable of being good
and therefore of' effecting good in his environment.

He will have

the power to effect ascension, evolution, in the processes of
his surroundings.

Possessod of belief in God man will experi-

ence power :for. good on levels of activity previously quite beyond his reach.

He will feel self-determined and satisfied.

Descriptions of the effects following commitment to belief
in God abound in Emerscn's works.

rapture for pages.

'l.'hey often run on in tones ot

Thus, in 1832, he writes this response to

the sceptical charge that we have no certain grounds tor belief
in virtue or reality:
!his is a true account of our instinctive taitb. Why
do I believe in a perfect system or compensations, that
exact justice is done? Certainly not upon a narrow
experience or a score or a hundred instances. ~or I
boldly affirm and believe the universality or the law.
But simply that it is better in the view or the mind
than any other way, therefore must be the 4ruer W8.1'•
Whatever is better must be the truer wa:r. 1

!en years later, when he had matured and modified his thought
he remarks, " ••• the general impression which a doctrine makes on
us, I think is the test of its truth.

It it frees and enlarges-·

if it helps me, then 1 t is true; and not otherwise. "

But perhap1

the shortest is the most poignant statement: "This CreligiousJ

14JMN, Vol. III, p. 317.

j!
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sentiment is divine and deifying. It is the beatitude of man.
It makes him illimitable.• 1 5 Belief in God places man in the
condition of his highest happiness; superior results prove the
reality ot the object o! this belief.

And in the "Over-Soul"

he relates that the divine presence affirms itself in us as
"the doubling of the heart itself, nay, the infinite enlargement
of the heart with a power of growth to a new infinity on every
side.• 16 Two implications of this quotation should be underscored.

Jirst, the choice of the word "heart" directs our atten·

tion to the figurative locus tor the religious sentiment.

The

sentiment, not the logic of argument, establishes the reality of
God.

Secondly the expression "doubling ot the heart" and its

intensified form "infinite enlargement of the heart with a power

ot growth" points out the unique effect which follows belief in
God.

By himself man must remain in the chains

sity ot time and space.

ot cosmic neces-

Believing in God liberates him.

He be-

comes a creator, he can make new things happen. He actively
participates in the evolution or nature. 1 7 !hat is what "a poweJ
of growth to a new infinity on every side" is intended to convey.

By evolution Ellerson means growth, qualitative ascent.
1 5itusk, Letters, Vol. III, p. ??; Emerson, Yorks, Vol. I,
p. 125.
16Eaerson, Works, Vol. II, pp. 292-293.
l?Ibid., Vol. I, p. 125. "Who can set bounds to the possib1litie"S01 man? Once inhale the upper air, being admitted to
the absolute natures ot justice and truth, and we learn that man
h~s access to the entire mind of the Oreator, is himself the
creator in the finite." Ibid., p. 64.
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!bus, belief in God gives man the power to do good, free
trom outside interf erencfls which would tie him to the level of
entirely determined series of causes and effects.

To do good

means to achieve creative novelty, ascension, being.

Hence the

sort of good act which results from belief in God is creative
novelty.

Acts of ascension, as he refers to them, are those not

entirely determined by their given causal antecedents in sensuou
time and space.

!heir source ultimately is God, who is most

free, i.e., completely self-determined.

Man by abandoning him-

self to nature opens himself to the working of God's creative
will.

Insofar as he surrenders to God's will in nature and acts

spontaneously, according to the directions of the divine will in
nature, man also becomes tree, self-determined.

He finds himsel

performing acts which run contrary to the laws which men ot
Understanding had concluded were ultimate, changless and inv1ola
ble.

He is tree; he is creative.

lastingly self-fulfilled.

And because ot this man feels

Placed in the context ot the argument

tor God's existence the ..............
tact of man's self-determination establi
shes that God exists.
That the Moral Sentiment Claims God Exists
But does the moral sentiment actually claim. that God existe?
Having established that the moral sentiment claims God as its

supreme

ob~ect,

it is essential to the argument to link that

with the further claim that this supreme object exists.
The belief in God as the su reme ob eot of the moral

I

'I
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sentiment includes the claim that God is real.

That such is

Emerson's view is clear, but his reasoning remains rather iaplicit.

Yet his thinking is not too difficult to piece together.

All objects which claim to be proper to the moral sentiment include the claim. ot reality.
purport tactual content.

!hey arise in natural beliefs which

As we have seen, it is basic to his

outlook that the claims of natural beliefs deserve credence.
Since nature is trustworthy it is appropriate to rely on it and
the deliverances of natural beliefs resulting from this reliance.
Be rejects Hume's notion that natural beliefs are merely practical postulates ot no objective import.

Instead for him. a belief

claiming factuality is either true or false.

It is true as it

promotes human living, false as it does not.
Por instance beliefs in the external world or in the presence of order in it arise not just as regulative postulates but
as tactual.

!l.'h.eir claims to reality are credible because

the7

are natural beliefs; the7 are falsifiable according to their
failure to promote human living.

Similarly belief in whatever

object, say x, as proper to the moral sentiment includes the
claim ot reality tor x.
a natural belief.

This belief too is credible it it is

A natural belier satisfies the conditions of

simplicity and spontaneity.

Spontaneity requires the beliet be

tested for its claim--as in this case that x is proper to the
moral sentiment.

Propriety is decided by the extent of selt-

tultilling creative power which results trom acting according to
belief in x.

It x is proper to the moral sentiment, beliet in x
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must be a natural belief.

Hence the concomitant claim that x

is real stands since the claims of natural beliefa are to be

trusted.
Various objects propose themselves in natural beliefs as the
supreme object of moral fulfilment, yet they are later set aside.
This, however, does not militate against trust in natural belief.
What man sets aside is their claim. to supremacy not their propriety.

»nerson reasons that with the exception of God as the

explicit object all other objects of the moral sentiment preserve
their claim to reality solely on the grounds that they are propel
to objects for moral fulfilment.

Though they originally appear

as supreme--proper in that sense--the sense of their 'propriety'
undergoes continuous modification, the most significant of which
is that they are not supreme.
ation in the

wa:y

What is discarded is the exagger-

they were originally taken.

It turns out that

to believe only x or y and not God is fulfilling has too narrow
a scope.
Their disposal as supreme does not necessitate their nullification as proper and hence as real objects.

Only if they

failed to contribute to fulfilment would their propriety and
claim to reality be falsified.

But they contribute to fulfil-

ment in that they lead to the eventual recognition of God as the
supreme object, and in that they continue to be required for the
promotion of highest fulfilment.

Indeed their pursuit is best

advanced only through commitment to belief in the primal source

ot creativity.

Their retained connection with the supreme object

169
'I'

upholds their propriety.

Hypothetically, were belie! in God
1:

somehow to bring about the recognition that concern for matter
in no way promoted moral fulfilment, then matter would have lost
its claim to reality.

But in tact belief in God only turns man

11

11

away from exclusive concern with matter; it actually promotes a
fuller appreciation of its functions.
Belief in God is a natural belief.

As it arises in sponta-

neity it too includes the claim ot supremacy and reality for its
object.

But in order to establish that this claim of reality is

true it is not enough to show that God is a proper object of the
moral sentiment.
supreme object.

It is necessary to establish that God is its
For while the other objects maintain their

propriety and their claim to reality by subsumed connection with
the supreme object, some object--God, as Emerson decides--must
be shown as truly supreme.

Emerson apparently establishes this

by following the general rule that the test of any object is the
power of self-fulfilment resulting from commitment to belief in

,,
!

the object.

Since man finds commitment to belief in God most

ful!ill.ing--no desire to rejoin the search tollowing--God is the
supreme proper object and hence is real.
!he Oredibilit1 ot the Twin Clail'lls
of €ne Horal Sent!ient

To this point the argument has established that the moral
sentiment asserts that God is its supreme object and concomitantly that God exists.

But the second major stage ot the

1ji

l.'/U

argument now presents itself, because a further question remains.
What gives these deliverances of the moral sentiment their cred1·
bility?

~e

answer rests with the earlier study ot the reliabil·

ity of nature and the procedure

vides.

or

verification which nature pro-

!'he moral sentiment is another designation for the veri-

fication procedure.

The claim that God exists must be accepted

as true because whatever the moral sentiment claims, is true.
In turn the general reliability of the moral sentiment rests on
the reliability or nature which gives rise to the verification
procedure.

Belief in the reliability of nature is grounded on

the success with which oomndtment to this belief promotes human
living.
We have seen that Emerson holds that whatever the verification procedure (moral sentiment) declares as true is true.

His

thinking rests on the premise stated early in Nature that "we
must trust the perfection of the creation so rar as to believe
that whatever curiosity the order of things has awakened in us,
the order of things can satisty." 18 As we have established earlier, this belief in the reliability of. nature rests on the
further belief that any other view would make the world chaotic,
which if adhered to practically would make continued human existence impossible.

The assumption that nature is reliable is

supported by the fact man can live.

Since his life and his

world are not chaotic, nature is reliable.
18 Ibid., Vol. I, PP• 3-4.

-

1

1

1
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But as nature impels man to wonder whether he has on hand a
trustworthy means to know what is really true or good tor him,
so nature supplies him
the only means.

wit~1

the moral sentiment as that means--

Were a person able to impugn the reliability

ot the moral sentiment, he at the same time would have shaken
bel1et in the reliability of nature.

At this point the limits

oj

the reliability or the moral sentiment are no longer considered
objections against its reliability but rather explicable ditticul ties about its reliability.
Linking his reasoning to the atfirmation by the moral sentiment that God exists, we discover that the argument is shaped
much like a pyramid of playing cards--if one card falls, the
pyramid collapses.

It we could show that the moral sentiJnent

lacked reliability when it asserted God's existence, we would
also show that the moral sentiment is unreliable in any and all
of its revelations.

The apparatus for verifying its assertions--

the condition of simplicity, the spontaneous arousal of purported intuition, the final pragmatic testing of the alleged intuition--is the same whether in the case of God's existence or any
other instance.

If after using this apparatus in the former

case, the issue were still questionable, then all other cases
should remain open tor doubt, since the procedure tor verifying
them is the same tor both.

Thus disproving the attirmation that

God exists, disproves the reliability ot the moral sentiment
generally.

But to disprove that would also be to undo belief

in the reliability of nature.

And that would be tantamount to
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declaring that the world is chaotic, orderless.

~orieasons

we

have already given :&uerson could not accept this last conclusion,
for that would mean that human living is absurd, which continued
living shows is not the case.

As he says: "Men are all secret

believers in it [the goodness of

nature~ ••

: they believe that thE

best is true ••• or chaos would come." 19
For the same reason, he insists we must accept the testimony of the moral sentiment that God exists.

Ir its testimony

were false we would live in a world of chaos.

Tb.at, however,

would make life an insupportablo curse. Ye find this view expressed as early as 1823. 20 It remained corner-stone of his
philosophy his entire life.

In 1824, he comments at length on

the implications of denying God•s existence.
It is casting man back into a cold and comfortless solitude. You leave him alone in a Universe exposed to the
convulsions or disorder and the wrecks of systems where
man is an atom unable to avert his peril or provide for
hia escape ••• Yhy should he live in this infinite wilderness of suns and stars; he has no securit~ no interest,
no love, in this dire dominion of Chanee?21
Worth stressing in this passage is that he relates the denial ot
God's existence to the consequent denial of order in nature, and
also loss of order to the loss

or

man•s desire to live.

Here it

is not obvious that the reason why the denial of God's existence
imperils :Emerson's belief in the reliability of nature is that

19~·, Vol. III, p. 283.
20JMN, Vol. II, P• 136.

-

21 Ibid., P• 252.
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the denial

or

God's existence places the reliability of the

moral sentiment in doubt; nor is it clear that the crucial test
for the acceptance of the orderliness of nature is whether man
can actualll live better by the one or the other view.

implications emerge later as subsequent texts bear out.

These
We

shall cite two.
In 1836, the year he published Nature, he wrote in his jour·

nal:
(G'lroant us the Ideal ~heory, and the universe is
soTved. Otherwise, the moment a man discovers that
he has aims which his faculties cannot answer, the
world becomes a riddle. Yet Piety restores him to
Health.22
Here belief in the orderliness of nature is said to be threatened precisely when the validity of the moral sentiment is shaken.

The world becomes a riddle, chaotic, if the moral senti-

ment sets before man aims which his faculties cannot accept as
real, let alone reach.

!he ttideal Theory" is that description

and account of nature which the moral sentiment sets before us,

.!!!••

that nature, and man as part of it, evolves because of the

effective presence of the creative spirit, God.
"Yet Piety restores him to Health" cryptically expresses
the doctrine that because the moral sentiment ........
is reliable, (in
all its revelations, the foreJ1ost of which is that God exists)
the world is orderl7 and hence the man who adheres to the promptings of the moral sentiment

22 JMI', Vol. V, P• 125.

CP1etyJ can

aetuall7 live.

!o make

174

this clear we must remember that the words "to live" mean to
develop in self-fulfilment.

Emerson associates living with grow-

ing and both ot these with being.
d.Ying, decaying, non-being.

The opposite associations are

Yollowing these standard analogies

in J!D.erson, haith would belong to the tirst group.

~us

"Piety

restores him to Health" means that on the one hand, he who does
not live according to the moral sentiment but instead by Understanding would make living impossible; on the other hand he who
opts tor the moral sentiment, lives.
!he man ot Understanding might be either a sensist or an
idealist, as Emerson's critique of these two philosophical postures reveals.

Either tradition if adhered to in practice makes

selt-tultilment impossible.

!he empiricist camp is particularly

open to the ·charge of denY'ing the objectivity ot the moral aenti·
ment, and hence of rendering practical living absurd.

Both, how-

ever, separate man or some aspect of him trom nature by declarin@
unreal some one or another aspect
as real.

or

reality which living affirms

Consequently both paralyze man's ability to live and

deprive him ot "Health."

"Piety," i.e., acceptance ot the moral

sentiment especially in its declaration ot God's existence, restores man to "Health."
That is best which gives me to myselt •••• That which
shows God in me, fortifies me. !hat which shows God
out of me, makes me a wart and a wen. There is no
longer a necessary reason tor my being. Already the
long shadows of untimely oblivion creep over me and
I shall decrease forever.23

23 Emerson, Works, Tol. I, p. 132.

"Tb.at which shows God
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Bis argument, therefore, is that since the moral sentiment

·1111.!

,,

claims God tor its supreme object, God exists.

The reality ot

the boundless source ot creativity is part ot the claim.

This

claim must be believed because all genuine claims ot the moral
sentiment a.re true.

The general reliability ot the moral senti-

ment is based on the reliability ot nature.

Nature provides the

moral sentiment as a way ot ascertaining true beliefs.

Nature

is reliable because commitment to that belief successfully promotes the quality ot human living.
Conclusion
Once he has established God's existence his search has
ended.

He could now rest his moral theory on the will ot God,

since God has been shown to exist.

Be has also discovered how

to solve his original puzzlement regarding the command:

~Be

7e

perfect, as your heavenly :father is perfect."· God is most tree,
self-determined.

!he supreme exercise ot God's self-determina-

tion is in his creativity.

Man becomes most like God by becom-

ing tree, by self-determination.

The supreme exercise ot man's

Man grows by develop-

self-determination is in his creativity.
ing nature.

Yet the search cannot end.

for while it may be

settled that man must be self-determined and creative, the paths
creativity will take to perfect him, man cannot know beforehand.
That depends on his day to day experience.
out of me."--a.D7 approach to God's existence not grounded in the
moral sentiment.
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The strength and limits of Emerson's approach to God's exis·
tence stem mostly from his stern refusal to pursue technical analysis any further than the problems in daily experience seemed

I,
'I

to require.

!be merit of his repose is his thorough-going reli-

ance on the evidence of ordinary experience.

Few philosophers

have been so tenacious in attempting to respect everything they
!ind in experience, and only what they find there.

The limits

arise mainly because while he saw the need for technical criticism of the beliefs widely held by the religious, political and
business leaders or the new Republic he could have taken more
seriousl7 a close technical scrutiny ot his own approach.

As-

sured as he was that in each situation nature provides its own
appropriate though implicit structures, he was confident that hiE
own approach was therefore validly (though implicitly) structurec
throughout.

"Whatever any mind doth or saith is after a law,

and this native law remains over it after it has come to reflection or conscious thought."

!he spontaneous principle contains
the logical, "but virtual and latent." 24
Emerson's approach to God•s existence requires closer tech-

nical analysis than he was willing to make--but not because he
was remiss tor refusing to explicate the logical structure of
his approach.

It is not an argument or proof in the demonstra-

24"Ve want in every man a long logic; we cannot pardon the
absence of it, but it must not be spoken. Logic is the procession or proportionate unfolding ot the intuition; but its virtue
is as silent method; the moment it would appear as propositions
and have a separate value, it is worthless." ~·• Vol. II,
pp. 327-329.

I

'I
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tive sense.

Its rorce is not demonstrative logical entailment.

He cannot be criticized technically tor not guaranteeing the
links of his approach by a mathematical-type certitude.

Indeed

the language of mathematical-type necessity and probability is
contrary to his view of ordinary experience.
!he genuine technical ditficulty is that, though he maintained his philosophical beliefs were not merel7 cultural assumptions but were grounded in lived experience, he did not articulate very clearl7 why bis particular views should not be regarded also as merely cultural assumptions.

He believed. that to

impose cultural assumptions on reality was to prescribe rather
than describe, but in places he leaves hillSelf open to that
charge. 2 5
A case in point--his meaning for the term

'God.'

Emerson

claims that the true meaning ot the term 'God'--as intelligent,
unique, possessed of will, etc.--comes to us from the experience
ot liTing, within •natural situations" to be precise. 26 B7 what
assurance was that notion of God anything more than a broadl7
based cultural assumption and not prescriptive?

He also sug-

gests that his conception ot God would bold true tor all future
times.

Flnerson's observation has it that once man relies on

this "divine" he is no longer restless.

But irretormable

25Prescr1ption would, of course, run counter to Emerson's
intention. 0 I.f I speak, I define, I confine, and am less •••• !he
moment we cease to report and attempt to correct and contrive,
it is not truth." ~., PP• 329, 342.
26Hopkins, Spires £!_ Form, P• 124.
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descriptions would appear to be inconsistent with his basic
stance.

!his "finalized" conception of the divine only seems to

turther the charge

or

prescription.

Although ha recognized the

impact of cultural assumptions on lived experience, he never

remarks on the possibility that his conception of the term 'God'
might be such an assumption, and hence might be retormulable at
a later day.
~e

magnitude of the difficulty comes to light when we con-

sider how hard it is to know whether his pragmatic test establishes, is as it seems to be.

This problem attends

~hing

the pragmatic test confirms, but especially God's existence.
~e

conclusion that God exists, rests on the supposition that if

the moral sentillent--ordinary experience--were to mislead in thi•
special instance, ordinary experience would have to be judged
unreliable in 8:tJ:3 instance.

It it were that unreliable then na-

ture itself would not be trustworthy.

But then living would be

impossible, which is contrary to tact.
Still, on the basis of his own perspective, I believe it is
possible--without impugning the reliability of ordinary experience--to project that at some later moment ot development some
other natural source of creativity might be substituted tor what
he understood by •God."

!he issue here is not whether or not

ordina17 experience misleads, but to what extent it might mislead before it must be

re~ected

as unreliable.

Ellerson clearly

acknowledges the limitations in ordinary experience, 8l1d that
these limits tend to distortions.

But the measure of the

1?9
reliability of the moral sentiment is the extent to which commit·
ment to a given thing actually fulfills its promise of a full anc
satisfying ability to live.
On

the one hand, ordinary experience, the moral sentiment,

would be unreliable if it convinced the simple man that x-reliance supplied him with his fullest measure ot freedom and power
when indeed it did not.

But on the other hand, if Emerson were

mistaken that the moral sentiment had made such a declaration,
and if further some other natural source were to supply man with
a still larger degree of freedom and power, then the moral aenti·
ment procedure would not have been unreliable, but Enerson's
estimate of its actual claims.
Bis conception

or

God was intended to rest both on the pre-

vious experiential and experimental setting aside of all aspects
of lived experience except the spiritual as the source of creativity, and also on the wide-spread

belie~

in God within the

community of "7oung Americans."
Both these bases are open to challenge.

The first supposes

unidirectional upward movement toward the spiritual in man's
awareness and indeed in all nature.

Logically, however, and

quite in keeping with his evolutionary view, it is possible to

project a more nearl7 circular progression.

Thus just as at

each previous stage man eventuall7 recognized his dedication to
some object was only partially worthy ot his commitment, so too
man may discover that dedication to the spiritual divinity is a
partially correct but passing phase in man's evolution.

Matter
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(induced chemical stimuli, or embryo reformation, for instance)
~ight agai~

be asserted in place

or

God as giving man a still

fuller measure of creative power consistent with his nature--but
matter now that man has gained a heightened appreciation of its
capacities.

It is possible to suggest this because he has not provided

an account f.or the necessity of the unidirectional progression
of objects of the moral sentiment--from the material to the spir·

itual.

It is also possible because his way of deciding "lasting

and full satisfaction," the standard tor determining the supremacy ot an object, invites it.

Since lasting satisfaction is

decided factually and since J!merson includes no discussion ever

of a timeless norm for what is lasting, there is no way to con-

clude that commitment to x or y or God will provide lasting satisfaction at some later time.

!hus it is possible to claim that

what was earlier thought to be spiritual, personal, or whatever,
was an exaggeration, that instead the source ot creativity is
matter, regarded in a way not previously comprehended.
The second base is also open to challenge, largely because

Emerson's devoted little study of the concept

o~

community.

He

holds that community assent (among the-Young .Americana") has
ontological significance but he does not clearly specify the
limits of community reliability.
say

It would beg the question to

the community is reliable because those who live naturally

are sustained by God.
question at issue.

!he approach to God's existence is the

His reliance on the "young Americans" was
I

1
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rooted in his faith in lived experience, not vice versa.
even the culture

or

ble to distortion.

But

the idealized "young American" would be liaHe would be the last to de117 that.

Nonethe-

less, he never quite specifies the means by which to distinguish

what the community mistakenly objectifies in its culture and
what he supposes community-experience trul7 establishes.

One might want to insist, as the later Allerican pragmatists
would, that the method emplo7ed by the scientific community has

the sort of weight Ellerson vaguely hoped to tind in the
of "7oung Americans."

com.munit~

Reliance on the scientific procedure for

truth might seem in basic opposition to :&aerson•s approach, however~

According to his critique, science restricts itself by

method to generalizations based on measurement.
two problems for a healthy lite-style.

!his represents

First, the scientific

procedure excludes a priori any feature ot lived experience
which cannot be guaged mathematically.

Secondl7, the scientific

procedure considers only those particulars ot value which can be
tit into laws.

Those particulars which are not measurable or

which may be unique to a concrete situation are regarded as
irrelevant.
Indeed the poet or the poet-philosopher2 7 rather than the
scientist personified what Emerson held to be the approach propel
to life.

But this poet was his idealization ot what a poet

27Plato is the prime example of the poet-philosopher: "Plato affirms the coincidence of science and virtue." Ellerson,
Works, Vol. IV, p. 83.

'I,

, I
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should be; the scientist, his typification ot the scientist ot
his day.

file poet kept his "inward and outward senses" in be.l-

a.nee, i.e., he recognized the richness

or

actual experience,

spirit and matter, unity and diversity, stability and change,
the emotive and the intellectual, etc.

The creative man, the

poet realized that the norms tor judging and transforming features in lived experience must come from the experience, and that
these norms would require retoraulation because experience con-

tinually reforms itself.
still under the

SW&.7

a mathematical model.

On the other hand, the scientist,

of the Enlightenment, drew his norms from
He did not yet acknowledge the need to

recast his generalizations in light of future cases.

Nor was he

ereative--repetition was the only pattern in a series he could
recognize.

In short the dimensions ot experience tended to be

drastically narrowed to what his mathematical ideal for inquiry
restricted him--to measurable sense qualities, nothing more.
i'he scientist had lost the delicate balance needed tor full humar.i
living.

Compare the following judgements ot "scientific" and

poetic experience.
I see not, if one be once caught in this trap ot socalled sciences, 8.l17 escape tor the man trom the links
or the chain or physical necessity. Given such an
embryo, such a history must follow. On this platform,
one lives iD a sty or sensualism, and would soon come
to suicide.2'8
~t

of poetic experience, " ••• now 11.7 chains a.re b::... ~ken; ••• and I

shall see and comprehend J8.'1' relations.
28 Ibid., Vol. III, P•

-

54.

That will reconcile me
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~o life, and renovate nature.• 29 !'he poet, not the scientist ot
~he

day, was best suited to husband the New Dien.
Emerson inte.nded neither to reject nor even to diminish the

~ortb

or

a genuinely scientific attitude.

His quarrel was with

the scientific attitude of his d8.7 which drew its norms trom a
mathematical model rather than from lived experience.

In his

mind, were the scientific approach to draw its norms from lived
experience it would be

bal~ced,

vital, human, creative.

In

fact, he worked and hoped tor the time when the scientist and the
poet would both rely on the same basic procedure, the procedure
he attempted to articulate in his "science ot the real."30
I look tor the new Teacher that ••• shall see the identity ot the law of gravitation with purity ot heart;
and shall show that the Ought, the Deity is one thing
with Science, with Beauty, and with Joy.741
Properly understood it might be consistent with J!lnerson•s
thought to accept the suggestion that the ideal coJ111unity for
support o! belief would be that or science, though not the scien•

titic colllDlunity or his day.

He thought the natural way or think-

ing was the genuinely scientific way or thinking.

His community

ot like-minded believers would in this sense be a scientific
comm.unity--though, of course, not necessarily a community ot scientists.

It would be proper to say that for him the conclusion

29 Ibid., p. 12.

-

30Ct. Ibid., pp. 12, 20-21.

--

3libid., Vol. I, P• 151; Vol. III, PP• 12, 20-21. "Por the
experieiie'e""or each new age requires a new confession, and the
world seems always waiting tor its poet." ~·• Vol. III, p. 1(.
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"God exists," rests on the scientific approach to human living,
and that he sought support tor this conclusion from among men
~ho

also shared his scientific approach.
Regardless of the 11.Jllits of his argument for God's existence

his work as a whole anticipated the efforts of later pragmatists
to develop fully a procedure in harmony with both humanism and
science.

Vhether or not his conception of God was entirely

rooted in experience, Emerson himself did not regard his over-all
efforts as finai.3 2 In fact, he was not certain what the final
~esolution

would be.

the first impact

or

In his old age, nearly twenty years after

Darwin's Origin 91. Specie!• Ellerson commented

on the rise in attention to science and the decline

or

interest

in poetry, with the remark that our heightened interest in the
sciences will either beget a new and better poetry, or extinguish
it completely.33

Between the lines runs his completed thought:

The future Eden would be either one of greater lite--ot more
bum.anly meaningful freedom and creativity--or one of mass sui~ide.

32Ibid., Vol. II, P• 369; Vol. III, PP• 14-15, 21 •
...............
33v1111ams, "Unpublished Letters of Enerson," PP• 477-478.
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